Aviation Resource Management Survey Inspections

¶ … Aviation Resource Management Survey Inspections on Army Aviation Accident Rates

G.W.L. BURNSIDE II

Worldwide Campus

Ramstein Germany Center

THE EFFECTS of AVIATION RESOURCE Management SURVEY INSPECTIONS on ARMY AVIATION ACCIDENT RATES

G.W.L. BURNSIDE II

This Graduate Capstone Project

was prepared under the direction of the candidate's Project Review Committee Member,

Mr. Bradford F. Kopp, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Extended Campus,

and the candidate's Project Review Committee Chair,

Dr. Franz Rosenhammer, Assistant Professor, Worldwide Campus, and has been approved by the Project Review Committee. It was submitted to the Extended Campus in partial fulfillment of PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE:

Bradford F. Kopp

Franz Rosenhammer, DBA.

Committee Chair

ii

ABSTRACT

The Effects of Aviation Resource Management Survey Inspections on Army Aviation Accident Rates

Institution:

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Degree:

Year:

2008

The purpose of this research was to assess the effects of Aviation Resource Management Survey (ARMS) inspections on U.S. Army aviation accident rates. The hypothesis was that ARMS inspections decrease Army aviation accidents. United States Army aviation resources are an expensive, finite product in the budget of the United States government. The numbers of helicopters required in war fighting deployments have a direct impact in peacekeeping missions and waging war in global conflicts. The loss of United States Army helicopters directly impacts the mission, capability, and accomplishment of Army aviation in deployments and support missions to ground forces. The paper looked into the United States Army Europe and Seventh Army (USAREUR) aviation accident statistics over a four-year period (2003-2006). Additionally, the paper focused on accidents that occurred 90 days before and 90 days after an ARMS inspection. After an examination and comparison of the accidents occurrence 90 days before and 90 days after, conclusions were drawn about the affects of the process. The results were significant in favor of ARMS, thereby supporting the research hypothesis. This study will potentially support the efforts of ARMS inspections; saving our significant resources.

iii

TABLE of CONTENTS

PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE

ii

ABSTRACT

iii vi

I

INTRODUCTION

1

Background of the Problem

3

Researcher's Work Setting and Role

3

Statement of the Problem

3

Hypothesis

4

Significance of the Problem

4

Limitations

4

Assumptions

5

Definition of Terms

5

Acronyms

6

II

REVIEW of RELEVANT LITERATURE and RESEARCH

9

History of Aviation Safety

9

Accident rate

15

Associated Regulations

17

III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

48

Research Model

48

Research Design

48

iv

Sources of Data

50

Treatment of Data and Procedures

50

IV

RESULTS

52

V

DISCUSSION

56

VI

CONCLUSIONS

57

VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

59

REFERENCES 64

BIBLIOGRAPHY 64

v

Table

1.

Classification of Accidents

9

2.

USAREUR Flying Hour Report

10

3.

Consolidated Accidents Report

11

4.

Raw Data Research Results

52

vi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As the United States continues the fight in the Global War on Terror, military resources continues to be the defining factor. The use of military resources and their continued use results in defense spending on the upward trend. This spending is no more significant than in military aviation accidents, and with great significant in the United States Army aviation.

United States Army aviation resources are an expensive, finite product in the budget of the United States government. The numbers of helicopters required in war fighting deployments have a direct impact in peacekeeping missions and waging war in global conflicts. The loss of United States Army helicopters directly impacts the mission, capability, and accomplishment of Army aviation in deployments and support missions to ground forces. The expenditure of these valuable assets, to include loss of life, directly impacts the strategy of the United States Army. If present aviation accident trends continue, coupled with combat losses, the expectation of over one billion dollars in United States Army aviation accidents, Class a through C, will become a reality. This downward spiral in aviation accidents must be stopped.

