Canada Needs a Foreign Intelligence

Canada Needs a Foreign Intelligence Agency At the present time, Canada, an independent sovereign nation, has no foreign intelligence agency. It does have a security agency, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), but CSIS is limited by its mandate and in function only to investigate and act on security threats inside Canada's borders. Until recently, the vague wording of the CSIS mandate was interpreted by the agency in a way that the agency did carry out a quasi-Foreign Intelligence with its Security Intelligence (Campbell 2008, 13).

That changed when Canada's Justice Edmond Blanchard ruled that the CSIS mandate did not extend itself to "extra-territorially" conducting security surveillances involving wire-taps, thereby redefining what had previously been interpreted by CSIS as the breadth of its mandate (13). Now, according to the redefined mandate, Canada is a first world nation that has had a role in World War II, and, more recently, in Afghanistan, but has in the past, and more so now since Blanchard's ruling, had to rely upon the foreign intelligence of its allies.

This raises the question of whether or not Canada, in its own best interest, should continue to rely upon the information provided to them from its allies.

What if the information being given to Canada was incomplete, or deemed by the allied source as not relevant to Canada? Should Canada rely upon other nations to gather and share information with Canada that could be vital to Canada's political and economic security? A 2007 study prepared by Barry Cooper for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute helps answer the questions asked here. Cooper begins with a discussion in an Executive Summary on why Canada should indeed be responsible for its own foreign intelligence.

He points out that American intelligence networks, for whatever reason, failed on September 11, 2001, when terrorists commandeered commercial jet airliners carrying civilian passengers, and turned those jetliners into weapons of mass destruction that killed still more civilians when they were deliberately flown into the World Trade Center, the U.S. Pentagon, and, one, unsuccessful in its mission crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, but was believed to have been targeting Washington, D.C. (Cooper 2007, i).

An intelligence failure of this magnitude in a country with a system of agencies dedicated to foreign intelligence and internal security, and one which Canada relies heavily upon for its own foreign intelligence, only further demonstrates that Canada must be responsible for its own foreign intelligence and protection. No foreign partner can possibly put Canada's interests above its own, nor should Canada rely upon a foreign country to do so.

Cooper says that "intelligence collection," as it now exists in Canada, where foreign intelligence is gathered from "members of the public, foreign governments and technical interception of telecommunications. combined with information from open sources including newspapers, periodicals, academic journals, foreign and domestic broadcasts, official documents, and other published material (i)," is insufficient in and of itself, and without an agency separate and distinct in its mandate and operation as a foreign intelligence agency, cannot be relied upon to provide the necessary foreign security for Canada to benefit from (i).

In other words, Canada sits alone, making itself vulnerable as a target to be considered by terrorists, to unseen enemies who would exploit Canada's vulnerability in "political, economic and trade-related intelligence" operations (Campbell 13).

In this study, we will examine the ideas and recommendations of experts, analysts, and politicians whose understanding of Canada's need for an independent foreign intelligence agency arises out of a vast knowledge based on research, and first-hand experience in the foreign and domestic arenas such that their ideas and suggestions should be guiding lights to the Canadian people and government in establishing for Canada an separate and distinct agency under a mandate of foreign intelligence in operation and function.

The Outside Threat to Canada's Internal Economy and Infrastructure The overall goal of terrorism is not to conquer by sheer force one militarily functioning force against another. It is, rather, to achieve specific objectives within the broader range of the terrorist group. To achieve these objectives, terrorism is the tactic employed to maim, kill, and to especially interrupt the operations of governments and nation-state economies such that they become over burdened with internal failures and weaknesses in their infrastructure that established and existing infrastructures become weak and collapse.

Once collapsed, the people of that nation-state become susceptible to new ideologies that promise relief from the threat of harm, even if that relief comes at the price of their freedom. In the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, Jerrold M. Post explains: "Thus, violence against victims is intended to convey a message to the audiences of attention.

And it is the fact that the victims are unarmed, and the randomness of the act that could occur to anyone at any time, anywhere -- the extranormality of the act -- that so compels horrified attention (3)." The traumatic effect upon the people of the world post September 11, 2001, is still being felt today.

More importantly, in the examination of terrorism as a tool of foreign enemies, America serves as an example of the success of terrorism on many levels: September 11, 2001 is a date that remains etched in the minds of Americans because of the horrific nature of the enemy's act of violence as a statement about the American government emphasized by striking civilians represented by that government over military personnel or targets with respect to the passengers on the commercial jets and the World Trade Center.

The Pentagon as a successful target, representative of the seat of power of America's military prowess, demonstrated that for all its technological strength, America was vulnerable to successful attack by a foreign enemy.

