At the time of its composition, Laird's proposal would be contextualized by the ongoing SALT conferences between the U.S. And Soviet Union designed to reduce each side's proclivity toward nuclear armament in a highly contentious setting. The result would be the re-assertion in Laird's strategy of American prioritization of its nuclear armament. As Laird would note, "we should make it clear to the Soviet Union that regardless of the outcome of SALT, our approach to strategic forces is designed to preserve our deterrent without question." (Laird, p. 10) This 'deterrent' would be the continued research, development and maintenance of its nuclear stockpile in the interests of demonstrating the latent power to respond to any Soviet nuclear action. As Laird reports, even under the terms of the uncomfortable negotiation with the Soviets over an Anti-Ballistics Missile treaty, it was the intention of the United States to remain girded by this stockpile.
Today, conditions are quite different owing primarily to the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. With its dissemination into an array of independent states would also come the dissemination of many of its nuclear secrets. These would not be accompanied by the same sovereignty principles that deterred the Soviets from engaging the U.S. On a nuclear front. Such is to say that as nuclear technology has become ever more accessible, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea demonstrate that the fear of nuclear retaliation may no longer be a sufficient deterrent. The current policy, accordingly, must more directly reflect the ambitions underlying the original SALT negotiations. That is, the United States must be an active participant in a multilateral effort to reduce the global presence of nuclear stockpiles as well as to apply political pressure on those rogue states that are not cooperative with that effort. This is a substantial departure from Laird's recommendations.
More consistent though is the relationship between Laird's sense of balance where the use of conventional force is concerned and the same sense as it is applied to military operations today. According to...
(2008), "the Army has chosen to man, equip, and train each of its combat and support units to be 'full-spectrum-capable,' able to function in all operational scenarios described in the previous passage. While the Army considers its units "full spectrum capable," Army units are optimized for traditional ground campaigns against the ground forces of other nations." (Feickert et al., p. 1) This directly echoes Laird's assertion that "a careful restructuring of forces to permit improvements in mobility, more tailoring of forces to operate with increased efficiency in specific areas and/or environments, and reorganization of these forces to provide improved responsiveness are all steps that should be taken." (Laird, p. 10) This recommendation would ultimately bear considerable relevance to the balance between full-scale operations in countries like Afghanistan and more limited operational engagements in contexts such as Libya.
Conclusion:
Ultimately, we can say that Laird's strategy for peace would be a prescient one, most critically helping to prepare policy-makers for a standing military that would no longer require a draft. This would represent a fundamental modernization of America's fighting force. However, it is also important to recognize the considerable impact of Cold War thinking on certain dimensions of Laird's policy recommendation. Today, recontextualization of Laird's ideas may bring illumination.
Works Cited:
Feickert, Andrew. Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 18 January 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34333.pdf
Laird, Melvin. "Strategy for Peace: National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence." Department of Defense. 6 November 1970.
Metternich, Ronald. "Security Force Assistance: Organization for the Long War." U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA520009
Nagl, John a. "Institutionalizing Adaptation." Center for a New American Security, June 2007.
