Arguments supporting a position on module development

¶ … Bioterrorism Surveillance

Challenges to bioterrorism

Challenges to surveillance

Having noted the surveillance methods that can be used in the monitoring of the bioterrorism and the possible intentional infection, there are some challenges that these surveillance systems might encounter. Bearing the nature of the agents that are used in bioterrorism, the challenges that might be experienced by both the syndromic surveillance and cell phone surveillance may have several similarities.

The syndromic surveillance challenges

Bearing the fact that syndromic surveillance depends on the general survey of the trend of a bioterrorism agent, the information that is generated from such a surveillance is quite general and in effect whenever such a surveillance systems comes across an anomalous trend in the health of the public, it would be hard for those implementing it to immediately propose a mass measure like issuance of antibiotics in order to curb the threat. There will therefore be a need to move from the nonspecific information and data to individual confirmation that such a trend is caused by anthrax or any other agents. This surveillance is therefore noted to be only a cue to the physicians to be keener to bioterrorism agents and the diseases that they cause before the attack is confirmed or otherwise.

There are chances that this kind of surveillance as well could lead to false alarm among the citizens. This false alarm may be both ways in that due to the nonspecific nature of the data that it presents, it can issue an alert of a bioterrorism act where there is actually none, or on the other hand it can fail to issue an alert where there is actually a case of bioterrorism.

The surveillance also depended on the zip codes in receiving the reports. His is a presumption that the infection and the reporting will occur in the morning or late in the evening when the residents are home still. This is inaccurate since once the people move about, it would be hard to track the infection trend and accordingly advice the health authorities and other concerned departments (Adam Szpiro et.al., 2007).

The above is an indication that the surveillance has little or belated chances of detection of bioterrorism as they may detect an attack one and a half a day later where the people are stationary and may be a few hours less than that if there is movement of the infected people. Terrorists can then employ this and target stationary populations and expose them to small doses minimizing the detection chances by this surveillance system (Tener Godwin, 2006).