NASA After The Challenger Disaster, NASA Was Case Study

NASA After the Challenger disaster, NASA was required to make changes in the way it managed its operations. There was to be more communication and more centralization, as well as better consultation with experts in order to make sure that the shuttle did not launch when it was not safe to do so. Despite all of the alleged changes, though, further disaster occurred. This was believed to be a product of the fact that NASA only made some of the proposed changes after Challenger failed. Even then, most of the changes that were made were undone over time, so they did not provide any significant improvement in the agency overall. Change not only has to come from within, but it has to be something that becomes the "new normal" (Evans, 2007; Palmer, Dunford, & Akin, 2009). If the changes that are made are seen as too different, or they are not continually reinforced over time, they will not remain with the organization, and it will revert to the way it was before changes were made (Kotter, 1996; Palmer). With NASA, the organization already had a lot of infighting and other problems, along with management and other facets that were too widely spread out geographically to work effectively with one another on making changes.

2. In the aftermath of Columbia, it was determined that many of the changes that should have been completed at NASA were either overlooked or had reverted back to the way things were done originally....

...

The most notable of those was the way in which the majority of engineers and other consultants were either ignored or not even asked regarding the safety of a particular component or the shuttle's readiness for launch. Additionally, NASA assumed that, because something had happened before, it would happen again and that was not a safety-of-flight issue. Unfortunately, that lead them to avoid studying serious problems that were occurring with the shuttle each time it went on a flight. If they would have paid more attention to the damage the shuttle was taking, and not just assumed there was nothing to worry about, it is possible that the Columbia disaster could have been more easily prevented. Change in any organization must be sincere, and must move throughout all of the levels (Evans, 2007). Just saying that change can or should be made is never enough.
3. Redesigning roles in the organization is very important (Palmer, Dunford, & Akin, 2009). The reward systems also had to be redesigned, because people need rewards that they can accept and appreciate. In other words, it is very difficult to reward someone with something they do not really want - but rewarding people for behaviors that are part of the needed change is a highly valuable thing to do in any organization (Evans, 2007). If the change objectives were created properly and linked to the selection decisions, the changes could have been…

Sources Used in Documents:

References

Evans, B. (2007). Space shuttle challenger: ten journeys into the unknown. New York, NY: Praxis Publications

Kotter, J. (1996). Leading change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press

Palmer, I., Dunford, R., & Akin, G. (2009). Managing organizational change: A multiple perspectives approach (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill


Cite this Document:

"NASA After The Challenger Disaster NASA Was" (2012, June 06) Retrieved April 18, 2024, from
https://www.paperdue.com/essay/nasa-after-the-challenger-disaster-nasa-80418

"NASA After The Challenger Disaster NASA Was" 06 June 2012. Web.18 April. 2024. <
https://www.paperdue.com/essay/nasa-after-the-challenger-disaster-nasa-80418>

"NASA After The Challenger Disaster NASA Was", 06 June 2012, Accessed.18 April. 2024,
https://www.paperdue.com/essay/nasa-after-the-challenger-disaster-nasa-80418

Related Documents

As they pushed engineers to continually test the limits when it came to the launches. This is because, the leadership inside NASA and at the different subcontractors created an atmosphere that made this possible. (Gross 1997) (Space Shuttle Challenger Case Study n.d.) The Influence of the Media Given the high profile nature of the program, meant that there were considerable pressures to be ready for the next shuttle launch. This is

Judgment in Managerial Decision Making Almost everyone has, at some point, been a victim of groupthink -- perhaps by thinking of speaking up in a meeting, and then deciding not to, so as not to appear unsupportive of the team's stand. Although such occurrences are quite common, and may appear quite normal, they are indicative of faulty thinking. Groupthink is, in basic terms, "a phenomenon that occurs when the desire for

Space Shuttle Challenger disaster took place on January 28, 1986 as the Space Shuttle Challenger blew up into pieces just 73 seconds after its launch. The destruction blew the shuttle into flames and dust causing the death of all seven crew members. Even though the crash was a sad moment in the history of NASA and United States Space programs, it is still being studied merely to figure out

In addition, the Rogers Commission made specific recommendations related to these issues. They suggested that NASA restructure its management system, including bringing astronauts into management positions, which will increase attention to flight safety issues. They suggested a full examination of all critical systems before conducting any more shuttle launches. They were instructed to establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality control. These suggestions bring safety back to prominence in

Challenger Launch Decision
PAGES 10 WORDS 2891

Challenger Launch Decision JOE KILMINSTER'S ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CHALLENGER DISASTER On January 28, 1986, the Challenger, one of the reusable space shuttle by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or NASA, was launched off at the John F. Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida but exploded 72 seconds after liftoff. The launch was approved and ordered by the management of the Morton Thiokol, Inc., an aerospace company, that manufactures solid propellant

There was one thing or the other to delay the launch of the Challenger, until the D-Day, when the shuttle was launched at 11:38 AM as against the scheduled take off time of 9:38 AM on January 28. About seventy three seconds into the mission, the Challenger exploded in mid air, and all the seven crew members were killed instantaneously. For the hundreds of people, the family and friends