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Yamamoto noted that "the war would continue for several years, our supplies would be exhausted, our ships and arms would be damaged and ultimately we would not be able to escape defeat." (Akira, 1990, pp.133-134).
Masaru (1990) added that another difficulty between the two nations was America's attitude during the U.S.-Japanese negotiations on the eve of the outbreak of war. In particular, Masaru points to the hard line position of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Hull turned down Japan's proposal for summit meeting between Prime Minister Konoe and President Roosevelt. Then Hull presented the Hull note which included a demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China. This demand was met with considerable opposition by Japan. Masaru stressed the worsening communication between Washington and Tokyo. Masaru reiterated that although Ambassador Joseph Grew had a good grasp of the situation in Japan, his views were not seriously considered by Hull, Hornbeck and other U.S. policy makers. Hornbeck in particular, was well-known as a pro-China hand. However, Hornbeck's hard line policy toward Japan only served to push the Japanese further in their drive south and into conflict of with the U.S. (p.49).
The most important lesson that can be derived from the Pearl Harbor attack is that it is imperative for leaders to maximize dialogue in conflict resolution. This responsibility rests heavily on leadership....
Leaders should learn to be open to the views of the other party and in the same way meet them half way. In resolving differences between states, the military option should always be the last option, but if push comes to shove, one is at times forced to make the first strike and this happen with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. While it may be a calculated attack on the part of the Japanese, it also shows a degree of complacency on the part of the Americans by somehow under estimating the military strength of the Japanese. On hindsight, the Pearl Harbor's most important lesson is that states should never be put in a predicament wherein they would have to settle their disputes using arms because at the end of the day no one wins.
References
Masaru, I. (1990) "Mismanagement in the U.S. Policy towards Japan" in Pearl Harbor Re-examined: Prologue to the Pacific War edited by Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray. Honolulu: University of the Hawaii Press.
Gaynor, E. And Esler, a. (2003) World History: Connections to the World. Upper Saddle River New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Stearns, P., Schwartz, D. And Beyer, B. (1991) World History: Traditions and New Directions. New York: Addison and Wesley Publishing Company.
Akira, F. (1990) "Road to Pearl Harbor" in Pearl Harbor Re-examined: Prologue to the Pacific War edited by Hilary Conroy and Harry Wray. Honolulu: University of the Hawaii Press.
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