Alger Hiss There Have Been

Alger Hiss

There have been many controversial issues throughout history and especially during the uncertain yeas of the Cold War. The American and the Soviet information apparatus were rather well established mechanisms of information gathering and contributed in large parts to the evolution of the political scene in the 20th century. However, their entire activities were based on the human performances of different agents infiltrated in the adversary's intelligence offices and their continuous and regular reporting. Their existence was ultimately discovered and it did steer in many occasions great public display of accusations and counter arguments. One such case was the Alger Hiss spy scandal which pointed out a series of problems the American intelligence community faced during the Cold War years. On the one hand, it outlined the deep infiltrations of the soviet espionage influences into the American system of intelligence and, on the other hand, it proved the concrete performance of the American justice system which, although on its second attempt, convicted for perjury a high ranked official, despite his well defined and coveted defense. Romestein and Breindel.() make a similar point by arguing the importance of Chambers and the case itself; they consider that "his revelations, based on service as a courier for the soviet spy apparatus during the 1930s would be one of the most important testimonies about soviet spy craft in America (...) Chambers' experience also illustrates just how tightly interlocked the American Communist party was with the Soviet spy service."

Taking the particular case of Alger Hiss, indeed, it represented a milestone in the judicial practice of the U.S. courts, especially because it relied on official documents to support and make its decision. In determining Hiss's guilt, there were however certain key elements which brought about his final conviction. These included a set of released files from the U.S.'s secret project designed to gather information on the U.S.S.R.'s activities and interception of information known as the Venona files, a series of documents, the so called Pumpkin Papers, concerning the activities of the American official governmental structures whose existence in the end incriminated Hiss and contributed to his conviction. Lastly, an important role was played by the prosecutor's emphasis on certain last minute technical details which weighted decisively in Whittaker Chamber's favor and in the final outcome of the Alger Hiss trial.

Despite the fact that due to special legal provisions, "the statue of limitations shielded Hiss from a substantive espionage charge," Alger Hiss did not stand trial for espionage, the basis of the trial and the support of the accusations brought to justify the perjury charges proved the fact that, indeed, in his activity he did engage in espionage for the Soviet Union against the national interests of the U.S., as they were considered at the time.

Nonetheless, the impact of his case must be considered from different angles and most importantly in the context that represented the ideological confrontation between the western liberal political system and the Russian communist pressure.

The historical and political background evolved inside a set of well defined coordinates. The period between the two world conflagrations was determined by a clear tendency of confrontation between two political ideologies on the one hand and economic systems on the other. Russia was an emerging political power, as the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent 1922 proclamation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics placed the communist threat in the frontline of political debates and polemics especially in the western world which was facing an increasing ideological pressure from the socialist pole. On the other hand, the communist system promoted a different type of economic development and scheme which also consisted into a possible threat for the western liberal economies. The eventual negative impact of such competitive forces would have reverberated onto others sectors of the national operational mechanism such as military capabilities and political supremacy. Therefore, it was considered by the American administrations in this period that measures needed to be taken in order to limit and control any development and possible degeneration of the situation concerning the spread of the soviet line of thought. Accordingly, "the U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service, the precursor to the National Security Agency, began a secret program in February 1943 later codenamed Venona. The mission of this small program was to examine and exploit Soviet diplomatic communications but after the program began, the message traffic included espionage efforts as well." Therefore, from one point-of-view, the background was defined by the existence of an information gathering system which made use of every possibility to intercept any sort of data relating to the unofficial conflict in which the U.S. And the U.S.S.R. were engaged.

As a consequence of this reality, there was the constant doubt of the power and influence of structures specific to the soviet system activating inside the U.S. The real scare for the American politicians dedicated to the core principles of liberalism was the eventuality that "many idealistic American anti-fascists eager to gain elite status in the Communist underground" would adopt the "scientific socialism" as "an attractive alternative to Depression-era capitalism. Few of these true believers accepted payment for their services," and therefore they were considered to be a threat to the stability of the political equilibrium in America.

