War on Terror: Redefining Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy

Introduction: Fear, Rhetoric, and the War on Terror

Although the rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror has subsided somewhat since the Bush administration left office, terrorism itself remains an unfortunate reality around the world. The War on Terror was largely a propaganda machine that perpetuated a cultural climate of fear. As Coaty points out in Understanding the War on Terror, fear-mongering is destructive rhetoric. In the end, too much fear-driven crisis leads to uninformed and ill-devised political strategies.

The responses to terrorism should be complex and multifaceted, taking into account the equally complex and multifaceted nature of terrorism itself. Terrorism has taught an important lesson in global politics and culture: the world is no longer dominated by the modern nation-state. Just as capitalist enterprises around the world have learned how to transcend national boundaries and operate on a global scale, so too have extra-governmental organizations, from terrorist groups to NGOs. In Understanding the War on Terror, Coaty describes the new, increasingly anarchic state of international politics. The War on Terror has evolved from an anachronistic foreign policy toward one that takes into account the diversity and complexity of global affairs. The future of the War on Terror depends on redefining terrorism, preventing it, and developing intelligent and coordinated responses.

Terrorism existed long before September 11, and long before Al Qaeda. As Coaty points out in Chapter 2 of Understanding the War on Terror, early modern and modern history are filled with examples of how terrorism has been used as a political strategy. Even beyond that, the definition of terrorism changes when one considers the way warfare itself has evolved. Prior to the predominance of the modern nation-state as the primary political entity, small-scale attacks, coups, and invasions could all be construed as terrorism.

The Historical Evolution of Terrorism

In the post-modern sense, however, terrorism has come to mean any organized or quasi-organized use of targeted violence with the goal of intimidation. Terrorism attacks civilians — it is not directed at military targets — which angers and baffles most people. Understanding this fact is key to evolving a more sensible definition of terrorism and developing nuanced responses to it. Terrorist organizations are generally trans-national ones without the military power or numbers to engage a foe directly, military to military. Intimidating civilians has the strategic objective of submitting the target and provoking an aggressive response. This leads to significant problems, as the United States learned in its reaction to September 11. The initial September 11 terrorist attack was carefully orchestrated and executed with precision. Yet rather than respond directly with new military strategies, the Bush administration reacted in precisely the ways Al Qaeda had hoped — with military aggression and a policy of fear and antagonism that made America look like the aggressor rather than the victim.

Coaty explains how terrorism has evolved since the days of targeted guerrilla attacks on monarchy figures in Western Europe. Drawing on examples such as Russian revolutionaries and the Nazis, he traces how terrorism evolved during the early modern era through the twentieth century. In early modern Europe, terrorism was viewed as any subversive attack against the established government. It was not about attacking civilians and was therefore far removed from the current definition of terrorism. On the other end of the spectrum is Nazism. Nazism can easily be framed as a state-sponsored terrorist regime, given its express intent to target innocent civilians through a grand scheme of social engineering. However terrible, Nazism does not necessarily fit current or future definitions of terrorism, because the Nazi party was elected by the German people.

Looking at contemporary regimes such as North Korea, one can see how terrorism has continued to evolve. North Korea is, like Nazi Germany, a terrorist-type government. Chapter 5 of Understanding the War on Terror shows how North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria have all sponsored or supported terrorism, though those nations are not terrorist organizations themselves. This fundamental distinction between being a sponsor of terrorism and being a terrorist organization comes down to the role of the nation-state in political affairs and diplomacy.

Nation-States, Sponsors, and Terrorist Organizations

If the nation-state model prevails as a convenient method of structuring international relations, then terrorism must be categorized as an essentially trans-national phenomenon. It may be geographically specific or confined to one nation-state, but terrorist organizations cannot, by definition, be national governments. A national government that sends suicide bombers into another country commits an egregious act that can lead to a formal declaration of war between two parties, supported on both sides by their respective allies. Such a model differs entirely from the War on Terror. In the War on Terror, formal declarations of war cannot be drafted because the aggression does not manifest at the formal, national level. It is not a conflict between two categorically equal entities meeting on a military stage. With a terrorist regime, only one entity is recognized as a "nation" or as a legitimate actor in the political landscape. The other entity might be sponsored by nations and legitimate players — much like an athlete sponsored for a competition — but ultimately that entity fights only for itself and its own objectives.

The September 11 attacks illustrated precisely this asymmetry: a non-state actor inflicted catastrophic damage on the world's most powerful nation-state, exposing the limitations of conventional military and diplomatic frameworks for managing trans-national threats.

Hamas is a special case. While Coaty does not spend much time on Hamas and the politics of Palestine, this issue warrants closer examination. The case of Hamas fuses the interests of a known terrorist group with the interests of what could foreseeably become a formal nation-state. The trouble with Palestine is that its people elected Hamas. Across the Middle East, radical governments have been democratically elected, meaning that terrorist organizations and formal governments are growing closer together in places such as Egypt. The consequences could be devastating.

Conclusion: The Future of the War on Terror

The future of the War on Terror involves a careful look at what has worked in the past and what has failed. Clearly, any effective strategy must take into account the diversity and complexity of terrorism — not all terrorist organizations can be treated equally. The situational variables must be understood before developing a strategic course of action.