Boot Camps Effective Juvenile Justice

¶ … Boot Camps Effective Juvenile Justice Methods? What is the problem the "boot camp" strategy for juvenile justice is attempting to address? The problem that needs to be addressed, and has been addressed - albeit without overwhelming success thus far - is juvenile crime. And through various juvenile "justice" strategies, including boot camps, another issue is how to best provide the punishment for, rehabilitation for, and prevention of juvenile crime.

According to the Executive Summary of the report, "Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice" (JCJJ, 2001), prepared by the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, though the juvenile arrest rate for violent crimes - which had soared in the late 1980s and early 1990s - "began decreasing in 1994, by 1999, it was back to the rate of the late 1980s." The encouraging part of the study - which was a cooperative effort of the U.S. Department of Justice (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention), the U.S.

Department of Education (Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program), the John D. And Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation - is the finding that "although a large proportion of adolescents" get arrested, only a "small proportion commits serious crimes." So, the initial problem is the fact that there is considerable juvenile crime in America.

The second problem is that society has not handled punishment of / rehabilitation for and prevention of juvenile crime very effectively; indeed, the JCJJ report states that "juvenile crime legislation and policy have become more punitive" and have caused the lines between juvenile and adult crime to be "blurred." This trend is continuing, JCJJ data indicates, albeit "research on recidivism and deterrence" shows clearly that it may be "more counterproductive to treat juveniles as adults." As to the questions: "At what stage in the juvenile justice system does the offender go to [boot camp]"; and "Who sends the offender to the program," it should be noted that (according to the JCJJ report) "...the United States has at least 51 different juvenile justice systems..

[and] there has never been a single dominant vision of how to deal with delinquent children in law or in practice." Moreover, "research to date shows that juveniles placed in secure detention or incarceration" - including boot camps - "suffer a wide range of negative effects and those transferred to adult court may be more likely to re-offend than those who remain under juvenile court jurisdiction." Youths who are incarcerated "have higher rates of physical injury and mental health problems, and they have poorer education educational outcomes." TWO: Describe the program: What are juvenile justice-related "boot camps" -- and what are they designed to do? What are the goals of the program? The growth of juvenile justice "boot camps" has been significant; between the time the very first boot camp - in Orleans Parish, Louisiana - was established in 1985, to today, in 2005, nearly every state in the U.S.

has now implemented boot camps, though the style and focus of the camps varies dramatically. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) (MacKenzie, 2001) reports that in 1996, there were 48 residential boot camps "for adjudicated juveniles" in 27 states, and an article in the Social Science Journal (Tyler, et al., 2001) reports that all 50 states currently have boot camps for youthful offenders.

Boot camps "are modeled after military basic training" programs, and are designed, according to MacKenzie's research, to target "offenders who are at risk of recidivism." That said, clearly, boot camps are designed not just to punish young men, but to instill discipline and structure into their lives. How do the programs operate? Every program is unique, and tailored according to the political and bureaucratic decisions effecting juvenile justice programs.

In the Social Science Journal article, writer Tyler identifies "three types of boot camps: the military drilling style that focuses on strict discipline; the rehabilitative approach; and the educational/vocational model." Most current camps, Tyler explains, though employing parts of the two latter styles, "still concentrate on the military drill as their central theme." For example, in Arizona, a joint program with county juvenile authorities and the U.S. Marine Corps is called "Juvenile All Weekend Supervision" (JAWS).

Offenders spend one full weekend with marine "volunteer instructors" from the Yuma, Arizona Marine Corps Air Station, where the youths learn "obedience to orders and discipline." After that, they spend another month in JAWSII, an "aftercare" boot camp environment.

Meantime, according to an article in the IRE Journal (Richissin, 2000), the boot camps are "portrayed [to the public] as tough-love programs that both punish and rehabilitate delinquents." But research on one boot camp in western Maryland at "Big Savage Mountain," where 14 boys were half-way through a 20-week "sentence," revealed that, according to eyewitness reports from major market journalists with IRE Journal ("Investigative Reporters & Editors"), "guards at the camp were routinely assaulting juveniles." According to the Richissin article, guards at the camp were "slamming" detainees "to the ground without provocation, often while the kids were handcuffed and shackled." In full view of a reporter and a photographer, while a busload of new boys arrived, "the guards began roughing them up before they even exited the bus." Reasons for assignment to a boot camp - according to NIJ's research of 49 participating correctional facilities, both boot camps and traditional juvenile incarceration facilities - include alcohol abuse, arrest for burglary, theft, drug offences; "on average," MacKenzie writes, these youths were "13 years old" when first arrested, and had been institutionalized (prior to boot camp) 2.5 to 3 times.

THREE: Assess the effectiveness of the programs; based on the research, does the program reduce recidivism, and should boot camps be retained as part of the juvenile justice system? The NIJ report states that "proponents" of boot camps believe the structure of the programs "creates a safe environment in which the youths are less likely to fight with or be victimized by other youths" - which they reportedly would be at "traditional correctional facilities." Opponents, on the other hand, according to the NIJ paper, say the camps' "confrontational environment" is absolutely the opposite of the type of "positive interpersonal relationships and supportive atmosphere" needed for youths to grow into.

"Certain components of boot camps," the NIJ report continues, make it "more difficult for juveniles to make the transition back to the community.. [and] juveniles may revert to their old ways of surviving in and relating to the community..." What about recidivism rates after boot camps? In the Tyler article, he reports that Florida's Department of Juvenile Justice have experienced recidivism rates up to 63% and 74% following offenders' release from boot camp (which means up to 7 out of 10 youths released get in trouble upon completion of the boot camp requirement).

"The U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention admits," Tyler writes, "that juvenile boot camps have not affected a decline in the recidivism rate." Indeed, an NIJ research paper showed that boot camp programs in Texas, Oklahoma, Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, "failed to reduce recidivism," Tyler continues. Even the U.S. Department of Justice "voiced even greater pessimism after a year-long investigation of three juvenile boot camp programs in Georgia by stating that they are ineffective." The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights under George W.

Bush, Tyler asserts, "said that not only are [boot camps] ineffective, but can be harmful to some youths." The bottom line, in Tyler's research article, is that "juvenile boot camps are likely to be ineffective both in terms of costs and recidivism unless they incorporate a program to give the delinquent the skills, the motivation, and the resources" to help him cope with the dangerous urban environment he will return to, which contributed to his delinquency in the first place.

Do these programs need to be improved? Most certainly they do,.