These worries were somewhat entitled, as there had been little action prior to the Second World War and the U.S. intervention in Europe to counteract the soviet interferences in the American society. Tim Weiner (1999) describes the political and social environment as being rather "fertile." According to him "there was no American counterintelligence to speak of before Pearl Harbor, and the romance of American communism was strong in the few years between Hitler's rise and Stalin's purges. Underground networks proliferated like hothouse plants, but agents quickly became ensnarled, with three separate strands of intelligence gathering -- the KGB, the GRU (military intelligence), and the Communist Party of the United States -- intermingling to ill effect."

The passage of time and the eventual disappearance of the historical implications of the acts of different persons made it possible certain names of espionage agents to be both made public and found out. Thus it is now known that persons such as Michael Straight, a close friend of the Roosevelt presidential family had been a part of the soviet intelligence during his academic years at Cambridge University. Similarly, important public officials such as Samuel Dickstein, congressman of New York, were proven to have collaborated with the soviet intelligence by providing secret information especially related to the U.S.'s war plans and projects. Other examples presented by Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev (1998) include the daughter of America's ambassador to Germany, Martha Dodd who offered confidential official documents related to the State Department, the White House and the Embassy system's activities to soviet espionage.

Therefore, there were certain forces that acted both inside the American society such as the Communist Party and different pressure groups, and from outside the U.S. borders especially the Soviet espionage; as Weiner notes, "the Soviet spies in the United States did what they could to buy or steal American secrets -- scientific, technical, military, and political information." In the ends he also concludes that indeed, the soviet espionage relied greatly on "the help of American agents." One f these agents was Alger Hiss, who although convicted for perjury would be later on proven to have engaged in espionage activities for the Soviet Union.

In order to understand the entire implications of the case at hand it is important to consider the full development of the issue, from the first accusations Chambers brought to the attention of Adolf a. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary of State in 1939 to the final outcome of the second trial against Alger Hiss on December 7, 1950.

The main characters of the events are considered to be in total opposition. This was quite obvious, from the physical appearance to the social and professional background. "Alger Hiss was (a) tall, handsome... with an impeccable pedigree. Whittaker Chambers was a short, stocky, and rumpled Columbia drop-out (...) from a poor and troubled Philadelphia family."

The press offered a rather comprehensive coverage of the news, especially considering the fact that one of the parties was directly involved in the activity of Time Magazine. Therefore, the same publication gave a detailed description of the events in its February 13th 1950 cover story. Thus, on the one hand, Alger Hiss was "an honor graduate of Johns Hopkins University and a graduate cum laude of Harvard Law School (...) he had won the coveted apprenticeship job of law-clerking for Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. He married Priscilla Fansler Hobson." Professionally speaking, he was a man of great political success considering his important position as "as executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, as a technical adviser at the Yalta Conference and as secretary general of the founding convention of U.N." Most importantly however, he enjoyed the large support of influential persons such as Secretary of State James Byrnes or Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.

On the other hand, Whittaker Chambers was "a contributing editor of Time (...) from 1925 to April 1938, (he) had been a Communist, a writer of radical literature, an editor of the Communist Daily Worker. He had also been what was then vaguely known as a Communist courier."

The major starting point of the case was Chambers' disappointment with the communist doctrine and the dual attitude Stalin had when signing the 1939 pact with the Nazi leadership. Therefore, according to Time Magazine, he "abandoned the party in revulsion and despair, and became a determined enemy of Communism." Consequently, outraged by the dramatic turn that the soviet politics had taken, he began expressing his views on the collaborators of the soviet regime in the U.S. It is in this way that Chambers contacted Berle, who, after the discussion he had with the former communist partisan, wrote in his notes from September 2, 1939 the information presented by Chambers in their discussions; Alger Hiss's name is associated with information regarding his position in the Administration as "Assistant to Sayre-CP-1937," as "member of the underground Com.-Active, Baltimore boys." Information was given in respect to his wife, Pricilla, who was also a member of the socialist party. Finally, in relation to Alger Hiss, there was also noted the period which determined his involvement with the soviets that was the "early days of New Deal."

