Australian Defense Force and Whole

Australian Defense Force and Whole of Government Operations

Has the Australian Defense Force (ADF) "broken the code" to successful integration of joint-interagency support during the conduct of military operations?

Following the end of Australian involvement in the Vietnam War a decision was made by the Government of Australia to reorganize the department supporting the military services, which included the Army, Navy and Air Force, which recommended the unification into one single Department of Defense. These recommendations were accepted by the government and the Australian Defense Force (ADF) was formed on February 9, 1976. Over the course of the next thirty years the ADF would continually redefine its role and how it interacts with supporting government agencies in the conduct of military operation. The contemporary security situation that exists today cannot be compared to the Cold War paradigm of the past that formed the parameters for military operations and interaction with foreign governments. The target set that presents itself is entirely new with added complexities that military forces neither trained, nor were expected to perform in the course of normal operations. A better understanding of the regional security situation at an earlier stage enabled the ADF to be prepared for the 21st century prior to others. Interaction with all aspects of government sooner in an officer's career has significant impact on the ability to work in and out of government circles. Operations in the Solomon Islands, East Timor and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq have served to showcase the ability of Australia to conduct military ventures with a joint-interagency approach far surpassing its nearest ally. This "whole of government approach" (WOG) that the Australian's utilize appears close to mastery with the recent successes over the spectrum of conflict in their region and globally. In the complex security situation of the 21st century the world finds itself immersed in politics as much as war upon the onset of conflict, so much that the acronym PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure) has been developed by the U.S. military to aid in planning and executive and to provide a greater awareness of its role in the conduct of military operations. Australia's tri-service attitude and depth and breadth of knowledge across government bears further attention and might hold a glimpse of the future of U.S. military action.

WORKING HYPOTHESIS

The Australian Defense Force has developed a keen sense for joint interagency operations since reorganizing as one multi-capable tri-service after 1976, serving as a model for western militaries seeking a whole of government approach in the security situation of the 21st century. Further analysis will inform and define what brought about this radical change in the ADF and what direction it will take in future joint interagency operations.

METHODOLOGY

The intent of this monograph is to inform the reader through the most practical and simple means of explanation available. Complexities will be spared where they only serve to confuse the reader and care taken to ensure that the issue of the ADF's ability to work across the PMESII spectrum is fully analyzed. The approach will look historically over past operations and recent ones to showcase examples of Australian interagency efforts from the Solomon's to Iraq. The Australian Defense Force's (ADF) involvement, over the period 1993 to 2006, in a range of operations and aspects of conventional conflict and the ADF's whole of government (WOG) approach is analyzed in what follows. During this time the ADF saw activity in the following: Operation Solace (1993) Somalia; Operation Lagoon (September-October 1994) Bougainville; Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) and Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) Bougainville (1997-2001); International Force East Timor (INTERFET) and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (1999-2002); Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001-2006); and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2006). What makes these operations unique is the stated fact by the Australian Government for the continued and increased "Whole of Government" approach to the conduct of military operations. For the purpose of this monograph only three of these operations will be looked at in an attempt to analyze and estimate the effectiveness of the operation and reasons tied to the success of the ADF's WOG approach. The rationale for this approach will allow the reader to gain insight into the inner workings of how the ADF is founded with a close relationship to government that begins in the early stages of an Australian officer's career and continues ascendancy of rank and promotion. The operations chosen cover a recent time period of exceptionally high operating tempo for Australia's forces. There are numerous government white papers and pamphlets produced on the subject of military operations and governance, as well as numerous studies of each of the proposed operations that will be researched. Thorough examination of the success and failure in the Australian Defense Force's whole of government operations will give an indication of what is required for success in future operations as well as potential indicators of success that may well be leveraged by allied forces in the future conduct of operations in the contemporary security situation f the 21st century and beyond.

INTRODUCTION

The origin and geographical setting of Australia "has strongly influenced its defense policy since Australian Federal in 1901. From 1901 until 1942 and again from 1945 to 1969, the defense policy was known as the Imperial and later the Commonwealth Defense Strategy." (Swinsburg, 2001) it is related that during this period "Australia maintained a small inlay part-time defense force designed for the land defense of Australia. The Australian Navy in contrast was integrated into the Royal Navy mobilization plans in a global role." (Swinsburg, 2001) the Royal Navy was relied upon by Australia for global and regional protection. The ground forces in Australia "were structured to be mobilized in an adhoc fashion, to prevent expeditionary forces deployed in support of a larger commonwealth force under British control." (Swinsburg, 2001) According to Major Philip R. Swinsburg in the work entitled: "The Strategic Planning Process and the Need for Grand Strategy": "Grand strategy is the process 'by which the nation's basic goals are realized in a world of conflicting goals and values. The ends of grand strategy are usually expressed in terms of national interests. The role of the strategy process is to translate those national interests into means for achieving those ends." (Swinsburg, 2001) According to Swinsburg the ADF defines national or grand strategy as "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives." (2001) Swinsburg relates that "the means of achieving national interests are those elements of national power commonly referred to as Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) capabilities." (2001)

