', the prime Apollo 1 command and service modules contractor. A task force review was conducted and headed up by Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo Program Director. Phillips conducted an extensive investigation of the management of the contractor on programs and recommended remedial action for North American Aviation, Inc.
J. Budget Impacts at NASA
It is reported that NASA did not feel effects from the accident budget-wise of the 1967 fiscal year however the Apollo 204 accident "therefore, will appear in future years as is evidenced bit the increase in the total runout cost estimate for the Apollo program." (Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection) Findings of the Apollo Review Board of the Apollo accident reported having "…determined that the test conditions at the time of the accident were 'extremely hazardous by either NASA of the contractor prior to the accident." (Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection)
The consequence was the failure to established safety precautions that were efficient in handling this type of incident and procedures were never established or group support focused on assisting the crew. There was a failure as well to locate medical emergency equipment or fire-fighting equipment on the scene in the 'white room' which surrounded the Apollo command module nor were emergency fire and medical rescue teams in attendance." (Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection) the Review Board of the Apollo 204 stated that there "appears to be no adequate explanation for the failure to recognize the test being conducted at the time of the accident as hazardous." (Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection)
K. NASA Firmly Claims Mitigation of all Hazards in the Apollo 204 Project
NASA is stated to have maintained through the entire investigation that they believed that all ignition sources had been effectively eliminated and NASA also held firm that the combustible materials and oxygen were effectively sealed off from one another. The truth is however, that "all ignition sources had not been eliminated." (Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection)
Differences in Apollo Spacecraft Design
Bug-like cab on legs
10 ft, 7in.
22 ft, 7in. excluding fairing
23 ft, 1in. (legs extended)
12 ft, 10in.
12 ft, 10in.
31 ft (diagonal of landing gear)
210 cu ft
160 cu ft (approx)
12,800 lb (approx)
54,200 lb (approx)
36,200 lb (approx)
Source: Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection
III. Outcomes and Recommendations
The Apollo Review Board Research Committee stated recommendations that NASA "continue to move the Apollo program forward to achieve its goal." (Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection) the testimony of NASA reports that the possibility to put man on the moon by 1969 was doable. It is reported that safety "must be considered of paramount importance in the manned space flight program even at the expense of target dates." (Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection) the committee additionally stated that the "earnest declaration that safety is our prime consideration must be transfused into watchfulness so that people do not again stumble into the pitfall of complacency." (Report of Apollo 204 Review Board-- NASA Historical Reference Collection) in the National Aeronautics and Space administration's fiscal year 1968 the Congress authorized its act, which authorized the appointment of an Aerospace Safety advisory Panel by the Administrator for conducted review of the operational plans of NAA and to advise the Administrator in, regards to the proposed or existing facilities in terms of their hazards.
Hill, William C. (2000) Final Report: Inspection of Apollo 1/204 Hardware. September 2000. Retrieved from: http://www.xmission.com/~jwindley/bibhill.html
Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences United States Senate with Additional View. 30 Jan 1968 Apollo 204 Accident. 90th Congress 2d Session. Report No. 956. Retrieved from: http://klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure_Reports/as-204/senate_956/index.htm