The purpose of the Aviation Resource Management Survey (ARMS) is to identify and recommend for correction deficiencies in the Operations, Flight Standardization, Supply, Aviation Maintenance, Safety, Petroleum, Aviation Life Support Equipment, Aviation Medicine, Air Traffic Services, Training, Tactical Operations and Night Vision systems in aviation organization from brigades down to the detachment level. ARMS accomplish this in the conduct of an independent and unbiased appraisal of all aspects of the aviation unit's operations, personnel, and facilities. The results are then reported to the unit and Major Army Command (MACOM) for consideration and action. Currently there are twenty-three active duty Army and one National Guard MACOM organized within the United States Army.

The ARMS is the tool by which MACOMs access the aviation unit's ability to conduct its wartime and contingency mission. The survey is comprised of 12 different functional areas that exist within each aviation unit: Operations, Flight Standardization, Supply, Aviation Maintenance, Safety, Petroleum, Aviation Life Support Equipment, Aviation Medicine, Air Traffic Services, Training, Tactical Operations, and Night Vision systems.

In order to conduct these inspections each MACOM has a dedicated team of functional area experts that travel to different installations, normally a two-year rotational cycle. Checklists have been developed for each functional area; every subject addressed in the checklist is based on an Army standard that is derived from Army Regulations (ARs), Field manuals (FMs), Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA PAMs), Training Circulars (TCs), and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Within the United States Army Europe and Seventh Army (USAREUR), USAREUR Aviation Safety and Standardization Detachment (UASSD) have that responsibility. The UASSD will schedule and conduct an ARMS of each USAREUR aviation unit. USAREUR's goal is to schedule and conduct an ARMS of every aviation unit on a 24-month cycle (AE Reg 95-1).

As of 31 December 2006, USAREUR experienced twenty five fatalities and an estimated loss of $164,583,907 due to Class a-C accidents within a four-year period (ASMIS Aviation Accident Data Base).

Background of the Problem

United States Army aviation accident rates continue in a costly upward trend that that negatively impact on future military budgets. During a four-year period (Fiscal Years 2003 thru 2006) the cost in aviation class a through C. accidents exceeded $164 million within USAREUR (ASMIS Aviation Accident Data Base).

Researcher's Work Setting and Role

The researcher has spent twenty four years in the United States Army working as an Army Aviation Operation Non-Commissioned Officer and retired as an Aviation Sergeant Major. The researcher served as the senior Aviation Operations Advisor to the Commanding General, Third United States Army, Army Central Command, and Coalition Forces Land Component Command, during combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The researcher also previously served as the Theater Aviation Sergeant Major for United States Army Europe and Seventh Army in Heidelberg, Germany. While serving in the Army, the researcher assisted and participated in numerous Army Aviation accidents and incidents investigations. The researcher is currently a graduate student with Embry Riddle Aeronautical University.

Statement of the Problem

In 1954 Army Aviation Training, an echelon of the Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma established the Army Accident Review Board. Its mission was to review Army aviation accidents. By 1957 the mission of the Review Board expanded and the Review Board was renamed the U.S. Army Board for Aviation Accident Research. It mission included not only aircraft accident review but crash site investigation and research into aviation safety matters involving aircraft design, operations, and training as well as supervision, maintenance, inspection and human factors. (United States Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center). Combat effectiveness is decreased and loss of Army aircraft and personnel is increased when the aircraft has not been properly inspected. Resulting from failure to inspect or failure of inspections due to lack of thoroughness results in a high risk to the Army aircraft, personnel and ultimately to the potential to conduct successful combat missions.

Hypothesis

ARMS inspections result in a decrease in Army aviation accident.

Significance of the Problem

Loss of any Army aviation combat asset; whether it be an aircraft or the loss of a flight crew becomes a significant loss and decreases our combat effectiveness. Success on the battlefield depends largely on our ability to reduce losses through decrease Army aviation accident rates. During the period 2003 thru 2006, USAREUR experienced a total of 57 aviation accidents (Class a thru Class C) resulting in 25 deaths and the loss of 14 aircraft.

