Pearl Harbor attack and its historical consequences

Pearl Harbor

Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the initial reaction by the President and his cabinet was to develop a plausible association for blame. In so doing they targeted the top two commanders in Hawaii, Admiral H.E. Kimmel and Lt. general W.C. Short. Several researchers even intoned that Kimmel and Short, were the official scapegoats of the President. () In retrospect most government investigations have demonstrated that this was not the case, and in fact the actions of these two men, actually rendered the Japanese attack, much less effective. Especially in retrospective as Kimmel stressed the fact that the Japanese attack strategy did not cripple the fleet, as they did not destroy the massive fuel supplies, which were at the time in the open, or target the machine shops which would be needed to keep the port active at a later time or the two large air craft carries, which were deployed at the time of the attack. ()

Vice-Adm W.W. Smith, chief of staff to Kimmel, said that the attack upon the fleet was Japan's "greatest mistake." The Japs, he said, knocked out only battleships, which were of less value than the two carriers which were at sea and escaped damage. Adm. Smith said that the Japs could have crippled the Pacific fleet for months if they had destroyed the oil supplies and machine shops at Hawaii instead of the battleships. By doing so, he said, the base would have been rendered untenable. ()

Furthermore, the response by Kimmel at least demonstrates a demonstrative attempt to put light on the event by reducing the strategic effects of the event, playing up what didn't happen as a result of Japan's aggression, rather than what did happen, a planned strategic act of war that killed many, wounded even more and demonstrated an utter lack of defensive action on the part of the two lead commanders.

This work will show that the ultimate responsibility of the attack lies squarely in the hands of these two men, as they had the most direct association with the events that immediately led up to the attack. The initial manner in which this work will argue this point is to analyze the actions and responses of the other categorical definitions of blame and then making a case for the responsibility of Kimmel and Short.

The commission, although charged with seeking derelictions of duty and errors of judgment only among Army and Navy officers, was at pains to state that Gen. Marshall, Adm. Stark, and Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox had discharged their responsibilities. In Conclusion 17, however, it implied that these officials did bear some responsibility, after all. It said that the dereliction of Kimmel and Short consisted of failing to "consult and confer... respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings" dispatched from Washington. ()

The foundation of the intelligence associated with the event is often the point which people use, to demonstrate the responsibility of Kimmel and Short, as the strategic position of these two commanders as well as the President and the cabinet was to discuss the importance of the emphasis of Japanese direct aggression as one of the only ways the American people and therefore the Congress would agree to an entrance into the war.

The discussion, has been linked to the idea that the government, e.g. Marshall and Stark had detailed intelligence that the Japanese were planning an attack on U.S. soil, some even going as far as stating that they knew that the attack would be on the base at Pearl Harbor but withheld such information because they knew that the American people would not support a strike on the part of the U.S. unless it was a counterstrike, in response to direct aggression to the U.S. territories, rather than the secondary aggressions previously taken by the Japanese, such as the isolation of the U.S. from strategic resources. ()

The meeting that most call into question when making this assertion is one that occurred on November 25 just a few days before the attack. It calls to mind the nature of a serious pending situation, on the part of the U.S. And the Japanese, but is judged by way of after thought, rather than someone viewing the communication before the attack took place, as it truly would have been interpreted.

On Tuesday, November 25, Secretary Knox and I met in Mr. Hull's office for our usual Tuesday morning meeting. Mr. Hull showed us a proposal that he had prepared, which he was considering laying before Nomura and Kurusu for a 3 months' truce. At 12 o'clock on the same day, we three went to the White House, where we met with the President and also General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The President at once brought up the relations with the Japanese. Mr. Hull said the Japanese were poised for attack -- that they might attack at any time. The President said the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we might even be attacked, say next Monday, for example. ()

The conversation may seem to foretell the actual attacks but it is also clear the intelligence was not specific, with regard to the nature of the proposed attack by Japan as the sources state the Japan had been fundamentally successful in their bid to make sure that surprise was on their side. Though there were clearly whispers of the Japanese desire to make a strategic preemptive strike on the United States there were no concrete clues as to where and when such an attack would take place and what it would entail. Communications between the involved parties reflect the idea that though intelligence was not conclusive, Japanese attack is eminent in one of the Pacific strongholds and barring cause of serious concern among the public the commanders of the Pacific strongholds were to take all evasive actions that they could to reduce the effects of such an attack, not sit and wait as many have rightly accused Kimmel and Short of doing.

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not comma not repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. ()

Even in Kimmel's statement of the mistakes of Japan, with regard to the strategic resources that Japan did not hit is a clear sense that the resources were not safeguarded, and this is especially true with the extensive fuel stores out in the open at Pearl Harbor, as there were no overt or even planned attempts to remove the strategically necessary fuel stores to a safer place.

Kimmel and Short's collective statements were to the effect that they were doing the best they could with the resources they had and that the failing was not with them but with the failure of Washington to give them the information that a direct hit on Pearl Harbor was imminent and when.

