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In addition, the Rogers Commission made specific recommendations related to these issues. They suggested that NASA restructure its management system, including bringing astronauts into management positions, which will increase attention to flight safety issues. They suggested a full examination of all critical systems before conducting any more shuttle launches. They were instructed to establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality control. These suggestions bring safety back to prominence in decision-making, and should downplay the effect of pressure to meet deadlines (Harwood, 1986).
The Rogers Commission also criticized NASA's communications and instructed them to devise ways that information flows from bottom to top as well as from top to bottom. In addition they expressed concern about a tendency for management to be somewhat isolated from others, further interfering with communication (Harwood, 1986). If middle management had been able to communicate effectively with upper levels in 1986, the GDSS would have heard about O. ring concerns from within NASA as well as from M-T.
The Rodgers Commission, in addition to making numerous suggestions about how to improve the structure of shuttles and ways to increase safety for the astronauts, noted the management decisions that contributed so significantly to the disaster. They particularly noted that decision makers were under considerable pressure to maintain ambitious flight schedules (Harwood, 1986). This pressure stemmed from both political and economic forces. NASA will have to decide whether its goals are one of scientific inquiry or of making money through space exploration. When it is recognized that these...
Given the inherently danger to space exploration, it will be clear that safety, based on the best science available, will have to be the overriding concern. In decision meetings, the structural dynamic must support real inquiry, not simply support a predetermined and preferred outcome.
In order to keep the shuttle program an effective vehicle for space exploration, safety of the astronauts must always be the first concern. Deadlines must always be flexible and based on the ability of NASA to make a launch that is as safe as possible. Final votes on decisions must be made anonymously to eliminate the influence of group pressure for a goal inappropriate for such a risky endeavor.
Bibliography
Eberhart, Jonathan. 1986. "Challenger disaster muddles NASA's future." Science News, March 15.
Editorial. 2003. "Bad News Rising." Air Safety Week, Feb. 17. (Editorial, 2003)
Forrest, Jeff. 1995. "The Challenger Shuttle Disaster," in Aviation & Aerospace. Accessed via the Internet 11/1/05. http://frontpage.hypermall.com/jforrest/challenger/challenger_sts.htm
Harwood, William. Voyage Into History. CBS, 1986. Accessed via the Internet 11/1/04. http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/51Lintro.html
Kruglanski, Arie W. 1986. "Freeze-think and the Challenger; in the Challenger tragedy the real culprit may have been the decision-making system rather than the individual decision-makers." Psychology Today, August.
Vaughan, Diane. 1990. "Autonomy, interdependence, and social control: NASA and the space shuttle Challenger." Administrative Science Quarterly, June.
Bibliography
Eberhart, Jonathan. 1986. "Challenger disaster muddles NASA's future." Science News, March 15.
Editorial. 2003. "Bad News Rising." Air Safety Week, Feb. 17. (Editorial, 2003)
Forrest, Jeff. 1995. "The Challenger Shuttle Disaster," in Aviation & Aerospace. Accessed via the Internet 11/1/05. http://frontpage.hypermall.com/jforrest/challenger/challenger_sts.htm
Harwood, William. Voyage Into History. CBS, 1986. Accessed via the Internet 11/1/04. http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/51Lintro.html
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