Limitations

This study was limited to one MACOM, USAREUR, headquartered at Heidelberg, Germany, and will include class a through C. aviation accidents only. All Army aviation assets assigned to the USAREUR was included in this study. All accident data without regard to type of airframe was included. Ground accident statistics were not included in this study. All aviation accident data was collected from the Army Safety Management Information System (ASMIS) database located in the United States Army Safety Center, Ft. Rucker, Alabama. The time frame was narrowed to four fiscal years, 2003-2006. There are twenty eight MACOMs in the Army and limiting the research to one MACOM allowed for a more manageable population pulse, without too many confronting variables. This enables the researcher to complete the research in an adequate time.

(1) Limiting the research to Class a through Class C accidents will enable an easy sampling of army aircraft data across the three major categories of accident classes.

(2) Analyzing all accident data without regard to the type of airframe provides for an easy sampling and less potential bias toward fixed wing vs. rotary wing aircraft.

(3) Not including ground accidents into the research will allow the research to focus only on aviation accidents.

(4) Limiting the research to a four-year period; 2003 to 2006 will provide an adequate sampling of the data and not constrain the research results.

Assumptions

First Assumption

The first assumption is that accident data to be used will be an adequate sample of class a through class C accidents within the USAREUR area of operations.

Second Assumption

The second assumption is that ARMS inspection dates derived from official USAREUR Publications and historical data files will reflect actual dates of ARMS inspections.

Third Assumption

The third assumption is that current ARMS inspections continue to incorporate comprehensive checklist used to evaluate resource management and assist in improving operational readiness and safety for USAREUR aviation.

Definition of Terms

ARMS Team -- Comprised of subject matter experts within each aviation functional areas such as: aircraft armament, airfield and heliport operations, aviation life-support systems (ALSSs), aviation maintenance, aviation night vision goggle (NVG) maintenance, aviation safety, flight operations, petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) operations, standardization and aircrew training program (ATP).

CLASS a ACCIDENT - an Army accident in which the resulting total cost of property damage is $1,000,000 or more; an Army aircraft or missile is destroyed, missing, or abandoned; or an injury and/or occupational illness results in a fatality or permanent total disability. (Department of the Army Regulation 385-40, 1 November 1994)

CLASS B. ACCIDENT - an Army accident in which the resulting total cost of property damage is $200,000 or more, but less than $1, 000,000; an injury and/or occupational illness results in permanent partial disability, or when five or more personnel are hospitalized as inpatients as the result of a single occurrence. (Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-40, 1 November 1994)

CLASS C. ACCIDENT - an Army accident in which the resulting total cost of property damage is $10,000 or more, but less than $200,000; a nonfatal injury that causes any loss of time from work beyond the day or shift on which it occurred; or a nonfatal occupational illness that causes loss of time from work (for example, 1 work day) or disability at any time (lost time case). (Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-40, 1 November 1994)

Acronyms

ADA -- Airline Deregulation Act

AR -- Army Regulation

ALSSs -- Aviation Life Support Systems

ARMS -- Aviation Resource Management Survey

ASMIS -- Army Safety Management Information System

ASNCO -- Aviation Safety NCO

ASO -- Aviation Safety Officer

ATP -- Aircrew Training Program

CAA -- Civil Aeronautics Act

CAB -- Civil Aeronautics Board

CRM -- Composite Risk Management

CSC -- Command Safety Council

DA Pam -- Department of the Army Pamphlet

ECOD -- Estimated Cost of Damage

ESC -- Enlisted Safety Council

FAA -- Federal Aviation Administration

FM -- Field Manual

FORSCOM -- U.S.. Army Forces Command

IP -- Instructor Pilot

MACOM - Major Army Command

METT-TC -- Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troop and Support Available, Time

