WWI Tactics and Weaponry: Technology vs. Obsolete Strategy

Introduction

In many ways, the "War to End All Wars" was fought with a wide range of increasingly modernized weaponry matched with obsolete tactics — a combination that resulted in millions of deaths and casualties on both sides of the conflict. During the period between 1914 and 1918, the full force of early twentieth-century technology was brought to bear on the battlefields of Europe, yet the initial results were insufficient to completely turn the tide of the war. Consequently, the belligerents became increasingly bogged down in trench warfare that demanded ever more destructive weapons. This paper details the techniques and weaponry used throughout World War I, examines how these evolved technologically to change future wars, and explores why so many battlefield stalemates led to a war of attrition and mass casualties.

Weaponry of the First World War

The First World War was fought primarily by the Allied Powers — comprising Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Japan, and ultimately the United States — against the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey (Neiberg 61). Each of these nations entered the war with their own weapons and tactics, but the crucible of combat that followed exposed their inadequacy on the modern battlefield. Erich Maria Remarque, in his classic account of German military life during World War I, vividly describes the horrific nature of the battlefield as well as the weapons and tactics typically used by both sides.

In many cases, the weapons used by World War I infantry would be familiar to the soldiers of World War II and even well into the twenty-first century. Bayonet-equipped rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and knives were standard issue for soldiers of both the Allied and Central Powers. Likewise, flamethrowers, tanks, and fixed-wing aircraft and dirigibles were increasingly deployed as the war dragged on, all with limited effectiveness (Childs 37).

Beyond the official arsenal, front-line soldiers devised their own improvised but highly effective weapons, and some of these were feared more than others. Together with the flamethrower, Remarque reports that German soldiers who carried standard-issue bayonets with saw-blade edges were specially targeted by Allied troops because of the particularly gruesome wounds those weapons inflicted. Prior to a major enemy offensive, German soldiers would be issued extra hand grenades and ammunition, but seasoned veterans took care to "overhaul the bayonets, that is to say the ones that have a saw on the blunt edge. If the fellows over there catch a man with one of those, he's killed at sight" (Remarque 103).

Interestingly, one of the most formidable weapons in trench warfare was not a weapon in the traditional sense at all — it was a sharpened entrenching tool, or spade. Spades were shorter than rifles and easier to maneuver in the tight confines of a trench. Remarque elaborates:

"It is usually the fashion now to charge with bombs and spades only. The sharpened spade is a more handy, many-sided weapon; not only can it be used for jabbing a man under the chin, but it is much better for striking with because of its greater weight, and if one hits between the neck and shoulder it easily cleaves as far down as the chest. The bayonet frequently jams on the thrust and then the man has to kick hard on the other fellow's belly to get it out." (Remarque 103–104)

The use of gas — discussed further below — was an especially gruesome feature of World War I, subsequently banned by international agreement. Yet the use of sharpened spades and hand grenades, primitive as they may seem, represented pragmatic tactics born of the specific demands of trench warfare. Neiberg underscores the scale of the entrenched positions involved: "By late 1914, the western front had bogged down into a stalemate of opposing trench systems that stretched from the English Channel to Switzerland. On the western front alone, the men dug 25,000 miles of zig-zagged trenches, enough to circle the globe if set end-to-end" (61).

The elaborate nature of many of these trenches is well documented; troops had ample time to improve their fortifications because the war dragged on for several more years with little substantive change in the battle lines. Battlefield commanders on both sides were therefore at a loss as to what tactics could break through these defenses, and the trial-and-error that followed was gruesome. As Neiberg notes, "The defensive nature of World War I weapons technology meant that offensive charges against these trenches, so crucial to the pre-war doctrine of all armies, were bound to fail. Nevertheless, commanders continued to order them despite horrific losses" (61).

In response to the human slaughter that ensued from these obsolete tactics, the German military leadership placed increasing priority on developing alternatives suited to trench warfare. According to Samuels, "The German infantry were equipped with weapons best suited to their primary Stosskraft [assault power] function. The use of stun grenades gave them protection over the last few seconds before contact, while their pistols and knives gave them a distinct advantage in a melee against men attempting to wield a cumbersome rifle in a narrow trench" (49).

Despite the rifle's versatility — it could be fired in the conventional way, used as a club, or fitted with a bayonet — the narrow confines of trench warfare generally precluded its effective use by either side. The muddy conditions that frequently prevailed in the trenches also meant that rifles were difficult to keep clean, further limiting their usefulness. Samuels adds: "A rifle is both more difficult to keep free from mud and harder to clean when dirty than is a pistol, which may be kept safely inside a man's tunic, while a grenade is largely unaffected by being dirty. The Germans' equipment was therefore technically better suited to the prevailing conditions than that of the British infantry" (49).

