Therefore this makes sense that certain conditions need to effectuate change, and as Gunther (2003) shows, it seems to be the elite. Taking the case of party elite behavior in Spain in the early 1980s, Gunther (2003) showed how some key party members were inaccurately informed regarding certain decisions producing outcomes that were irrational. Other key members also sought fulfillment of personal objectives. The result was engagement of elites in irrational behavior and behavior that contradicted the norm -- or the expectation -- of the political system.

On the other hand, Gunther's study did not involve firsthand observations, surveys and research but rather revolved around simulation and explorations of elite-level coalition-building strategies, a far less reliable technique. Whilst their reasoning sounds plausible and highly contrasted, there are still room for gaps particularly since their reconstruction is a removed and subjective evaluation of possible reasons behind eventual structure of laws and consequent formation of political system. Other weaknesses consist in alternate variables resulting in consequent law / direction of party. As Gunther shows, uncertainty too played a part. It would be difficult, therefore, to determine which of the two was the greater determiner: elitist behavior or uncertainty -- or something else totally different.

Benoit and Hayden (2004) studied institutional change and persistence in the evolution of Poland's electoral system (1989-2001). The hypothesis was that party support for particular system was linked to perceived system's effect on the party seat. The researchers modeled electoral system change and operationalized 'system change' as that driven by partisans self-interest in maximizing their number of seats and tested this model in five different sagas of electoral system change in Poland from 1989 to 2001, comparing the parties' support for alternatives of electoral law to their expectations of the amount of seats gained as a result of these alternatives. The IV was expectation of seats, the DV was selection of political system and consequent development.

The...

Their conclusion and findings were that the office-seeking model (that described possessiveness of seats as driver to electoral selection) best described evolution and development of political system rather than other models such as the transitional fittings explanation.
The researchers chose the policy-seeking and office-seeking instruments as means to conceptualize, operationalize, and explore their subject. As stated their employed office-seeking model, does not tightly conform to the selected case study, rather serves as heuristic. Nonetheless, it seemed to adequately explain the process of change and institutionalization. This was particularly so as it traced the development of the electoral system.

The strengths of their argument consist in their close reasoning, caution taken with their study, clear graphs and layout, as well as thorough contrast with pertinent political parties. Their observation is acute, and the research longitudinal.

Weaknesses consists in the general weakness that pertain with opinion polls - merely that they are often misbalanced not equally representing all samples of the population aside from which they share shortfalls generic to all surveys in that they are subjective, relying on mood, context, and other aspects such as participant's understanding of interviewer and the reverse. Furthermore, elements that may influence party's choice in Poland may, for instance, not be existent in another country where different variables may prove deterministic in impelling agents to act.