Available, Civil Considerations

MRM -- Maintenance Resource management

NATI -- National Air Transportation Inspection

NVG -- Night Vision Goggle

OHR -- Operational Hazard Report

POL -- Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants

RAC -- Risk Assessment Codes

SP -- Standardization Instructor Pilot

SOP -- Standard Operating Procedures

TC -- Training Circulars

USACRC -- United States Army Combat Readiness Center

UASSD -- USAREUR Aviation Safety and Standardization Detachment

USAREUR -- United States Army Europe and Seventh Army

CHAPTER II

REVIEW of RELEVANT LITERATURE and RESEARCH

History of Aviation Safety

The work of Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley (2005) entitled: "History of Aviation Safety Oversight in the United States" relates that federal aviation safety with the Air Mail Service, including a safety program that featured "strict selection criteria for pilots and rigorous maintenance" (p.v). This programs' value was realized through the lowering of fatality rates when "compared with unregulated itinerant commercial fliers" (p.v). This led to a call for regulation of civil aviation by the industry leaders in aviation resulting in the Air Commerce Act being passed in 1926 establishing the Aeronautics Branch (AB) in the Department of Commerce, and made it responsible for licensing and ensuring the airworthiness of aircraft and certifying airmen" (p.v). In the early days of airline safety the leaders of the AB held an objective that was "not so much to regulate as to promote." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.v). The intention was safety improvement without excessive regulations that increased costs dramatically. During this period of aviation AB leaders generally consulted with leaders of business prior to issuing rules and setting regulations in order to "accommodate industry." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.v). Aircraft were even granted temporary certificates by the AB allowing them a space of time to correct any noted deficiencies and as well as the AB "work constantly to modify the rules in the face of experience and rapid development of the aviation industry" (p.v).

In 1930, "certification requirements were extended to business enterprises engaged in aviation, such as airlines and flight schools." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.v) From the very start, the oversight system "employed inspectors who were assigned to districts around the U.S." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vi) in 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed "motivated in part by the accident of the TWA plane in 1935 that resulted in the death of Senator Bronson Cutting." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vi) Under the CAA the responsibilities for aviation oversight belonged to a "five-member Civil Aeronautics Authority Board, a three-member Air Safety Board, and an Administrator." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vi)

Policies were set by the CAA board who was responsible for promulgating safety rules and the Air Safety Board held the responsibility for investigation of accidents however, "this structure proved unworkable, and in 1939 it was changed to include a Civil Aeronautics Board with responsibility for accident investigation and economic regulation, and a CAA, back again in the Department of Commerce, with responsibility for safety regulation." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vi) the responsibility for oversight was held by the CAA Office for Safety Regulations with "divisions devoted to general aviation, airlines, aircraft design, and flight testing and factory inspection." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vi)

Challenges cited by the CAA inspector workforce included not only a heavy workload but also "being forced to play the role of instructors when checking ill-prepared pilots." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vi) Complaints were made about inspectors "cutting corners in testing and reporting, discourteousness, and large work backlogs." The safety record was improving by 1939 and in 1940 more than a year passed with no incident involving fatalities for single commercial airlines. While accidents eventually "became the exception rather that the rule" however, when they did occur and most notably when there were "several in a short time period" the public's attention was heightened which led to excessive rules "causing rule adherence to supplant safety as the primary goal." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vi)

In 1959, the Federal Aviation Agency was assigned as responsible for safety oversight with the Bureau of Flight Standards absorbing the Office of Flight Operations and Airworthiness while "also absorbing the safety rulemaking authority that had previously belonged to the CAB, "(Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vii) the FAA is responsible for development of the capacity for quick diagnosis and solution proposal however political challenges remained to implementation of the solutions. In 1966, the FAA "was absorbed into the newly created Department of Transportation. Accident investigation responsibility was also shifted from the CAB to the newly created National Transportation Safety Board." (p. x)

In 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) was passed by Congress. This Act served to liberalize the economic regulation of airline fares and routes as well "curtailed the authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) the agency that administered the economic regulations, until it was finally abolished in 1985." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.x) the structure, conducted and performance of the aviation industry was dramatic changed by economic deregulation. (paraphrased) in 1984, the Department of Transportation Secretary "initiated the National Air Transportation Inspection (NATI) effort" (p.x). This program was "both a broad and deep surveillance effort in which all major and commuter airlines received additional inspections." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.xi) This represented the "first comprehensive audit of the surveillance element of the safety oversight program, and it provided data that could be used to change the safety oversight system." (p.xi) a following review of the safety oversight by the Safety Activity Functional Evaluation (SAFE) resulted in an extension of the efforts of the NATI program and "called for increased standardization in safety oversight." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.xi)

