Airport Security Design and Implementation

Airport Security Design and Implementation

The objective of this work in writing is to devise a plan for setting up a state-of-the-art airport security system. This work will discuss: (1) The security force: selection, organization and training; (2) Airport lay-out: suggest a design which maximizes security management efficiency and passenger flow while minimizing discomfort and delay to air travelers; (3) the screening system step-by-step detailing the process, the equipment used and the function of that equipment; (4) how systems would be integrated for maximum efficiency; and (5) security management of freight air carriers in brief. The design of an airport security plan is complex and inclusive of many considerations to ensure the safety of passengers and employees. The airport security plan serves to increase communication between airport tenants, airport manager and law enforcement as well as serving to identify specific activities to be reported and to increase awareness of airport security issues. The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Public Law 101-604 provided directions to the FAA to work in cooperation with the aviation industry for the purpose of developing guidelines for "…airport design and construction to allow for maximum-security enhancement." (Transportation Security Administration. 2006 ) The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), Public Law 107-71 "established the TSA" which is described as an act that "authorizes increased federal responsibility for all aspects of aviation security, including a federal take-over of passenger and baggage screening." (Transportation Security Administration, 2006 ) The responsibilities of TSA were defined further with the 2002 passage of the Homeland Security Act, Public Law 107-296, which effectively resulted in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security is charged with the prevention of terrorist attacks in the United States as well as with reduction of the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism at home, and minimization of the damage and provision of assistance in the recovery from any future attacks. It is reported that there are new technological tools available to assist with vulnerability and risk assessment, flow modeling, and bomb blast protection, all of which serve to "reduce guesswork and minimize certain expenditures in new structures." (Transportation Security Administration, 2006 ) The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is charged with general planning, design, construction and operations requirement of commercial airport establishment and government under airport certification requirements as set out in 14 CFP 139. (Transportation Security Administration, 2006, paraphrased) Planning for security should be a critical aspect of any airport project. Physical security approaches should be on the basis of "…applicable federal, state, and local regulations and policies to ensure the protection of the general public, airport personnel and assets." (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

Physical Security

Physical security approaches should, at the very least, include the following: A vulnerability assessment to evaluate the security of an existing airport of a comprehensive security prospectus evaluating a new facility or site; Periodic inspections to ascertain whether a security program and its implementation meet pertinent federal, state, and local standards or regulations; A comprehensive and continuing security and threat awareness and education effort to gain the interest, support and participation of employees, contractors, consultants, and visitors; and Implementation of procedures for taking immediate, positive and orderly action to safeguard life and assets during an emergency. (Transportation Security Administration, 2006) Planning of facility protection should include several elements including that of the general security areas and boundaries. The following diagram shows a general depiction of the various areas of a typical commercial airport including the terminal, aircraft apron, runways or taxiways, as well as other components.

(1) Aircraft Operations Area (AOA) -- the area within an aviation facility in which flight-capable aircraft are present for the purposes of loading or unloading of cargo or passengers, refueling, maintenance, parking, storage, etc. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006)

(2) "Aviation Airport Facility" (AAF) means any DOI owned or controlled real property that has been developed or improved for aircraft (landing and takeoff) at which DOI owned or controlled aircraft are regularly or intermittently based. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006)

(3) Control -- used in two contexts. (a) As it relates to aviation facilities, the term "control" refers to the condition existing when a DOI entity has authority to institute, modify or otherwise effect physical security changes at an aviation facility regardless of property ownership; and (b) As it relates to aircraft, the term "control" shall mean "operational control" as defined in Federal Aviation Regulations Part 1.1: "Operational control with respect to a flight means the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting or terminating a flight." This definition is independent of aircraft ownership. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006)

(4) Dual-lock method -- use of a combination of two locking devices or methods to physically secure or disable a parked aircraft for the purpose of reducing the probability of aircraft theft and associated misuse by unauthorized personnel. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006)

(5) Risk assessment -- refers to the result of a combined. threat and vulnerability assessment. It can generally be characterized as an analysis of the probability of serious impact or damage resulting from a known or postulated threat successfully exploiting one or more vulnerabilities. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006)

(6) "Aircraft Movement Area" - refers to that area where aircraft are maneuvered, taxied and parked for normal operations. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006)

(7) CFR - Code of Federal Regulations (U.S.) (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

(8) DHS - The Department of Homeland Security (U.S.) and any directorate, bureau, or other component within the Department of Homeland Security, including the United States Coast Guard. (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

(9) FAA - Federal Aviation Administration (U.S.) (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

(10) HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Cooling ((Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

(11) TSA - Transportation Security Administration (U.S.) (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