Swinsburg relates the statement of Collins in the work entitled: "Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices" who states the definition of grand strategy to be something which:

fuses all the powers of the nation, during peace as well as war, to attain national interests and objectives. Within that context, there is an over-all political strategy, both foreign and domestic; a national military strategy, and so on. Each component influences national security immediately or tangentially." (Collins, 1973; as cited in Swinsburg, 2001)

Swinsburg relates that: "The changing strategic environment in Australia's near and immediate neighborhood, as well as those areas where Australia's economic interest lie continues to evolve. Any strategic plan must therefore be flexible and accept change." (2001) Swinsburg additionally states: "The SPS needs to develop a process of strategy formation that accommodates both deliberate and emergent strategies. A strategy for the protection of Australia is well developed in the defense of Australian concept." (2001) Swinsburg states: "...few if any, strategies can be purely deliberate, and few can be purely emergent. One suggests no learning and the other suggests no control. All real world strategies need to mix these in some way to attempt to control, without stopping the learning process. Effective strategies need to mix both the intended and emergent strategies to have any real expectation of having them realized. " (2001)

I. WHOLE of GOVERNMENT (WOG) APPROACH

The work entitled: "A Military Perspective on Civil-Military Cooperation in the War Against Terror" presented by General Peter Cosgrove" in an Address to the Fulbright Symposium July 5, 2004 relates: "Since the end of the Cold War we have faced a new security paradigm that includes many non-state players. Our environment is now characterized by a complicated web of interconnected threats and vulnerabilities including traditional state-on-state tensions, and also including amorphous groups of rogue states, terrorist organizations and trans-national criminals." (Cosgrove, 2005) Cosgrove states additionally that: "If necessary, military forces have a clear role to play at what I call the hard end of the spectrum of response. Military Forces quite rightly provide capability to kill and destroy an enemy on behalf of our nation if required. That is part of our professional job. However that part itself should be the option of last recourse for our forces." (2005)

Cosgrove states that while the Australian Defense Force may be used in achieving specific aims "it cannot be a panacea..." therefore the ADF "will work from a 'whole of government' approach and often in collation with other countries and militaries to provide the outcomes that are needed to meet modern security challenges." (Cosgrove, 2005; p. 3) Cosgrove relates that there are many other agencies "intimately involved in preserving our security, be they law enforcement, border protection, intelligence or other civil authorities and a comprehensive, that is, an enduring solution to global terrorism requires using all aspects of national power, including legal, economic, diplomatic intelligence and military capability." (2005) Because of the differing roles and the new pressures brought to the environment in the process of the integration of traditional defense functions with law enforcement and civil authorities it is necessary to understand that there are different requirements needed by various entities such as for example: "...military forces need good intelligence but law enforcement agencies need information that meets an evidentiary standard..." (Cosgrove, 2005; p. 4) Cosgrove relates that there is a need for development of "appropriate frameworks" and for responsibilities to be: "...clearly defined" if the effective combination of these differing roles is to be ensured. Cosgrove states that like many countries "Australia...is taking action to bolster the traditional capabilities employed to defend its people against the threat of terrorism." (2005; p.4) Cosgrove relates that there are 'whole of government' Memoranda of Understanding on counter-terrorism between: "...Australia and Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Fiji, Cambodia, East Timor, India and Papua New Guinea..." (2005; p. 4)

Cosgrove relates that it is necessary for the Australian Defense Force to be "adaptable and flexible to meet the diverse possible scenarios in modern conflict circumstances." (2005; p. 5) Cosgrove relates the following operation of the ADF: (1) in East Timor the ADF demonstrated its capability in ADF led regional peace enforcement in a rapidly executed and successfully transitioning operation from military to civil control beginning through the United Nations and then through the Government of Timor-Leste "with appropriate reducing support form the global community; (2) in the Solomon Islands the ADF "provided a strictly supporting role of security and logistics to the Australian Federal Police led operation to bring law and order to that place"; and (3) in Afghanistan, the ADF contributed to "a multi-national coalition to attack al Qaeda sanctuaries and depose the regime that was supporting them." (Cosgrove, 2005; p. 5) Furthermore, the ADF contributed in Iraq in the form of a "war fighting coalition and now to the rehabilitation of Iraq." (Cosgrove, 2005; p.6) Cosgrove relates that "it is important to note that the ADF's recent experiences have learnt from and been built upon a long history of contribution to the United Nations missions in places like Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda to stabilize and rebuild societies." (2005; p. 6) it is held by Cosgrove (2005) to be "critical that each situation or conflict be closely analyzed. The elements to achieve success will prove to be unique in each case. But the emergence of global terrorism has meant there is an increasing need to link internal and external security. As a result there's been a need to enhance the roles that our Special Forces play in counter-terrorism, whether that is externally in, for example, Afghanistan or internally in Australia." (p. 6)