The FAA responded by creating the National Work Program Guidelines that focused on standardization of the "inspection process while taking into account risk precursors." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.vi) Additionally, the FAA and stakeholders collaborated in efforts and new requirements were issued by the FAA in addressing the issue of structural integrity of older aircraft assurance. The complexity of the oversight system increased as efforts were made to introduce new systems including systems for data collection and information technology systems. This new complexity resulted in" more complex analysis, training, data collection, and administration." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.xi) Because of the problems that were inherent with implementation of new data collection systems and databases as well as the challenges associated with systems design, questions arose concerning whether the needed information to decide compliance and make safety assessment was actually possessed.

The FAA began, in the early 1990s to "pursue system safety strategies for the safety oversight systems." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.xii) Stated as one of the "pivotal events in the history of FAA's oversight was the crash of ValuJet Flight 592 in May 1996…" which serves to illustrate "how combinations of factors such as a new-entrant carrier, outsourced maintenance, and rapid growth create complex systems that are difficult to survey. (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.xii) Following this crash a laundry list of corrective actions resulted which "converged to a system safety strategy for safety oversight." (Hansen, McAndrews and Berkeley, 2005, p.xii)

United States Army Aviation accidents cost the taxpayers millions of dollars. The price tag for personnel deaths, aircraft replacements, and repair of aircraft and aircraft components are skyrocketing. Military budgets are approaching one billion dollars at a time the United States is at war, both overtly and covertly. This trend must stop.

Currently the United States Army Safety Center located at Ft. Rucker, Alabama, collects and analyzes information for all United States Army accidents. These accidents with day and date of occurrence are investigated and reported through the chain of command by soldiers within the U.S. Army. During the investigation, the monetary damage from the accident is assessed by Estimated Cost of Damage (ECOD) reports and injury reports sustained by U.S. Army personnel. (Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-40) the cost of repair for aviation accidents is calculated in accordance with Department of the Army Pamphlet 738-751, and the cost of personal injury or death is calculated using Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-40. Based on the cost of the accident, a determination is made to assess the accident into a specific category. All aviation accidents are classified as a Class a through F. accident based on the following criteria:

Table 1

Classification of Army Accidents

Class a

Army accident in which the resulting total cost of property damage is $1,000,000 or more; an Army aircraft or missile is destroyed, missing, or abandoned; or an injury and/or occupational illness results in a fatality or permanent total disability.

Class B

Army accident in which the resulting total cost of property damage is $200,000 or more, but less than $1, 000,000; an injury and/or occupational illness results in permanent partial disability, or when three or more personnel are hospitalized as inpatients as the result of a single occurrence.

Class C

Army accident in which the resulting total cost of property damage is $10,000 or more, but less than $200,000; a nonfatal injury that causes any loss of time from work beyond the day or shift on which it occurred; or a nonfatal occupational illness that causes loss of time from work (for example, 1 work day) or disability at any time (lost time case).

Class D

Army accident in which the resulting total cost of property damage is $2,000 or more but less than $10,000.

Class E

Army incident in which the resulting damage cost and injury severity do not meet the criteria for a Class a-D accident ($2,000 or more damage; lost time/restricted activity case). A Class E aviation incident is recordable when the mission (either operational or maintenance) is interrupted or not completed. Intent for flight may or may not exist. An example of a recordable Class E incident is: during maintenance operational check (MOC) the engine quits. Examples of nonrecordable Class E incidents are: chip detector light illumination and the component is not replaced; mission interrupted/aborted because of weather, unless mission is canceled; failure of Fair Wear and Tear (FWT) items found on pre- or post-flight inspection; radio failure where radio is replaced; closing a door found open in flight.

Class F

Foreign Object Damage (FOD) aviation incident (Also known as Class F incident).

Recordable incidents confined to aircraft turbine engine damage (does not include installed aircraft Auxiliary Power Units (APU)) as a result of internal or external FOD, where that is the only damage. These incidents will be reported using DA Form 2397 -- AB -- R; Check " F " in the" Accident Classification" block.

Note. From Department of the Army PAM 385-40, Army Accident Investigation and Reporting, 1 November 1994.