These proved to be essential for the development of the case because they represented the basic proof Berle needed to begin inquiring into the matter. After a series of personal investigations, he finally decided to take his notes to the Department of Justice which in turn called Chambers for additional questioning relating to his statement. Nonetheless, Hiss's reputation was still intact and he successfully participated at the Yalta Conference and the San Francisco UN Conference. After Hiss's appointment as the head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a very strived for position in the field, he was somewhat twisted by Secretary of State James Byrnes to address the still unproven suspicions of his affinities with communist groups in America and abroad. Hiss thus officially affirmed his complete lack of involvement in activities similar to those he was accused of.

The matter however worsened and "In the spring of 1948 Thomas Donegan, a special assistant to the Attorney General, spread before a federal grand jury in New York an FBI report on Alger Hiss." From this point on, because of the official level that the entire situation had reached by implicating the House Un-American Activities Committee, every public statement would represent on the record appreciations. From this perspective, when Hiss firmly denied any involvement with soviet services or any knowledge of former party member, Whittaker Chambers, he in fact had committed perjury. This would be proven, if not very clearly in the court of law at the time, through additional documents and official records which would be presented to the public years later.

In support of the allegations of espionage there were numerous testimonies, among which that of Elisabeth Bentley, one of Chamber's former communist colleagues who testified to knowing Alger Hiss, among others from the party lines. In response, "Alger Hiss also denied the accusations." In his testimony before the House Committee, Hiss clearly and unequivocally stated that "To the best of my knowledge. I never heard of Whittaker Chambers until in 1947, when two representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation asked me if I knew him and various other people, some of whom I knew and some of whom I did not know. I said I did not know Chambers. So far as I know, I have never laid eyes on him, and I should like to have the opportunity to do so."

The determination in denying the accusations and the fame and respect he was enjoying from his colleagues permitted Hiss to convince his adversaries of the relativity of the charges he was faced with. Nonetheless, an important role was played by the Republican Congressman Richard Nixon, whose intervention in the case also stirred rumors according to which the attempt to indict Hiss with espionage was politically motivated. Notwithstanding, a subcommittee was created in order to establish the truthfulness of the two sides of the story. In this process, all sorts of questions were being asked, with apparently no direct connection to the case. In the end however, to Richard Nixon's perspective, Chambers proved his point-of-view by offering certain details of Hiss's personal life and passions that at least an acquaintance if not a friend would have access to. Linder points out that "in discussions after the hearing, (August, 16, 1948) Committee members indicated they were now convinced Hiss was lying based on large parts on the response about the warble." Moreover, as Edward White notes, "a lengthy interview with Chambers convinced Nixon that the Chambers case was so airtight that the Justice Department had no choice but to ask for an indictment of Hiss." As a consequence, the House Committee considered Hiss's testimony to be "vague and evasive," while Chambers' to be "forthright and emphatic." The events continued to evolve and, following Chambers' public accusation of Hiss being a liar, the latter filed suit against him.

The libel suit represented the turning point in the Hiss-Chambers case. It was not so much the trial itself, but what it meant in terms of evidence brought in support of the affirmations made. It is in this context that the Pumpkin Papers emerged and sealed Hiss's fate. They played a crucial role in Chambers' defense because they represented the evidence needed to attest the relationship Chambers and Hiss indeed had, and therefore opened the road for the accusation of perjury and for finally proving Hiss's implication in the soviet espionage.

The Pumpkin Papers represented "samples of the documents that Chambers had provided to Soviet intelligence" which he had kept " as an insurance policy (...) documents he had hid one night on his farm in a hollowed-out pumpkin in fear that the Soviets might try to steal and destroy them." They consisted of sixty five pages of secret documents, four notes handwritten by Alger Hiss, and five strips of 35 mm film. "The two developed microfilm rolls only contained copies of more solemn State Department documents from the same frame time as the typed copies Chambers had disclosed." Therefore, they indeed were a certification of the fact that Chambers had in fact a material and factual support of his claims and accusations in relation to Alger Hiss's activities. Their content dealt with the State Department's activities in various areas, including "the Soviet Union, the Spanish Civil War, and Germany's takeover of Austria. Other frames dealt with subjects that hardly seem the stuff of spy novels, such as diagrams of fire extinguishers and life rafts. All of the documents that bore dates came from the period from January 5 through April 1, 1938"

