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Counterinsurgency
The best counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics are those that do not require armed responses. History and current global conditions suggest that for the most part governmental troops are simply not very good at suppressing the forces for change that challenge, peacefully or otherwise. But knowing what doesn't work is not the same as understanding how to put into practice what does. And there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that this issue will become even more difficult in the future as populous confrontations become less monolithic and national in scope and pick up their own armaments of support from global frustrations and jihadists calls for fidelity. Two additional proven elements include using the police forces to the greatest extent possible and expanding the police presence. Doing this apparently allows for making sure that troop visibility is minimized. [3: Ibid, pg 10.]
One of the better demonstrations of this problem can be seen in a 2005 piece by Sepp, a DoD analyst.[footnoteRef:1] He identifies an estimated 53 incidents across recent history and looks at the characteristics of the confrontation, over and above who won the battle, to see what has been proven effective and what has not worked. But before reviewing these specifics, it's worth restating a concern his included upfront: "The focus of all civil and military plans and operations must be on the center of gravity in any conflict -- the country's people and their belief in and support of their government. Winning their hearts and minds must be the objective of the government's efforts." [footnoteRef:2] [1: K. Sepp. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review. May-June 2005.] [2: Ibid, pg. 9.]
The unsuccessful elements convey as similar image of the limitations of military tactics. Those that do not work include those that emphasize the primacy of military direction; that use "kill-capture" methods; that require battalion-size operations or large bases; that deploy raids by specialty forces; or that try to build local forces in the image of the U.S. military. Sepp does say that peacetime government processes and open borders or uncontrolled air space don't work either, since perhaps the public may not participate or may run from volatile government.
But it is not just the U.S. military that is problematic. A 2008 study…
The mosaic's many sectors will use an increasingly indirect approach to shift popular support in particular states away from assisting global insurgency. A coalition force therefore may be deployed in a soft security role to help a weakened state assert aspects of authority, none of which may be primarily military. However, in a serious breakdown of order the soldier has to be able to transform from being a security provider, border observer, trainer, secondee staff officer, and intelligence collector into a combat soldier. In this scenario, the continued reliance on short-term cures, strategic medicines, futuristic technologies, and special-force expeditions represents a failure to understand the past or the direction of the future.[footnoteRef:5] [5: Ibid, 53.]
The RAND quotation like other commentators interesting pushes away the potential for seeking innovative solutions based on new community technologies. But it is not clear why they do this. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that insurgent groups are finding good uses for technologies as they connect with friends and strangers alike in opposition to the government's military strategies. Why the reverse cannot be explored is unclear.
Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare sums up the reality of the situation that countries are facing when they look at the issue just as a military challenge.[footnoteRef:6] He notes that building trust is critically important, and that means having personnel who are flexible enough to options of all kinds. This includes not relying on military commanders who are not willing to look to new solutions. Perhaps technological possibilities could be fit into this set of possibilities. At least as much can be gleaned from the fact that the writer of the forward of Galula's work, Lt. Colonel John Nagel, a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, chooses this summary to share with the readers, "A workable solution is to identify those who readily accept the new concepts of counterinsurgency warfare and give them responsibility. Those who then prove themselves in action should be pushed forward." [footnoteRef:7] [6: D. Galula. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Praeger Security International. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006).] [7: Ibid, Forward, x.]
This is important in the 21st century since the clear lines of dominance between the Soviet and American spheres of influence no longer exist, and more and more conflicts focus more on terrorist or other sectarian groups with no national power, but funds and some level of popular support. It is a method of warfare that is counter-intuitive to the United States, yet addressing it is critical (Counterinsurgency Operations,
The country of the individual must also adapt to the changing culture. Currently, the world's cultures, in regard to the information environment-shaping capabilities, continually change at an accelerating pace. Based on the rate of the increase of media outlets that disseminate the propaganda of Hamas, such as Filastin al-'An, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Al-Aqsa TV, PALDF Forum and Sabiroon Websites, increases for this group will likely follow the same path
Yaphe compares America's invasion with that of the British experience, at the end of World War I. According to Yaphe, he parallels between the two are remarkable, showing how Iraq's ethno diverse territory gives rise to violence and cruelty against others. What Yaphe saw was a common course of political division that was present in both Britain 1917 incursion in Iraq, as well as in America's 2003 invasion. The different
Each level of the counter-terrorism strategy present in the United States has its own flaws and its own weaknesses. Law enforcement cannot be left behind in the pursuit for more professional counter-terrorist elite units. The New York Police Department sets the bar for what municipal police can put together in terms of counter-terrorism, NYPD Shield, as its known, has conducted several successful operations since its inception in the aftermath of
(MACV Dir 381-41) This document is one of the first confidential memorandums associated with the Phoenix Program, which details in 1967 the mostly U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency intelligence and activities and discusses the future training and development of South Vietnam forces to serve the same function, that had been supported by the U.S. In civilian (mostly CIA) and military roles. The document stresses that the U.S. role is to
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