America's intelligence systems proved themselves to be flawed and incompetent, resulting in the creation of Homeland Security, intended to be the hub of all information, but which continues to reflect an even greater breadth of internal weakness as demonstrated by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when spokes to the hub, like Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) failed to respond efficiently and timely to the natural disaster. American economic infrastructure collapsed, first, by its response in completely shutting down all non-military air traffic over the country (CNN 2002, film documentary).

The terrorist attack closed down Wall Street, interrupting America's economic life-line. Wall Street remained closed for six days following the 9/11 attack, and when it resumed business, the stock market reflected the economic impact of the attack, closing at a significant low (CNN, documentary). That impact on the American market began a negative decline in the American economy that completely collapsed in 2008 and resulted in government bailout interventions. The ripple effect of America's economic collapse has been felt around the world.

The United States responded with military force and engagement on two fronts: Afghanistan and Iraq. The wars have been prolonged, entering the ninth year since the terrorist attack on the United States at a cost of billions of dollars to the American taxpayers, but it has failed to bring about an end to the terrorist network responsible for the attack. The American people have become war-weary, forcing the government to bring about an end to the war in Iraq, and demanding the government bring home its troops from Afghanistan too.

The wars have left the American public politically and philosophically divided even though there was unity immediately following the events of 9/11. The impact of the events of 9/11 has deteriorated the American public's confidence in its leaders, and we now see a governmental infrastructure potentially at risk from its own citizens. All of this must serve as lessons learned for Canada. Canada cannot rely upon an ally and source of foreign intelligence as close as America, nor far away as Europe.

Since 9/11, terrorist attacks have been carried out against European nations once thought to be well informed on matters of foreign intelligence, at least to the extent that they could protect their selves from terrorist attacks on their civilian populations, especially following the events of 9/11. This has taught us that terrorism is the face of the new war tactic (Morden 2003). No longer will we see two nations stand one against the other in military strength with strictly military targets.

Reid Morden (20023), in a CSIS commentary wrote: "Whatever the intelligence instruments in play, the focus is most likely to depart from identifying threats to and protecting Canadian security. Terrorism tops this list but it would probably encompass military intelligence where Canadian forces are engaged, organized crime (which wraps in money laundering, drugs, illicit immigration), arms trafficking, and nuclear proliferation.

In fact, since 9/11 and subsequent attacks, most intelligence organizations would concede that the line between 'security intelligence' and 'foreign intelligence' has become increasingly blurred (3)." Canada has troops in Afghanistan, and that is not going to change in the foreseeable near future.

Morden is saying that Canadian forces are deserving of the foreign intelligence needed for them to carryout their mission objectives, but that to rely upon sources other than Canadian intelligence could put Canadian forces in harm's way if the focus of sources depart from a focus on Canadian intelligence needs.

Canadian forces in Afghanistan, and whatever location those forces are directed to by the Canadian Government to protect Canada at home and its interests around the world, should be supported with intelligence sources that are directly focused on Canada's security needs and objectives. Foreign intelligence is more than identifying and taking counter-terrorism defence actions. Aaron Shull, a law school graduate who also holds a master's degree in international affairs helps put into perspective the meaning of foreign intelligence vs. The meaning of security intelligence services (Campbell, 13).

"The difference in this country (Canada) is that we separate foreign intelligence and security intelligence. Security intelligence relates to threats against security of Canada and foreign intelligence relates to everything else -- political, economic, and trade-related intelligence (13)." Shull is looking at these definitions in terms of Justice Blanchard's ruling, but also the notion that security intelligence and foreign intelligence are perceived as two separate functions has long been the perception of the Canadian Government since it relied largely upon outside agencies for the bulk of its foreign intelligence (13).

The difference is perhaps the way in which what should operate as two separate bodies of intelligence gathering sources do with the information they receive. In a Center for International Policy briefing in 2009, Daniel Livermore points out that ninety percent of foreign intelligence comes from non-classified reporting sources (2).

While many might use this as an argument against creating a separate foreign intelligence agency, contending that the lines between foreign and domestic security have been "blurred (Jackson 2009, 149), it is in actuality an argument for the creation of a separate foreign intelligence agency. The credibility of foreign intelligence gathering, that which makes it reliable as a tool for anti-terrorism and counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism responses taken by a country, rests on the analysis of the information that is gathered from the non-classified sources, and classified sources too.

Analysis of the information is integral to understanding what level of threat exists and in what form it exists: political, economic, trade-related espionage, or clandestine operations with the intent to bring about an internal disruption of infrastructure. In terms of anti-terrorism, the analysis involves sorting through massive amounts of information, comparing information, and sifting out misinformation which is put out on non-classified networks to deliberately confuse and mislead intelligence agencies.

The information gathered by the foreign intelligence agency should be analyzed in a different agency from the security intelligence gathering, and in fact be provided to the security agency only after it has been analyzed and assessed as to the existing threat within the Canadian borders. There is certainly a link that must exist between the two agency operations, but not one which is blurred or obscured by function.

