Hurricane Katrina - Emergency Management All discussions regarding the Hurricane Katrina need to acknowledge the fact that the primary reason for Katrina having a great impact was task scope and size, rather than human failure. While effective management is capable of modifying disasters, one cannot expect it to eliminate them. Still, it is evident that an increased sense of urgency, enhanced coordination among responder groups, and more efficient management of communication tools and information (intelligence) could have minimized losses brought about by the disaster (Moynihan, 2009).

Nature and extent of the disaster

Hurricane Katrina represented a significant natural calamity that caused human life and material loss. It marked the most devastating of natural catastrophes in the history of the U.S., wrecking no less than ninety thousand square miles of the nation -- an area equal to UK's size. A powerful storm surge destroyed the coastal regions of Mississippi, leaving thousands of citizens homeless and penniless. It flooded the city of New Orleans, claiming over 1500 lives. Several thousands of individuals dwelling in the Gulf Coast regions went without key necessities for nearly 7 days. The anguish that continued up to several weeks following the storm didn't pass soon; rather, it persisted much longer than anticipated owing to governmental failure in aggressive planning, preparation, and response at each level; in some instances, governmental action (or lack thereof) exacerbated the misery. Governmental failure was both obvious and pervasive. The four major factors responsible for failure: 1) long-term words of warning were disregarded and authorities ignored their duty of preparing for a natural disaster for which they were forewarned; 2) governmental authorities made erroneous decisions or took inadequate action in the time just before and subsequent to calamity; 3) a failure occurred in systems which authorities depended on for aiding them in response, and 4) governmental authorities at each level were incapable of providing effective leadership. Furthermore, the above individual failures took place against a background of failure to cultivate the ability for a nationwide, coordinated response to an actual catastrophe, whether man-made or natural, over time ([Senate Report, 2006] U.S. Senate Committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs (Senate Report), 2006).

Response and recovery efforts undertaken by the different levels of government, non-governmental organizations and private sector companies

The customary practice, for long, is that disaster response starts at the lowermost jurisdictional level (i.e., the local level). Local governments enlist state authorities' help when their resources prove, or may prove to be, insufficient. Also, while continuous federal funding is directed towards local and state governments for disaster preparation, it ordinarily gets involved in disaster response when a state requests aid owing to overwhelming (or possible overwhelming) of its own resources. The Emergency Operations Plan of Louisiana clearly outlines this response hierarchy.

Search and Rescue

On account of flooding, hundreds of New Orleans survivors had to go to their rooftops and attics, where they awaited rescue. Some individuals who were stuck in nursing homes and attics ended up drowning as the water level rose to drown them. Others were lucky enough to escape death only by hacking away at roofs and making their way out. Damage to infrastructure made matters worse in search-and-rescue operations in the city and in neighboring areas. In particular, communication infrastructure destruction limited search teams' ability to keep in touch with each other, weakening efficiency and coordination. Additionally, rescue workers had to deal with polluted water, fire, and debris. An extraordinary success story in Hurricane Katrina's response operations is the dedication and skill of Louisiana State's Fisheries and Wildlife Department members, and other individuals toiling in such adverse conditions.

Situational Awareness

Though officials understood the need for initiating search-and-rescue operations even before hurricane winds had completely receded,, other response elements were hampered by their failure to realize the extent and magnitude of the disaster on time. These failures at the level of federal government were more pronounced.

Post-Storm Evacuation

Overwhelmed by the destructive force of Hurricane Katrina, state and city authorities sought the help of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Louisiana State governor, Kathleen Blanco requested Michael Brown, director of FEMA for buses; FEMA responded in the affirmative on the very same day, assuring the citizens of Louisiana that no less than 500 buses, on their way to facilitating evacuation efforts in New Orleans, would reach them in a few hours' time. These claims proved false -- the state of Louisiana continually implored FEMA authorities in the following 48 hours, and it was only two days after the landfall that FEMA ordered buses to be sent by the U.S. transport department -- these buses only started arriving late that evening, and the next day dawned before a significant number had arrived- a clear lack of communication and assessment of the emergency.