Once the accident is classified, proper reports are prepared and required administrative procedures are followed until completion of the accident investigation. The report is forwarded to Ft. Rucker for inclusion into the Army Safety Management Information System (ASMIS) database. This allows, at any given time, a comparison of past accident history by classification and type airframe. Computer queries are also allowed for any type of information one may want to compare, i.e. time of day, ranks of pilots etc. United States Army officials can use these numbers for comparison to determine the health of its aviation safety program.

Accident Rate

The current standard of comparison used in the United States Army for aviation accidents are calculated as one aircraft accident per 100,000 flight hours (1:100,000). Ground accident statistics are calculated as one accident per 1,000 soldiers (1:1,000). In the table below is a typical flying hour program for a Major Army Command. USAREUR figures are listed. Civilian aviation accident rates are calculated using passengers carried as opposed to hours flown.

Table 2

UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE & SEVENTH ARMY

FLYING HOURS

FISCAL YEAR

HOURS

2003

81,404

2004

93,277

2005

73,426

2006

53,085

Note. From USAREUR G3 Aviation Division Historical Files

Table 3

UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE & SEVENTH ARMY

ACCIDENT RESULTS

ACCIDENT CATEGORY

FISCAL YEAR

A

B

C

TOTAL

2003

4

4

2

10

2004

1

3

17

21

2005

4

1

9

14

2006

5

5

2

12

TOTAL

14

13

30

57

Note. Compiled from accidents data received from ASMIS Aviation Accident Data Base

Table 4

UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE & SEVENTH ARMY

ACCIDENT RATE PER HOURS FLOWN

FISCAL YEAR

TOTAL ACCIDENTS

TOTAL HOURS FLOWN

ACCIDENT RATE/HOUR

2003

10

81,404

8,140

2004

21

93,277

4,442

2005

14

73,426

5,245

2006

12

53,085

4,424

TOTAL

57

301,192

5,284

Note. Compiled from accidents data received from ASMIS Aviation Accident Data Base

and USAREUR G3 Aviation Division Historical Files

Importance of Teamwork in Aviation Safety

The work of Robertson (nd) entitled: "Maintenance Resource Management" states that "MRM improves safety by increasing the coordination and exchanged of information between team members, and between teams of airline maintenance crews." (nd) Aviation maintenance is stated to be a "complex and demanding endeavor" and ultimately the success of this endeavor is "measured by the safety of the flying public, depends on communication and teamwork." (Robertson, nd) This holds just as true in view of Army aircraft maintenance for indeed it takes a team instead of a group of individuals to effectively develop good safety procedures and to adhere to those procedures. Robertson states that there is "a growing body of evidence that team coordination among aviation crews improve safety, product quality and system effectiveness." (Robertson. nd)

The Army Aviation Accident Prevention Program

The 'Strategic Program Plan' prepared for the Aircraft Maintenance Division (AFS-300) of the Flight Standards Service in cooperation with the Office of Aviation Medicine (AAM-240) relates that aircraft maintenance human factors "is one of the last 'frontiers' that can have significant impact on aviation safety." (Army Aviation accident Prevention Program, 2007) it is held in this report that accidents and incidents are much more likely to result from the actions of humans instead of by mechanical failure. In fact, human error is a contributor in approximately eight-percent of airline accidents and include "all aspects of human factors: (1) operation; (2) maintenance; and (3) air traffic control. The best opportunity for improving safety is stated to be understanding and managing "the human factors that pose safety risks." (Army Aviation Accident Prevention Program) the Army Aviation Accident Program -- Department of the Army Pamphlet 385090 states that "Aviation operations involve inherently higher risk (higher probability of accidents and more severe consequences) than most ground operations." (Army Aviation Accident Prevention Program) it is reported that when deployed to combat theaters that historically army aviation, "has suffered more losses to accidents that to enemy action." (Army Aviation Accident Prevention Program) Because accidents in aviation are generally of the same nature that occur during times of peace commanders of units that are involved in aviation operations must necessarily place and emphasis on the safety aspect of force protection.