James Franklin (2000) looks at Kuhn's work from a different angle, and finds that the paradigm theory is the same in science as it is in terms of human interactions: "Kuhn's thesis is that scientific theories are no better than ones in the humanities. The idea that science is all theoretical talk and negotiation, which never really establishes anything, is one that caused trouble long ago for Galileo." Furthermore, Franklin looks at the content of the book and finds several inconsistencies. Probably the most relevant example in this sense is constituted by the classification of several "unsustainable" theories. The author of the article points out that Kuhn did not clarify the understanding of the appellative "unsustainable," nor its context, be it logic or philosophical. Either way, Franklin argues that the use of this adjective in the given context is inappropriate. "If it means that there are a number of observed results that would be unlikely if the theory were true, then one is back in the realm of logic, of the bad old philosophy of science that studied the relation of evidence to hypothesis. Naturally, Kuhn is not keen to emphasize that direction. But if "unsustainable" is a purely psychological matter, a kind of collective disgust by a salon des refuses of younger scientists who simply think their elders are too smug, then it is impossible to see why it should have any standing as science" (Franklin).

An article of the Physics Department at the Weber State University argues that Kuhn's complicated view is due to the essential nebulous character of the paradigm itself. Given this situation then, the authors at the Weber University argue that Kuhn's model is not entirely applicable as one cannot entirely know the features and characteristics of a paradigm, such as its components or its evolution. They go on by offering the example of the atoms, which, despite the extensive years of research and analysis, continue to be used in terms of assumption and controlled experiments. Given this situation, in which it may be difficult to control and foresee the movement and actions of atoms, the professors at Weber conclude that it is rather impossible to foresee the evolution of science as a whole, and even less so include it in a paradigm.

The final critique brought to Kuhn relies in the actual choice of words. Critics argue that the concept of paradigm is generally vague, and as such fails to offer consistency and reliability throughout the research and theory formulation process. Despite this criticism however, the author of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions promoted the concept of paradigm in its understanding of "a collection of beliefs shared by scientists, a set of agreements about how problems are to be understood" (Emory University, Division of Educational Studies).