In summary, the Pacific Fleet in 1941 established and maintained the highest degree of security measures at sea and in port consistent with our assigned mission of intensive preparation for war....We needed only one thing which our own resources could not make available to us. That vital need was the information available in Washington from the intercepted dispatches which told when and where Japan would probably strike. I did not get this information. ()

Even Kimmel's opening statements in his defense, including his Naval resume, seriously demonstrates the Kimmel was clearly on the hot seat, but there is also a great deal of evidence that this was essentially appropriate, as it was inaction on the part of Kimmel and Short was the source of the massively successful attack, by Japan on the Harbor. () The basic sentiment being that clear indications of a possible attack were given to the two commanders and if they were not specific it was a source of the nature of the intelligence at the time, not as a desire to keep the commanders out of the crucial link in the information web. "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." () The communication sent to the Pacific fleet commanders was clear in that is stressed that war was imminent with Japan, and though the statement goes on to say that the imminent attack may take place elsewhere in the Pacific it warns all commanders, and especially in the Pacific to make ready for war.

Though Kimmel himself states that there had been submarine activity around the Islands, there were no actions taken against them as he was waiting for approval from Department of Navy, in the ten days preceding the attack to act decisively. "For some time there had been reports of submarines in the operating areas around Hawaii.... The files of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, contain records of at least three suspicious contacts during the 5 weeks preceding Pearl Harbor." () Yet, actions were not taken by Kimmel and Short to act on a suspicion of overt operations, by Japan in their immediate vicinity. Kimmel and Short waited to take action, to a point where the attack came as a complete shock, to the men at work that morning in the harbor.

On November 3, 1941, a patrol plane observed an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longtiude 157-41. The patrol plane searched a 15-mile area. A sound search was made by the U.S.S. Borden, and an investigation was made by the U.S.S. Dale, all of them producing negative results. On November 28, 1941, the U.S.S. Helena reported that a radar operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area. A search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the U.S.S. Gamble reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine. On the morning of the atttack, the U.S.S. Ward reported to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District that it had attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon a submarine operating in the defensive sea area. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District directed a verification of this report with a view to determining whether the contact with the submarine was a sound contact or whether the submarine had actually been seen by the Ward. He also directed that the readyduty destroyer assist the Ward in the defensive sea area. Apparently, some short time after reporting the submarine contact, the Ward also reported that it had intercepted a sampan which it was escorting into Honolulu. This message appeared to increase the necessity for a verification of the earlier report of the submarine contact. Between 7:30 and 7:40 I received information from the Staff Duty Officer of the Ward's report, the dispatch of the readyduty destroyer to assist the Ward, and the efforts then under way to obtain a verification of the Ward's report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number of such contacts which had not been verified in the past. ()

Kimmel directed his messages toward inference that information was withheld from him and Short, in his later testimony made the same assertions, even more directly accusing the government of a conspiracy to leave him in the dark and force the attack readiness to be limited.

On Pearl Harbor day I was carrying out orders from the War Department as I understood them.2. At no time since June 17, 1940, had the War Department indicated the probability of an attack on Hawaii. In none of the estimates prepared by G-2 War Department was Hawaii mentioned as a point of attack, but the Philippines was mentioned repeatedly.3. There was in the War Department an abundance of information which was vital to me but was not furnished to me. This information was absolutely essential to a correct estimate of the situation and correct decision. My estimate of the situation and my decision were made without the benefit of this vital information. Had this information been furnished to me, I am sure that I would have arrived at the conclusion that Hawaii would be attacked and would have gone on an all-out alert.4. When I made the decision, based on the information available to me, to go on alert to prevent sabotage (No. 1), 1 reported measures taken as follows:Reurad 472 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. The War Department had 9 days in which to tell me that my action was not what they wanted. I accepted their silence as a full agreement with the action taken. I am convinced that all who read the report thought that my action was correct or I would have received instructions to modify my orders. ()

Short, like Kimmel leaves the opening for a historical slew of revisionists as well as conspiracy theorists, so clearly that it is the stuff of film, rather than official government investigations. The resulting historical interpretations are almost inevitable in this cloud of shirking that the two commanding officers in Hawaii have created through repeated assertions of their correct actions, and the incorrect actions of others.

Some of the intelligences that Kimmel and Short state they were not privy to include the official cable traffic of the Japanese that was decoded under a system referred to as MAGIC. The information, in retrospect was often unreliable and many mistakes were made in interpretation. In fact, the intelligences have frequently been referred to as interpretive. () ()

Both sides made mistaken judgments of each other. The Americans underestimated the Japanese strength and determination; the Japanese convinced themselves that the United States, after receiving a knockout blow at Pearl Harbor, would not pursue them to the far reaches of the western and southern Pacific. ()