The work entitled: "Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia" Chapter 7: Countering the Terrorist Attack published by the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade relates that Australia is deeply committed to the "global campaign against terrorism." (2004) This work states that no country can "...combat the threat from transnational terrorism on its own. Effective action against terrorism requires a coordinated international response based on close and sustained international cooperation. A vigorous proactive approach to fighting transnational terrorism is also essential." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) it is further stated: "At the hard edge of Australia's whole-of-government contribution to the global campaign against terror is the use of military force. The Australian Defense Force (ADF) has been deployed twice since September 11 in major military operations against terrorism. First in Afghanistan, where we helped eliminate a safe haven for Al Qaida, and presently in Iraq, where international terrorists are among those fighting coalition forces and the Iraqi people over the latter's right to determine their own future." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) it is further related that law enforcement agencies are in a good position to disrupt terrorist activities and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) is Australia's lead international law enforcement agency and has a critical role in implementing Australia's regional counter-terrorism strategy. Since September 11, the government has boosted the AFP's capacity to combat terrorism. The formation of an AFP International Deployment Group was announced by the government in Australia in February 2004 that would strengthen the involvement of Australia in "...peace-keeping operations, missions to restore law and order, and the delivery of capacity-building initiatives in the region." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004)

It is related that: "The AFP has worked hard over a number of years to establish solid working relationships with regional police services. This groundwork paid dividends in the successful joint investigation into the Bali bombings. The investigation was underpinned by our bilateral counter-terrorism arrangement with Indonesia signed in February 2002, and an arrangement between the AFP and the Indonesian National Police, signed in June 2002. The AFP also helped the Philippines police investigate a series of terrorist bombings in the southern Philippines in 2003. And AFP officers were deployed to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Spain in response to terrorist attacks in those countries. " (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) the AFP delivers a range of capacity building programs to assist law enforcement agencies in Asia and the Pacific through its Law Enforcement Cooperation Program (LECP) which include: "specific counter-terrorism programs as well as programs designed to strengthen skills in conducting transnational crime investigations that are also relevant to terrorism investigations. Key areas for attention and assistance include crime scene management, forensic investigation, and the collection of intelligence for law enforcement purposes. The AFP is helping a range of countries establish Transnational Crime Centres that strengthen their ability to investigate transnational crimes, including terrorism.'(Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) Finally it is related that the AFP is making the provision of "...targeted counter-terrorism assistance to police services in Indonesia and the Philippines as part of broader Australian assistance packages with these two countries. A key initiative with Indonesia is the establishment of a Transnational Crime Coordination Centre. In another major new initiative, Australia and Indonesia recently agreed to establish the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). Malaysia has for many years been a strong and reliable partner of the AFP in fighting transnational crime, with a long record of participation in AFP training and capacity-building programs."

The ADF engages with regional partners in combined "counter-hijack and hostage recovery exercise, the maintenance of close intelligence contacts and the provision of intelligence training." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) Furthermore, the ADF has a focus on "improving regional countries' national coordination between defense and other agencies in the event of an incident, and on improving the standard of consequence management responses." (Transnational Terrorism, the Threat to Australia, 2004) ADF Incident Response assists in chemical, biological and nuclear (CBRN) response capacity-building efforts in the region." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) Strategic partnerships have been formed between several Australians' state and territory governments with the Pacific island countries, including Fiji, Samoa, Papua New Guinea and Vanutu." (Transnational Terrorism, the Threat to Australia, 2004) Furthermore, bilateral counter-terrorism relationships with countries outside of the region have been formed with the most important stating to be that with the United States. Regional organizations and bodies also play an important role in combating terrorism through development of common policy response to the problem, as well as acting as a forum "for the exchange of information and ideas, coordination of regional programs and in the development of "the political will and momentum for action." (Transnational Terrorism, the Threat to Australia, 2004)

II. DEFENSE BUDGET SPENDING 2007-08

The work of Mark Thompson entitled: "Your Defense Dollar: The 2006-07 Defense Budget" published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute relates: "...in today's world it's not just Australia that needs to be defended and secured but also Australian interests." (2006) Whatever Australia's interests might be, two clearly stand out in explaining our recent military endeavors: the alliance with the U.S. And the security of our local region. The reasons aren't simple. We can't be secure unless we live in a secure region, and we need a powerful ally to underwrite our security more broadly. Moreover, while we have many 'interests' most of them are shared problems that we can't make a decisive difference to anyway." (Thompson, 2006) That is however, noted to have changed since is that "...both the immediate region and the U.S. are more demanding now than at any time since the 1960s." (Thompson, 2006) the defense budget in Australia is based on two factors: (1) Outcomes: these are the results or benefits that the government aims to deliver to the community through the work of its agencies; and (2) Outputs: these are the goods and services that the agency produces to achieve its outcomes. (Thompson, 2006) Defense is stated to have six outcomes which are those of:

