For example, in decision making style differences arise from professional backgrounds, "the decision cycle of a fighter pilot (the Navy Captain) [is] measured in seconds while that of an infantry officer (the Colonel) in hours and days." If one compounds this paradigm with career Statists, who tend to measure decisions in months or years based on "never enough data," we can see the conundrum (Marks, 2007).
For generations, though, training on both sides has been based on a world polarized by fear -- of mutual destruction, or of the United States and the Soviet Union continuing to militarize in order to maintain the balance of power that would ensure the other side refrained from ever having the advantage. . Through it all, though, the economic model that drove both sides certainly caused the downfall and bankruptcy of the U.S.S.R., and an overall change in the very idea of war as a political solution. However, that solution has also been somewhat technical -- we now have ways to kill and wage war without putting personnel on the ground and certainly limiting human causalities -- a sanitized war some have said. The problem, according to Rife, is this new warfare produces not clear victory or ideological change, but a "war among the people," that even if successful from one point-of-view, typically provide only limited desired objectives. This new war takes place as much in the global media as it does in the pseudo-battlefield, and may even be fought in the hyper-shadows of guerilla warfare and terrorism. It requires a "cooperative...
Instead, a new paradigm of thought must occur -- a revolution in thinking -- the military-industrial complex can no longer sustain economies, and what must occur is change in approach so that conflicts may be won at all levels of culture. "Military activity is essentially short-term, discrete, and finite. Diplomacy is about the relationship between…. creatures…. A never-ending process" (Marks). For this to happen, both sides need to adapt to the new mindset and blend strategy and tactics into a more coherent whole. Approach tactical details like food, utilities, and potable water to the population while still working at the higher diplomatic levels of statecraft. Use the military to help buttress the infrastructure of schools and programs that work to serve the culture. Look at the big picture (strategy) but implement feasible programs (tactics). Indeed, taking a page from the business world, embrace diversity, do not shy away from dissent, but use radical innovation to embrace change (See: Horibe, 2001).
Horibe, F. (2001). Creating the Innovation Culture. New York: John Wiley & Sons
Marks, E. (April 2007). Three Years Before the Mast. American Diplomacy. Retrieved from: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/0103/life/marks_three.html
Rife, R.L. (1998). Defense is from Marx, State is from Venus. Army War College. Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc / …/dod_from _mars_state_from_venus.doc
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This will continue to be the case for the foreseeable decades as the United States fights wars that are so far not yet even imagined. If these wars have been fought (as many have suggested) over the presence of the scarce resource of oil, the next wars may be fought over the even more precious resource of water. Looking not too far into the future, the next wars may be
A terrorist network does not seek legitimacy either, but acts without regard for human liberty, human rights, or international law. Terrorist networks speak only for themselves. While nation-states may support them through funding or providing safe havens, terrorist groups are not polities. They do not deserve the juridical considerations due to even the most rogue of nations. The rules for preemptive action must therefore be more flexible with regards
Conversely the partnerships of open source databases vendors including MySQL and others have created a strong alliance that has forced Microsoft's SQL Server database team to create customized connectors for these open source applications. Open source, first the subject of an encirclement strategy, is now implementing its own on Microsoft's operating system business. The Linux operating system is now pre-installed on many of the world's leading hardware manufacturers' laptops,
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How should allied operations in Afghanistan be pursued? In order for the operation in Afghanistan to be effective, there are several ways that can be opted for. The allied forces should be trained aptly for the terrain that is in Afghanistan, the training should as well cover the entire insurgents possible pockets. This however may prove difficult since the insurgents have their protected areas that they would not allow the allied
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