Both sides made assumptions, and the assumptions demonstrated the best possible case scenario, for each, supporting the resources they actually had and demonstrative of the historical reluctance of the U.S. To enter the war and the preceding conservative military tactics of the Japanese. Intelligences that were interpreted by Stark, Marshall and others were an underestimation of the lengths that Japan would go to attack and for that matter their actual strengths.() Thinking they would attack in a less extreme manner, and in locations that were closer to Japan and less direct was the desire of the whole of the government, and yet they knew something was coming and all those in command positions in the Pacific were charged with taking evasive actions immediately to ward off damage and loss of life was crucial to the military safety of the nation. It is therefore very unlikely, as Kimmel and Short, as well as hind-sight revisionist historians have frequently claimed that any withholding of information was done, as the information that was available was not conclusive and it goes without saying that the officials in Washington, despite their desire for a Japanese first strike to occur before the U.S. could in good conscience enter the war, would have no vested interest in keeping a valuable resource in the dark about the potential damage they might incur during such an attack. The interest of the officials was to protect the U.S. not leave it open for attack, without warning. Warnings were given to Kimmel and Short, but they were not heeded to the degree of necessity.

Another revisionist stance on the conflict concludes that Roosevelt was in collusion with Churchill and even possibly Stalin, with regard to military intelligence about Japan's intentions to strike Hawaii and that intelligence was deliberately withheld, because of some collective idea about the manner in which it would help the popular cause of the U.S. entering the war. The revisionist interpretation is a long held set of assertions of conspiracy and collusion, and has created an academic body of knowledge that stretches across the decades and feeds even more conjecture. ()

Of the revisionists who saw evidence of a conspiracy in the pattern of Washington's mishandling of information before the attack, none has offered conclusive evidence. Kimmel's defender and former subordinate, Rear Admiral Robert Theobald, wrote that the failure to provide CincPac with the means to decode the Purple messages [yet to be decoded messages from the MAGIC files] was "a deliberate act... part of a definite plan" to ensure the success of a Japanese surprise attack. ()

Theobald's assertions are unsubstantiated, as at the time it was not unusual for intelligences to be disseminated before they were fully decoded and many of the MAGIC files were backlogged in the system, for lack of manpower and other reasons. A fact pointed out by a leading historian on the subject of WWII and decoding.

Budiansky...addresses U.S. codebreaking operations against the Japanese. He examines the Japanese diplomatic Purple cipher (intelligence from it was codenamed MAGIC) as well as the Japanese Fleet General Purpose Code. The author notes that intercepted Purple messages of 3 and 6 December 1941 indicated that Japan was about to go to war with the United States. However, not a single Japanese Fleet message (which would have contained details) was read by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. Following the war, when cryptanalysts examined the unread traffic, they found some of the details. Although none of the messages specifically mentioned Pearl Harbor, Budiansky points out that had the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese Fleet traffic been decoded and read at the time, it would have certainly conveyed heavy hints about the attack. That it was not decoded was partly a matter of manpower and partly one of priority. MAGIC was such a dazzling find that it blinded its possessors to possible attack information that lay buried among Japanese Fleet supply orders and maneuvers. ()

To some degree information was available, that had not been interpreted fully before the attack but it was not available in a strategic sense to Kimmel and Short, or those they frequently accuse of withholding it. ()

Yet, another revisionist, Barnes declares without serious evidence that '"Steps were taken to ensure that the Hawaiian commanders...would not be forewarned" of any impending attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor. ()

According to most historians there is little if any supporting evidence for such claims, just a number of hunches and common revisions of timelines.

Theobald offers no supporting evidence for his charge, and Barnes, for his part, admits that "there is no definitive documentary evidence which has thus far [1972] been revealed and fully proves that Roosevelt had been informed" of the Japanese plans. 3. ()

The last revisionist to be discussed here did offer some evidence of a conspiracy but the information is not completely legitimate, in that it is based on unconfirmed reports, mostly experiential, testimony.

Infamy, by John Toland, is the most recent work to assert that President Roosevelt had foreknowledge of the attack and withheld warnings to Kimmel and Short. Unlike earlier writings in this vein, Toland presents evidence to support the thesis. He claims that radio messages from Nagumo's task force were intercepted as the carriers approached Hawaii. These intercepts, Toland says, were correctly interpreted by U.S. naval intelligence to track the First Air Fleet's movements across the North Pacific. The core of Toland's evidence is a series of interviews with a former U.S. Navy radio technician (called by Toland "Seaman Z," actually James Ogg), the diary of Leslie Grogan, a Lurline radio operator, and the diary of and an interview with the Dutch naval attache in Washington. ()

According to Toland

The Lurline operator detected what he believed to be Japanese signals coming from an area north and west of Hawaii. The U.S. Navy radio technician, working in San Francisco, told Toland he plotted strange radio signals emanating from the same area. The diary of the Dutch naval attache, Captain Johan Ranneft, recorded a December 2 visit to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Toland says Ranneft was told there by U.S. Navy officers that a Japanese carrier force was approaching Hawaii. 4 ()

Another historian assessing the validity of Tolands claims points out that the information could be considered flawed, and at the very least is interpretive in nature, just as the intelligences on the same matter were before and after the attack.