Logistics and Military Support

Issues with information procurement, communication, and management...

FEMA was lacking in tools required for tracking shipment status, leading to interference with vital commodities' (i.e., water, food, ice etc.) supply management to affected Gulf Coast dwellers. Another problem was incompatibility of state and federal governments' electronic systems, which were employed for addressing requests for aid; incompatibility implying that requests had to be transferred manually from state to federal systems ([Senate Report, 2006] U.S. Senate Committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs (Senate Report), 2006).
Strength and weaknesses of the response and recovery

Strengths

1. Non-governmental Organizations

An extraordinary number of non-profit and volunteer agencies participated in the relief effort for Hurricane Katrina. Nearly all local, regional, and national- level charitable organizations in America, and several foreign organizations, provided aid to Hurricane Katrina victims.

1. State Governments Support Other Critical Services

The governments of other U.S. states volunteered to offer non-response-linked critical assistance that Mississippi and Louisiana were unable to provide any longer. Public health labs from various states volunteered to support local public health services of the devastated states of Mississippi and Louisiana.

1. Local Officials

Several individuals who responded to perform the toughest of tasks were also individuals who had suffered the greatest losses in the tragedy. Local emergency service teams, police, fire authorities, worked untiringly in spite of suffering in the disaster themselves. Several of them lost valuable possessions like homes and vehicles. Others even lost members of their family, and other loved ones. Despite this, they toiled to serve and protect the community they had committed to serving.

1. Private Sector Organizations

Private sector businesses provided services, goods, funds, volunteers, and expert advice, and assisted with relief efforts. Courier Company FedEx aided in distribution of supplies and equipment, especially for the Red Cross. Corporations like Wal-Mart, Dell, IBM, Pfizer, Home Depot, and Lenovo contributed several million dollars' worth goods and cash for supporting both short-term recovery and relief efforts, and long-term reconstruction of hurricane-hit areas (The White House, 2006).

Weaknesses

1. Record demand for services and actions

1. Decreased capacity of communication and response

1. In Bush's regime, FEMA was rendered extremely weak

1. Local and state capacity issues

Lessons learned

1. Federal authorities must team up with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to revise current plans, ensure a working operational structure (at the center and in regions of the nation), and institute an accountable, well-defined process for overall countrywide preparedness efforts. In doing so, they should:

Ensure planning, training, and preparation of Executive Branch organizations in regard to the performance of response roles.

Confirm and execute National Preparedness Aim.

1. The transportation department should coordinate with other relevant Executive Branch departments for preparing to carry out mass evacuation when local and state bodies are incapacitated or overwhelmed by calamities.

1. DHS must head an interagency appraisal of existing procedures and policies for ensuring efficient integration of every federal-level search-and-rescue asset in the response phase.

1. The justice department should coordinate efforts with DHS and look into Federal obligations for supporting local and state criminal justice and law enforcement systems at the time of catastrophes, and subsequently develop operational plans, policies, and procedures for guaranteeing effective response by federal law enforcers.

1. The HHS (Health and Human Services department) should align with DHS and other DHS partners for strengthening Federal government's capacity to deliver medical and public health aid at the time of a crises. This necessitates improvements in public healthcare resources' control and command, development of careful plans, speeding up of the endeavor to support widespread utilization of interoperable EHRs (electronic health records), and an added investment in operational resources that are deployable.

1. Federal resources and funding should be deployed and establish core competencies, the Housing and Urban Development Department should collaborate with other relevant Executive Branch departments to formulate integrated strategies and reinforced capabilities for evacuees' short- as well as long- term rehabilitation. DHS and the Red Cross must retain charge, improve mass sheltering, and care process during calamities.

1. DHS must formulate an integrated strategy of public communication for better informing, guiding, and reassuring citizens prior to, in the course of, and following a disaster. DHS must facilitate this strategy through operational capabilities for deploying organized public affairs units in the event of crises.

1. Federal response efforts should better combine contributions of nongovernmental organizations and volunteers into wider nationwide efforts. This sort of integration would best be achieved at…