(12) 49 CFR - Transportation Security Regulations (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

(13) Vulnerability - . . . A weakness in physical structures, personnel protection systems, process or other areas that may be exploited by terrorists . . . (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

(14) Vulnerability Assessment - Any review, audit, or other examination of the security of a transportation infrastructure asset; airport; maritime facility, port area, vessel, aircraft, train, commercial motor vehicle, or pipeline, or a transportation-related automated system or network, to determine its vulnerability to unlawful interference, whether during the conception, planning, design, construction, operation, or decommissioning phase. A vulnerability assessment may include proposed, recommended, or directed actions or countermeasures to address security concerns. (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

Airport Security Plan

The airport security plan will contain information about "what to report, how/who to report information, new electronic gate, locking aircraft and hangers and contacting FSS prior to each flight. The security plan should be sent to the local law enforcement agency, the local county Sheriff's Department and local Emergency Management (EMA) and the local fire department. There should be a 'Security Information Bulletin Board" available for use by pilots and airport tenants so that the latest security information can be related and disseminated. There also should be a 'Contact List' that identifies personnel and agencies involved in airport security. (Wisconsin Aviation Association, 2007) In order to create awareness of airport security issues the following should be addressed in the security plan: (1) electronic security gate; (2) signs for airport or airspace closure for gate and terminal; (3) barricades for taxiway closures; (4) airport perimeter fence checks; (5) locking hangars/aircraft; (6) locking hangars/aircraft; (7) exterior lighting; (8) airspace closure procedures; and (9) airport closure procedures. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) It is necessary to determine if the airport is public or private use. The following is the 'Airport Characteristics Measurement Tool' (AAF) which can be used to identify the characteristics of an airport. Included in the security plan is a section on Administration, which lists the AAF/site Operator and the individual responsible for AAF/site security. The responsibilities of this individual should be specifically stated including the "time provision of evidence of security measure compliance upon request. Responsibilities include: (1) maintenance of a complete and current listing of all individuals with AAF access; (2) maintenance of documentation of all training provision in accordance with any current AAF security procedures; (3) maintaining and updating the AAF Security Procedures to reflect the current state of conditions at the AAF; (4) maintaining and updating the AAF Security Procedures to reflect the current state of conditions at the AAF; (5) timely distribution of the AAF Security Procedures or specific parts thereof, to appropriate persons or entities; (6) proper dissemination of all correspondence or other communications with AAF tenants and others on security related matters; and (7) Daily oversight of security provisions at the AAF and ensuring compliance with the Security Procedures. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) The aircraft security plan should contain a section on the aircraft movement area and security control. The section on the aircraft movement area should provide a description of any area that may be potentially used for landing, take-off and surface maneuvering of aircraft. This includes all intermediate unpaved sections of the airfield on the airport property. A map or diagram should be attached. This section should provide a description for perimeter barriers or access controls including: Fencing; Gates; Access control systems; AAF locks; and Key Control Systems. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006)

Airport Security Features

In addition, a necessary section of the Airport Security Plan is the section, which describes any airport/AAF Security Procedures including: (1) aircraft security requirements; (2) pedestrian/vehicle access; (3) challenge procedures; and (4) procedures for reporting suspicious behavior. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) The Airport Security Plan should include an Airport/AAF Emergency Grid Map that identifies all areas of the Airport/AAF on a grid map. Areas to be identified include those as follows: Runways; Ramp areas; Fence line; Gates; Automobile parking areas; Hydrants; Emergency Shelters; Buildings; and Hazardous materials sites. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) The emergency grid map should be provided to emergency response personnel and law enforcement in addition to Airport/AAF personnel. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) There should also be a section that provides for the description of personnel identification methods or systems and the procedures that are currently being used including: Airport/AAF-issued identification badge(s) or card(s). Identification Badge / Card application procedures . Other acceptable forms of identification, Accountability of lost/stolen identification badges / cards. Temporary Airport/AAF identification badges / cards. Amd Uniforms which display logo or other identifiable markings (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) The methods and systems used for identification of authorized vehicles in the operations area of the airport is necessary. Methods for identification of authorized vehicles include special paint schemes or markings such as placement of a decal on a specific location on the vehicle or hang tags. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006, paraphrased) The Airport Security Plan should also contain a section that describes any agreement and responsibilities that the Airport / AAF owner/operator has with law enforcement agencies for the provision of "support, traffic control, police patrols and any emergency responses." (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) Included should be: (1) any written agreements (should be attached to the AAF Security Procedures); and (2) any methods of systems used (radios, communication channels) to directly communicate with law enforcement personnel. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006)