The foreign intelligence agency would have by way of its distinct and separate mandate the ability to function in foreign territories, and to act covertly or overtly to mitigate and minimize the threat to Canada within its borders (Kott No Date, 88 of 90). The foreign intelligence agency would have the authority in its mandate to operate at a distance, and that is essential to the security of Canada.

Right now, not only are Canadian troops at risk because of reliance upon other than Canadian foreign intelligence with which they must plan and carry out their missions, but Canada itself is at risk because the opportunity to collect and analyze foreign intelligence is done through the scope of security intelligence, distant from the on-site source of activity that impacts Canada's domestic security.

Jackson says: "The CSIS Act of 1984, which lays out CSIS's authorities, is ambiguous in some respects, and this has caused confusion and legal debate in the evolving security climate.

It gives the agency the authority to investigate threats "within or relating to Canada" but elsewhere explicitly restricts the gathering of information about foreign states (149)." A merged agency of interests foreign and domestic would not serve to illuminate the mandates should a foreign component be added to the CSIS by way of updating its mandate, but would only serve to create more confusion and more legal debate that could delay and be the source of risk to Canada as the emerging combination of mandates would be subject to even greater legal debate and challenge.

Thus, valuable time in creating the network of a separate foreign intelligence agency network of sources and function that could serve Canada's overall security in the best way possible would be delayed. The extent to which sources and contacts and valuable information that might be lost to Canada by acting sooner rather than later cannot be measured.

What is certain, however, is the fact that Canada now has insufficient tools to act in its own behalf in matters of foreign intelligence, and that its security intelligence is as a result lacking, which puts Canada at risk in a changing global environment. Other Threats and Purposes Shull makes the point that foreign intelligence is not just anti-or counter-terrorism. It also blankets political, economic and trade-related intelligence (13). In these aspects, spying is necessary in order to protect Canada's trade interests (13).

Spying cannot be done from just canvassing non-classified news and other related sources, but must be done on foreign territories with the authority for the agents to investigate, gather information and even steal that information if necessary to protect Canada's foreign interests (Livesey 2002). Hedieh Nasheri (2005) talks about efforts made by United Nations agreements in an effort to circumvent economic espionage, and theft of technologically sensitive information from and by friendly nations. Nasheri writes: "The most extensive multilateral protection of intellectual property was established by the TRIPS Agreement.

It requires member countries to protect against acquisition, disclosure, or use of an individual party's undisclosed information. Specifically, it protects 'confidential' information having commercial value. The TRIPS Agreement also protects trade secrets, not as individual intellectual property, but prohibition against unfair competition. It also enhances the IPRs through improved enforcement mechanisms and remedies. The TRIPS Agreement provides a broad exception, however, permitting members to adopt contrary national laws if necessary to protect 'sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development.

.' The exception may allow countries to avoid specific prohibitions against economic espionage (126).'" Economic espionage and theft of socio-economic and technological products of an individual or national interest threatens the stability of Canada's economy. Right now, there is no component within the CSIS that is sufficiently designed to protect Canada's proprietary economic secrets and developing technology.

It is also one area of Canadian interest that Canada cannot expect even its allies in other world affairs to provide them adequate or even nominal information on, especially when it involves that nation's own economic interests and future. Albanese (2007) cites Nasheri further commenting on intellectual property theft and fraud as saying: "The economic impact of the misuse and theft of intellectual property is far-reaching.

The copying of software, movies, video games, and music in ways that deny publishers and authors their legal rights have drawn the most attention, but trademark and patent infringement, corporate espionage, computer intrusions, and transmission of copyrighted materials also have been identified as problems (95)." While none of this might immediately strike one as a matter of national security, it is indeed that, because it is eroding the economic base of the country's economy.

Canada has a large business sector that covers all of the ranges mentioned by Nasheri, and income lost to the rightful owners of copyrights and patents is income lost to the state. Canada needs to be diligent in protecting its economic base and consumerism, and the CSIS cannot be effective in this regard under its outdated and vague mandate. In China, piracy of intellectual property has become a billion-dollar industry (Mastel 1997, 83).

The Chinese offer no protection to owners of intellectual property residing in foreign nations, nor does it take steps to prevent Chinese entrepreneurs from intellectual piracy. China has grown in its economic wealth, and much of that can be attributed to intellectual piracy. Mastel (1997) says: "By the 1990s, Chinese intellectual property pirates had become enormously successful producing, selling, and often exporting pirated material primarily from western countries. Most companies operating in China have their own stories of intellectual property piracy; the U.S.

automaker Chrysler even had knock-off artists producing illegal copies of its jeeps. Most of the piracy was, however, concentrated upon products, such as agricultural chemicals, films, computer programs, and sound recordings (83)." The loss to owners of copyrighted materials and patented products was so vast, that in 1992 the United States threatened China with trade sanctions.