Poison Gas: Development, Use, and Aftermath

One of the most feared weapons of World War I was poison gas — mustard gas and blister agents that were used to devastating but frequently unpredictable effect. At the collective level, poison gas created confusion and pandemonium. Initially, the Allied response to gas warfare mirrored that of their opponents: shock and surprise. The French had experimented with gas grenades in 1914 but were unimpressed by their lackluster performance and discontinued their use (Bundt 82). Moreover, the Hague Convention of 1907, which Germany had signed, prohibited the use of poison or poisonous weapons, and the British military leadership believed the Germans would abide by the agreement (Bundt 82).

In fact, the German leadership itself had remained unconvinced of gas as a viable tool of warfare, and the attack at the Battle of Ypres served primarily as a testing ground to evaluate its effectiveness (Bundt 83). The results surprised everyone: "the gas attack was so devastating and unexpected that it created a gap over 4 miles wide in the Allied lines. When news of the attack reached the Allies, public outrage was pervasive. The Allies had received warnings from German prisoners attesting to the impending attacks, but, incredibly, the Allies chose to ignore them" (Bundt 83).

Allied leadership was either unwilling or unable to grasp the imminent threat, directly contributing to additional casualties as troops were ill-prepared and ill-equipped. When the Allies did respond, they made matters worse. Using largely untested gas-delivery methods that performed poorly under battlefield conditions — and with the wind an ever-present variable — they endangered their own men. At the Battle of Loos, the British released gas from cylinders that blew back into the faces of their own advancing troops (Bundt 83).

The gas masks issued to Allied troops also provided inadequate protection against the range of chemical agents deployed. The immediate improvised solution was "a gauze pad soaked in urine. Within a few days of Ypres, nearly 100,000 troops received these gauze-type masks. The delayed production of adequate equipment, gas masks, and supplies came at the cost of increased casualties and wasted resources from accidents involving hurried training programs" (Bundt 83). The aftermath of Ypres spurred research into further destructive weapons, including flamethrowers and incendiary bombs deliverable by the growing air forces on both sides (Bundt 83).

In response to the inhumane nature of gas warfare, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 specifically banned its use, along with biological warfare, prohibiting "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare" (Geneva Protocol 1925). Nevertheless, some Allied tacticians continued to argue that gas represented a viable weapon, particularly in the latter years of the war when improved gas masks were available. Their reasoning rested on two points:

1. Many chemical agents had only transient effects and disabled rather than killed troops outright, allowing them to be captured and presumably treated humanely; and

2. The chemical agents capable of causing real damage — such as mustard gas — were difficult to control and relatively easy to avoid if troops were equipped with proper masks (Gould 17).

In sum, the unsuccessful argument advanced was that if it is acceptable to kill the enemy with guns, bullets, and flamethrowers, it is equally acceptable to kill them with gas (Gould 17).

Conclusion

The research showed that World War I was fought on land, in the air, and on and below the sea in ways that directly foreshadowed the next world war two decades later. Innovations in military weaponry far outpaced the ability of military strategists to respond with effective countermeasures, leaving both sides mired in the stalemated trenches of the European theatre. It is reasonable to conclude that had tactical nuclear weapons existed, both sides would have used them to gain ground at any cost. Even without that capability, the weapons deployed in World War I — including mustard and blister gas, flamethrowers, machine guns, hand grenades, and sharpened spades — exacted a horrific toll measured in tens of millions of lives lost and tens of millions more injured. In the final analysis, the War to End All Wars only served to refine the weapons that would inflict even greater global destruction in the war that followed.

Works Cited

Bundt, Thomas S. "Gas, Mud and Blood at Ypres: The Painful Lessons of Chemical Warfare." Military Review 84.4 (2004): 81–83.

Childs, David J. A Peripheral Weapon? The Production and Employment of British Tanks in the First World War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.

Geneva Protocol. U.S. Government: Department of State, 8 Feb. 1928.

Gould, Stephen J. "Above All, Do No Harm." Natural History 107.8 (1998): 16–18.

Neiberg, Michael S. Warfare in World History. London: Routledge, 2001.

Remarque, Erich Maria. All Quiet on the Western Front. New York: Ballantine Books, 1982.

Samuels, Martin. Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Seligmann, Matthew S. Spies in Uniform: British Military and Naval Intelligence on the Eve of the First World War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.