Procedures for Special Events

A section should also state the procedures for special events, which might include such as: Air shows; VIP visits; and Events that result in unusual numbers of people on the AAF. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) The Airport Security Plan should also contain the methods used to implement security measures "in accordance with the raising and lowering of the Homeland Security Advisory System and should contain a section that identifies and describes all contingency plans and procedures for incidents such as: Bomb Threats (Bomb Threat Checklist is provided as an example)' Civil Disturbances & Crowd Control; Air Piracy (Hijacking) Actual or Attempted; and suspicious/Unidentified Items (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) It is reported by the Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures that the TSA "…administers Transportation Security Regulations (TSRs), which are codified in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Chapter XII, parts 1500 through 1699. Many TSRs are former rules of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that were transferred to TSA when TSA assumed FAA's civil aviation security function on February 17, 2002." (2006)

Regulations of the Department of Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures

The following are the regulations stated by the Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures:

49 CFR Part 1540 Civil Aviation Security: General Rules - This part contains rules that cover all segments of civil aviation security. It contains definitions that apply to Subchapter C, and it contains rules that apply to passengers, aviation employees, and other individuals and persons related to civil aviation security, including airport operators, aircraft operators, and foreign air carriers. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006);

49 CFR Part 1542 Airport Security - This Part requires airport operators to adopt and carry out a security program approved by TSA. It describes requirements for security programs, including establishing secured areas, air operations areas, security identification display areas, and access control systems. This Part also contains requirements for fingerprint-based criminal history record checks of specified individuals. This part describes the requirements related to Security Directives issued to airport operators. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006);

49 CFR Part 1544 Aircraft Operator Security: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators - This Part applies to certain aircraft operators holding operating certificates for scheduled passenger operations, public charter passenger operations, private charter passenger operations, and other aircraft operators. This Part requires such operators to adopt and carry out a security program approved by TSA. It contains requirements for screening of passengers and property. This Part also describes requirements applicable to law enforcement officers flying armed aboard an aircraft, as well as requirements for fingerprint-based criminal history record checks of specified individuals. This Part describes the requirements related to Security Directives issued to aircraft operators. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006);

49 CFR Part 1550 Aircraft Security under General Operating and Flight Rules - This part applies to the operation of aircraft for which there are no security requirements in other Parts of Chapter XII, including general aviation aircraft. (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006); DOI Departmental Manual located at: http://elips.doi.gov/app_DM/index.cf ?fuseaction=home; and Part 352: AVIATION SAFETY Chapter 10: AIRCRAFT AND AVIATION FACILITY SECURITY (03/04/05) Part 444: PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND BUILDING SECURITY (Department of the Interior Aviation Facilities Security Procedures, 2006) Issues to consider when conducting a vulnerability assessment include the following specific issues: Surrounding terrain and adjacent structures; Site layouts and elements, including perimeter and parking; Location and access to incoming utilities; Circulation patterns and spatial arrangements; Location of high risk assets within a facility; Mail-handling protocols and procedures; Access controls for service and maintenance personnel; Information technology (IT) controls; and Blast resistance and HVAC Protection. (Transportation Security Administration, 2006)

The likelihood of occurrence of vulnerabilities should be considered and designated in the following categories: Frequent -- event will occur; Probable -- expect event to occur; Occasional -- circumstances expected for that event which may or may not occur; Remote -- Possible but unlikely; Improbable -- event will not occur. (Transportation Security Administration, 2006) Critical Assets include such as: Stations; Shops; Headquarters building; Tunnels; Bridges; Trackwork vehicles; Command and control systems; Critical Personnel; Passenger's information systems. (Transportation Security Administration, 2006) Threats included are the following: (1) Explosives; (2) Incendiary materials; (3) Chemical agents; (4) Biological agents; (5) Radiological agents; (6) Nuclear agents; (7) Ballistic attacks; (8) Cyber attacks; and (9) Insider threat/sabotage. (Transportation Security Administration, 2006) Effective assessment includes five elements, which are stated to include: (1) asset analysis; (2) target or threat identification; (3) vulnerability assessment; (4) consequence analysis (scenarios); and (5) countermeasure recommendation. (Transportation Security Administration, 2004) The report contained herein has set out the basic requirements for airport security plan design and implementation. The actual requirements for airport security program design and implementation are much more detailed and are not able to be included fully in the present study due to its brevity. Further information is available for airport security program design and implementation and should be included in the actual airport security design initiative.