1) Command of operations in defense of Australia and its interests;

2) Navy capability for the defense of Australia and its interests;

3) Army capability for the defense of Australia and its interests;

4) Air Force capability for the defense of Australia and its interests;

5) Strategic policy for the defense of Australia and its interests; and 6) Intelligence for the defense of Australia and its interests. (Thompson, 2006)

Thompson states that there is "actually a seventh outcome, mainly covering superannuation payments for current and former ADF personnel and housing subsidies provided under the Defense Force Act 1990." (Thompson, 2007) the following figure illustrates the organization of Australian Defense.

Figure 1 - the Defense Organization

Source: Thompson (2007)

The groups are stated to fall into three categories, which include:

1) Output Executives groups are (mostly) responsible for delivering Defense's outputs to the government (the customer).

2) Owner Support Executives groups are responsible for protecting the government's interest as the owner of Defense, including by ensuring its long -- 'term viability.

3) Enabling Executives groups are responsible for providing business services, such as asset procurement and facilities management, to the other two types of groups.

Thompson states that the day-to-day management of the Department of Defense should not be confused with the command of military operations as "the former occurs through the diarchy and group/output arrangements, the latter through a formal command chain and dedicated headquarters structure." (2006) Defense command arrangement are illustrated in the following figure.

Figure 2: Defense Command Arrangements

Source: Thompson (2006)

Thomson relates that the ADF numbers dropped from 70,000 to 50,000 permanent personnel after 1991 and during the same period the numbers of civilians dropped from around 25,000 to 17,000. This is shown in the following figure.

Figure 3- Defense Workforce, 1990-91 to 2006-07

Thompson (2006)

It is reported that in February 2004 a Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism was co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia which served to produced "...concrete outcomes in the critical areas of law enforcement, information sharing, and legal frameworks." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) This meeting was attended by foreign and law enforcement ministers from twenty-five countries and provided a "fresh political momentum to regional counter-terrorism efforts." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) Australia supports the initiative of the South-East Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur and supports the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok as well as the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime in Manila. Australia is further leading an APEC initiative."..to raise awareness about and build the capacity of computer emergency response teams (CERT). These teams are valuable building blocks for increasing cyber security in our region and globally." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) Australia is also funding a new Financial Intelligence Support Team (FIST), which has as its focus the needs of the Pacific Island countries. The FIST will be located in the region and will provide both legal and strategic policy advice as well as mentoring and training to assist the island countries in meeting their international anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing obligations. FIST will further ensure: "...that existing and proposed Financial Intelligence Units in the Pacific are equipped with the necessary skills to deal with emerging financial crimes, including the financing of terrorism. Australia will join with its partners under the Five Power Defense Arrangements in defense exercises that will focus on addressing non-conventional threats in the region, particularly terrorism. The first of these exercises, which will involve ADF units, is scheduled to be held in the South China Sea in October 2004 and will be based on a mock merchant ship hijacking. Other government agencies will also participate in the exercises, where appropriate, to develop a broader multi-agency approach to countering terrorism in the region." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004)

The work entitled: "Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia" further reports that the complexity and multifaceted nature of terrorism "demands resources from across the community and from all levels of government. The government is committed to dedicating the resources to defend Australia and its global interests. These include intelligence and law enforcement activities, border protection, transport security, finances, diplomatic efforts, military commitments, humanitarian assistance, energy and national will." (2004) the resources of Australia are committed including "economic, social and intellectual wealth...intelligence, law enforcement and defense services...of the highest standard." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) Furthermore, the "arms of government are responsive and flexible." (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004) the work entitled: "The Hardened and Networked Army" states that the army is being enhanced through the Defense Capability Plan and will "enhance the survivability of deployed land forces through an increase in the Army's combat weight. This will include re-roling the 3rd Battalion the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) from a light parachute battalion to generate a second mechanized battlegroup in 2011." (Australian Government Department of Defense, 2006) This will enable improved sustainability as the army "will be more capable of sustaining is deployed forces through an increase in size of 1,485 personnel." (Australian Government Department of Defense, 2006) Redistribution of personnel and equipment as well as increasing the size of the Army will enhance the readiness across the Army. As well improvement in the communication networks of the Army will.." ensure rapid transfer of information across the battlefield." (Australian Government Department of Defense, 2006) Refocus will result in the provision of a smaller number of higher readiness forces at the individual and small team level rather than providing larger units that are at lower readiness." (Australian Government Department of Defense, 2006) Better joint and coalition interoperability will be realized with increased capability and versatility.