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Bibliography
Adams, Marilyn McCord. Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Belliotti, Raymond a. Roman Philosophy and the Good Life. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009.
DeRose, Keith. "Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991), 497-512.
Draper, Paul. "Probabilistic Arguments from Evil," Religious Studies 28 (1992), 303-17.
Dueck, a.C. Between Jerusalem and Athens: Ethical Perspectives on Culture, Religion, and Psychotherapy. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995.
Ferreira, M. Jamie. "Surrender and Paradox: Imagination in the Leap." In Kierkegaard Contra Contemporary Christendom, edited by Daniel W. Conway, 142-67. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Griffin, David Ray. God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy. Louisville: Westminster Press, 2004.
Hick, John. "The 'Vale of Soul-Making' Theodicy." In the Problem of Evil: A Reader, edited by Mark Joseph Larrimore, 355-61. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001.
Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Other Writings, edited by Dorothy Coleman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Lactantius, "The Wrath of God." In the Problem of Evil: A Reader, edited by Mark Joseph Larrimore, 46-52. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001.
Larrimore, Mark Joseph. The Problem of Evil: A Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001.
Leibniz, G.W. "Theodicy." In the Problem of Evil: A Reader, edited by Mark Joseph Larrimore, 191-200. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001.
Mackie, J.L. "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind 64 (1955), 200-12.
Pereboom, Derek. "The Problem of Evil." In the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by William E. Mann, 148-72. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
Peterson, Michael L. "Recent Work on the Problem of Evil," American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1983), 321-339.
Tinker, Melvin. "Purpose in Pain? -- Teleology and the Problem of Evil," Themelios 16 (1991), 15-18.
Van Inwagen, Peter. The Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Wielenberg, Erik J. "Omnipotence Again," Faith and Philosophy 7 (2000), 26-57.
Raymond a. Belliotti, Roman Philosophy and the Good Life (Plymouth: Lexington Books,...
William E. Mann (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 172), Spinoza is another figure who "retained omnipotence but rejected instead divine goodness."
Lactantius, "The Wrath of God," in the Problem of Evil: A Reader, ed. Mark Joseph Larrimore (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 47.
Keith DeRose, "Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991), 504-9.
John Hick, "The 'Vale of Soul-Making' Theodicy" in the Problem of Evil: A Reader, ed. Mark Joseph Larrimore (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 355-61.
G.W. Leibniz, "Theodicy" in the Problem of Evil: A Reader, ed. Mark Joseph Larrimore (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 191-200.
Melvin Tinker, "Purpose in Pain? -- Teleology and the Problem of Evil," Themelios
16 (1991), 15-18, is representative.
From "Epistle I: Of the Nature and State of Man with Respect to the Universe." Quoted in David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Louisville: Westminster Press, 2004), 86-7.
J.L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind 64 (1955), 201-2.
Erik J. Wielenberg, "Omnipotence Again," Faith and Philosophy 7 (2000), 42.
Michael L. Peterson, "Recent Work on the Problem of Evil," American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1983), 330-1.
Peter van Inwagen, the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 114.
Mackie, 201.
For an extensive rehearsal of the primary debate, see Paul Draper, "Probabilistic Arguments from Evil," Religious Studies 28 (1992), 303-17.
Pereboom, 163.
David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Other Writings, ed. Dorothy Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 68.
A.C. Dueck, Between Jerusalem and Athens: Ethical Perspectives on Culture, Religion, and Psychotherapy (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995), 153.
M. Jamie Ferreira, "Surrender and Paradox: Imagination in the Leap," Kierkegaard Contra Contemporary Christendom, ed. Daniel W. Conway (New York: Routledge, 2002), 145.
Larrimore, xx.
A.C. Dueck, Between Jerusalem and Athens: Ethical Perspectives on Culture, Religion, and Psychotherapy (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995), 153.
M. Jamie Ferreira, "Surrender and Paradox: Imagination in the Leap," Kierkegaard Contra Contemporary Christendom, ed. Daniel W. Conway (New York: Routledge, 2002), 145.
Larrimore, xx.
The Cosmological Argument: This argument begins with the tenet that for the Universe to exist something outside the universe must have created it. Also refereed to as the First Cause or the Uncaused Cause theory, here God exists as the prime mover that brought the universe into existence. The universe is a series of events, which began with God who must exist apart from the universe, outside of time and
Even before one gets to Rowe's argument, however, one may disregard Hick's argument because it depends on imagining an infinite number of possibilities to explain away evil, rather than accounting for it. Instead of actually explaining how a benevolent and omnipotent god can allow evil to exist, Hick's argument simply states that this evil is not really evil, although with no evidence to back this up other than the convenient
Evil The free will defense suggests that God permits, but does not cause evil. Therefore, it is possible to live in a universe in which good and evil continually coexist. Human beings are blessed with the ability to make a choice that can further the objectives of God and good, or to promote the interests of evil. Although this view is logically coherent, there are clear objections to it. One objection is
Once again, the theist can simply point out that human knowledge -- either our own, or in the collective sense -- is not only incomplete but not even necessarily close to complete. Furthermore, inference from incomplete evidence is dangerous; before Columbus, European philosophers would have felt themselves on firm "rational ground" to suppose that no edible starchy tuber existed, and yet the potato would have proved them wrong. Attempts to
Evil and Suffering The logical problem of evil is that if God is all-good then evil should not exist. Perhaps one can argue, then, that evil is a creation of man and that God cannot not prevent that, but God being Omnipotent, and, therefore, by definition able to accomplish all should be capable of preventing if not destructing evil. Either then God is not all good, or he is not all
If all falls are "lucky," then we truly live in the best of all possible worlds. While we may avoid accusations of Candidean naivete by announcing that "God" must not exist, this all-or-nothing stance lacks rigor. The persistence of evil is incompatible with certain ideas of God, but in itself this only indicates that our ideas are imperfectly refined. At its best, this approach deepens our definitions of the divine