The controversy surrounding these documents revolves around a number of different aspects. On the one hand, the respective documents pointed out the existence of a clear case of espionage. For instance, one of the documents was dated January 6, 1938 and concerned secret information regarding the "change in direction force of the economic development of Manchukuo from the South Manchuria Railway to a new company, the Manchukuo Heavy Industry Development Company, which will be a holding company jointly owed by the Manchukuo Government and the Japan Industries Company." The most important aspect of such documents was not necessarily the actual information they contained, as sometimes they were mere plans for life rafts, but rather their actual existence outside the diplomatic circuit. The "Report on the new economic organization in Mnchukuo" for example was meant for restricted circulation, from the American Consul in Yokohama, Japan, to the Secretary of State in Washington. Despite the clear evidence of espionage, due to legal loopholes, there could have been no indictment for espionage.

On the other hand, there was still the accusation of perjury for which Hiss could be accounted because he had lied before the Committee about him knowing Chambers.

In connection with this point, there are two contradictory testimonies regarding the papers. Following their more or less voluntary release, as Chambers had to be subpoenaed by the Committee in order to hand over the entire material, both Hiss and Chambers testified before a Grand Jury up to mid December 1948. Throughout these testimonies however, when asked about the papers which constituted the proof of the defense, "at any time did you, or Mrs. Hiss in your presence, turn any documents of the State Department, or of any other Governmental organization, over to Whittaker Chambers," Hiss refused to admit any wrong doing or meetings with Chambers with such aim, "never, excepting, I assume, the title certificate to the Ford (...) and to no unauthorized person." However, the prosecutor managed to swiftly underline the discrepancy between his affirmation and Chambers' "Mr. Hiss, Mr. Chambers has testified that he obtained typewritten copies of official State Department documents from you." This line of questioning did in fact have a specific aim: it tried to saw the seed of doubt in the mind of the Grand Jury, and to refocus their attention from the possibility of accusing Chambers of perjury to that of indicting Hiss of the same fact.

A major role is this attempt was held by the ambiguous testimonies of the Hisses who were somewhat forced to give clear cut answers in response to the defense's questioning. For instance, Hiss's wife, Pricilla, when trying to justify the car given to Chambers, despite the fact that they considered themselves mere acquaintances, unwillingly admitted that "it wasn't very much of a gift." Thus, the existences of the relationship would have been established.

Another major element in the demonstration of the defense case was the link between the typed documents and Hiss's own typewriter. According to the defense theory, the documents were retyped at night because it was a well-known fact that they could not have been kept more than one night, as it would have appeared suspicious. In support of their arguments "Eunice Lincoln, a secretary in Hiss's office, testified that Hiss often took department documents home to work on. The most critical testimony tying Hiss to the typed copies of State Department documents came from the FBI laboratory expert Ramos C. Feehan who told jurors that letters known to have been typed by the Hiss standards were typed on the same Woodstock typewriter as the sixty five papers." Still, Hiss argued in his defense that he had acquired the typewriter for his stepson, while the latter testified that "I do not remember any typewriter being specifically for my use" thus contradicting Hiss's argument. In the end, the lawyer in charge of defending Chambers concluded sarcastically that indeed, there were too many typewriters for a family which in fact does not use any of it. Moreover, the focus on the typewriter issue went even further, and Hiss tried to convince the jury that the respective machine was somehow given away prior to the evens occurring in 1938 and thus it would have been practically impossible for the Hisses to type the documents. Despite a series of personal depositions, such as the three members of the Catlatt family, that "testified that the Woodstock typewriter on which the Baltimore papers were allegedly typed was in fact in their possession," they could not shad light or a clear image on the situation, as there were serious hesitations and discrepancies between the examination and the cross examination of the same witness, each of the lines of questioning resulting in different answers.

Notwithstanding the somewhat obvious evidence in support of a favorable verdict for Chambers which would have accused Hiss of perjury, the jury came back without a clear verdict and it was declared a mistrial. There were numerous reasons for the deadlock. One of it was Hiss's strategy to underline his illustrious career and reputation, together with his distinctive high ranked friends who testified in his support. Thus, a unanimous decision could not have been reached.