For example, in decision making style differences arise from professional backgrounds, "the decision cycle of a fighter pilot (the Navy Captain) [is] measured in seconds while that of an infantry officer (the Colonel) in hours and days." If one compounds this paradigm with career Statists, who tend to measure decisions in months or years based on "never enough data," we can see the conundrum (Marks, 2007). For generations, though, training on both sides has been based on a world polarized by fear -- of mutual destruction, or of the United States and the Soviet Union continuing to militarize in order to maintain the balance of power that would ensure the other side refrained from ever having the advantage. . Through it all, though, the economic model that drove both sides certainly caused the downfall and bankruptcy of the U.S.S.R., and an overall change in the very idea of war as a political solution. However, that solution has also been somewhat technical -- we now have ways to kill and wage war without putting personnel on the ground and certainly limiting human causalities -- a sanitized war some have said. The problem, according to Rife, is this new warfare produces not clear victory or ideological change, but a "war among the people," that even if successful from one point-of-view, typically provide only limited desired objectives. This new war takes place as much in the global media as it does in the pseudo-battlefield, and may even be fought in the hyper-shadows of guerilla warfare and terrorism. It requires a "cooperative attitude that recognizes the differences [between statecraft and military measures] and, in fact, capitalizes on them" (Rife). Instead, a new paradigm of thought must occur -- a revolution in thinking -- the military-industrial...

"Military activity is essentially short-term, discrete, and finite. Diplomacy is about the relationship between…. creatures…. A never-ending process" (Marks). For this to happen, both sides need to adapt to the new mindset and blend strategy and tactics into a more coherent whole. Approach tactical details like food, utilities, and potable water to the population while still working at the higher diplomatic levels of statecraft. Use the military to help buttress the infrastructure of schools and programs that work to serve the culture. Look at the big picture (strategy) but implement feasible programs (tactics). Indeed, taking a page from the business world, embrace diversity, do not shy away from dissent, but use radical innovation to embrace change (See: Horibe, 2001).
REFERENCES

Horibe, F. (2001). Creating the Innovation Culture. New York: John Wiley & Sons

Marks, E. (April 2007). Three Years Before the Mast. American Diplomacy. Retrieved from: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/0103/life/marks_three.html

Rife, R.L. (1998). Defense is from Marx, State is from Venus. Army War College. Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc / …/dod_from _mars_state_from_venus.doc

Smith, R. (2007). The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World.

New York: Vintage.

Somerville, J. (1975). The Peace Revolution: Ethos and Social Process.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Watkins, J. (October 27, 2009). When is War Just? JamesWatkins.com. Retrieved from: http://www.jameswatkins.com/justwar.htm