Due to the apparently low level of contagion, the need for public awareness is not urgent, but it is still necessary. Warnings to stay away from the convention area and to report to a local hospital if symptoms developed after being in the area or in contact with someone who had been at the convention should be issued (CDC 2009).
The known details of the attack, however, should not be released, as it is likely to create panic and bolster the terrorists' optimism. Federal assistance should be immediately sought, not necessarily for control of the spread of the disease but for the investigation and apprehension of suspects. All available resources should be called in as soon as possible in order to counter the attack. As far as treatment of the attack goes, mass prophylaxis of all convention attendees and those who have come into contact with infected individuals should be mandated, especially if anthrax is identified as the specific agent used (CDC 2009). Thos who refuse antibiotics should be kept under quarantine, by the use of force if necessary, and monitored for the development of symptoms. Human rights codes do not permit for the forced use of medication, especially on non-prisoners, but neither can the public be exposed to a possible infection (CDC 2009).
Finally, those whose lives are lost due to the infection should be held over for full autopsies in an effort to better understand the mechanism of infection and pathology of the disease. Following this, bodies should be cremated in an appropriate facility to ensure that all traces of the agent are eliminated....
Again, human rights and common decency might not allow for this in instances where a will or next of kin stipulates that an autopsy is not to be performed and/or a form of burial other than cremation. Depending on the communicability of the disease, the latter which may or may not be honored; if it is determined that the bodies cannot be properly sterilized or sealed, cremation may be mandated (CDC 2009). Yet the combined efforts of prophylaxis, quarantine, and an immediate clinical response should minimize deaths and infections to a considerable degree.
References
Bravata DM, Sundaram V, McDonald KM, Smith WM, Szeto H, Schleinitz MD, et al. (2004). "Detection and diagnostic decision support systems for bioterrorism response." Emerging infectious diseases. Accessed 25 April 2009. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no1/03-0243.htm
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2009). "Emergency preparedness and response." Accessed 25 April 2009. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2009). "Anthrax." Accessed 25 April 2009. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/
Gerberding JL, Hughes J, Koplan J. (2002). "Bioterrorism preparedness and response." Journal of the American medical association. Accessed 25 April 2009. http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/287/7/898
Snyder J. (2003). Role of the hospital-based microbiology laboratory in preparation for and response to a bioterrorism event." Journal of clinical microbiology. Accessed 25 April 2009. http://jcm.asm.org/cgi/content/full/41/1/1