Fencing -- Perimeter Security

Fencing is reported to be the typical means of securing the airport perimeter. Fencing is variously designed and differs in height as well as differing in type which is dependent upon the security needs of the locale. Various barriers can increase the fence functionality include chain link topped with barbed wire. It is stated that it is important that airport personnel and users "be educated in the use of a "challenge" system. A challenge system involves airport employees and users confronting unknown personnel on the airport to determine whether or not they have a valid reason for being on airport property." (Transportation Security Administration, 2006) Included in such systems are "…stopping and questioning or even simply greeting the unknown individual and engaging in conversation to determine their purpose for being in a restricted area." (Transportation Security Administration, 2004)

The physical security barrier provided by a fence serves the following functions: (1) provides notice of the "legal boundary of the outermost limits of a facility or security sensitive area; (2) Assists in controlling and screening authorized entries into a secured area by deterring entry elsewhere along the boundary; (3) Supports surveillance, detection, assessment, and other security functions by providing a zone for installing intrusion detection equipment and closed-circuit television (CCTV); (4) Deters casual intruders from penetrating a secured area by presenting a barrier that requires an overt action to enter; (5) Demonstrates the intent of an intruder by their overt action of gaining entry; (6) Causes a delay to obtain access to a facility, thereby increasing the possibility of detection; (7) Creates a psychological deterrent; (8) Optimizes the use of security personnel while enhancing the capabilities for detection and apprehension of unauthorized individuals; (8) Demonstrates a corporate concern for facility security; (9) Provides a cost effective method of protecting facilities." (Transportation Security Administration, 2006) Some basic fencing features that serve to provide enhancement to security include: (1) Height - the higher the barrier, the more difficult and time consuming to breach; (2) Barbed Wire - adding barbed wire at the top of the fence increases the level of difficulty and time to breach; (3) Eliminating handholds - omitting a rail at the top of the fence makes the fence more difficult to climb.; (4) Burying the bottom of the fencing - eliminates the possibility of forcing the mesh up so that individuals can crawl under; (5) Sensor system - addition of an intrusion/alert system adds another level of security to the perimeter; (6) Lighting - increases visibility as well as raises the level of psychological deterrent; (7) Signage - installed along the fence line, signs are important to indicate private secured areas and the presence of security patrols, alarms, or monitoring systems; (8) Clear areas - security effectiveness of perimeter fencing is materially improved by the provision of clear areas on both sides of the fence, particularly in the vicinity of the terminal and any other critical facilities; and (9) Such clearance areas facilitate surveillance and maintenance of fencing and deny cover to vandals and trespassers." (Transportation Security Administration, 2004)

The suggested height of fences surrounding an airport range from ten to thirty feet in height and it is stated that there should not be any "…climbable objects, trees, or utility poles abutting the fence line nor areas for stackable crates, pallets, storage containers, or other materials." (Transportation Security Administration, 2004) There should be minimal vehicle parking along the fence perimeter and landscaping in the fence area should be minimal so that there is an elimination of the possibility of hidden "persons, objects, fence damage, and vandalism." (Transportation Security Administration, 2004)

Lighting

Lighting is another security feature and it is reported that lighting that is "good…protective…" is that which is "adequate, even light upon bordering areas…" (Transportation Security Administration, 2004) Lighting units for perimeter fence areas should be located "a sufficient distance within the protected area and above the fence so that the light pattern on the ground will include an area on both the inside and the outside of the fence. Generally, the light band should illuminate the fence perimeter barrier and extend as deeply as possible into the approach area." (Transportation Security Administration, 2006) Types of protective lighting systems are stated to include those as follows: (1) "Continuous Lighting. This is the most common protective lighting system; (2) It consists of a series of fixed lights arranged to flood a given area with overlapping zones of light on a continuous basis during the hours of darkness. There are two methods of employment of this system: (3) Glare projection lighting where the glare of lights directed across surrounding territory will not be annoying or interfere with adjacent operations; (4) Controlled lighting where the width of the lighted strip is restricted to meet a particular need; (5) Standby Lighting. Lights in this system are either automatically or manually turned on at a prearranged time, when suspicious activity is detected, or when an interruption of power occurs; (6) Movable Lighting. This type of lighting consists of manually-operated, movable flood lights; (7) Emergency Lighting. This system may duplicate any of the aforementioned systems. Its use is limited to periods of power failure or other emergencies and is dependent upon an alternate power source; (8) Solar Powered Lighting: In areas where electricity does not exist or is cost prohibitive solar powered lighting may be considered a viable alternative and have a wide range of applications." (Transportation Security Administration, 2006) Lighting of secure areas on both side of the airport fence perimeter gates is reported to be a method that is highly effective not only for ensuring the perimeter is secured to as well to ensure that "fence/gate signage is readable and that card readers, keypads, phones, locks and/or other devices are the gate area visible and usable." (Transportation Security Administration, 2004)