Causal Analysis of the Proxy Wars Iran Saudi

The causes of political turmoil and instability are always complex. The civil war in Syria, the insurgency of the Islamic State, and strife in Yemen, Bahrain, and other regions of the Middle East are extensions of decades-old, even centuries-old, conflicts between Sunni and Shia. Currently, Iran and Saudi Arabia are engaged in a sort of cold war scenario in which they are using proxies to fight their bigger overarching battles. Saying that the conflict is related to the Sunni-Shia divisions would be oversimplifying the case, although these ideological, cultural, and historical differences are in part to blame for the ongoing violence. As promising as it seemed at first, the Arab Spring ultimately caused uncertainty and instability, leaving power vacuums that Iran and Saudi still attempt to fill. Money, political power, and access to strategic oil reserves are also part of the reason why Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting their proxy wars in the Middle East. The causes of the proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran include the Sunni-Shia divide, the regional instability initiated by the Arab Spring, and a realpolitik vying for regional political and economic dominance.
One of the most important causes of the proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the Sunni-Shia divide. The distal causes of the Sunni-Shia divide are traceable to the founder of Islam, the prophet Muhammad. When the prophet Muhammad died in the year 632, he did not name a successor and had no heir to clarify his legacy. A power struggle ensued, with one faction believing that a blood relative should assume the mantle of power and another believing that succession should be determined by a group of elite clerics (Shuster, 2007). Both sides seemingly neglected the core teachings of Muhammad, instead opting for outright violence and bloodshed. The animosity between Sunni and Shia has ensued ever since the 7th century, and is at the root of much of the current conflict in the Middle East. Currently, Iran is the biggest bastion of Shia Islam and Saudi Arabia the hub of Sunni culture.
The Sunni-Shia divide is partly related to power, control, and subordination, which is why it is a proximal cause of the current conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Throughout time, the Shia people have been the minority of the Muslim population (Shuster, 2007). As the minority group, Shia people have frequently experienced persecution. Being persecuted systematically inevitably leads to frustration and social strife, causing generation after generation to resent the oppressive powers. Compounding the problem was the fact that for centuries, both Sunni and Shia lived under the mantle of Ottoman colonization, followed by a brief period of colonization by Western powers like France and Great Britain. Colonization led to arbitrary lines of geo-political demarcation, precluding the ability of Sunni and Shia groups to peacefully cohabit their respective regions. Countries like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon ended up with sizable proportions of both Sunni and Shia Muslims, with resulting battles for political power.
The Arab Spring is another proximal cause of the current proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Until the Arab Spring, which started in 2010 in Tunisia, modern Muslim nation states in North Africa and the Middle East had been ruled by authoritarian figureheads and/or religious clerics, Although the discovery of oil had led to relatively rapid economic development in these regions during the 20th century, the authoritarian dictatorships also led to “dissatisfaction with the standard of living, poor labor market conditions, and corruption,” (Arampatzi, Burger, Ianchovina, et al, 2015, p. 2). The Arab Spring was not necessarily a movement to replace previous models of leadership with Western-style democracy, but the Arab Spring was a grassroots movement expressive of dissatisfaction with the status quo and a desire for meaningful change. While the upper echelons of nations reaped the benefits of robust oil economies, the vast majority of people living in Middle Eastern countries faced poverty and unemployment. The Arab Spring started in Tunisia, spread rapidly to Egypt, and then onwards to other nations. Yet in spite of the opportunity to create a more populist and democratic form of governance in these countries, the Arab Spring resulted in continued corruption and the lack of strong leadership.
A power vacuum ensued after the Arab Spring, creating just the right conditions for major Shia and Sunni superpowers Iran and Saudi Arabia to fight for the spoils. Even before the Arab Spring, Iran and Saudi Arabia had been vying for regional dominance by funding local sectarian groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Palestine (Hinnebusch, 2016). By funding sectarian groups, Iran and Saudi Arabia set the ball in motion for the proxy wars that have culminated in the Syrian civil war. The funding of sectarian groups starts with basic appeals to human sociological and psychological values. For example, Iran started to fund Hezbollah because Hezbollah had been a Shia minority systematically deprived of access to political or economic power in Lebanon. Without access to political representation in Beirut, the Shia minority in Lebanon naturally appealed to their fellow Shia in Iran for support. These types of opportunistic funding and militarization of sectarian groups has led to the proliferation of terrorism throughout the region, causing mass destabilization and the current proxy wars. Without viable political leadership in places like Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been able to slowly and surely infiltrate local sectarian politics, fomenting antagonism between neighbors.
Of course, one of the most important causes of the Saudi Arabia and Iran proxy wars is linked to realpolitik factors including regional dominance and economic opportunism. As Shuster (2007) points out, a large portion of strategic oil reserves are located in areas controlled by Shia communities, even though some of those Shia communities in and around the Persian Gulf live in nations that are controlled by Sunni governments. In many cases, a Sunni government has claimed power over the economic and political spoils of the global oil trade, disempowering and subjugating the Shia people who actually work in the oil-rich, oil-producing areas. Exploitation and oppression lead to anger and resentment, poverty and disenfranchisement. Poverty and disenfranchisement creates the social and psychological conditions that make proxy wars possible. Shia minorities in Sunni-controlled nations have resorted to militarization and violence, feeding into the goals of Iran and Saudi Arabia to secure power in the region. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran want control over Persian Gulf oil. Control over oil leads to economic benefits, but also to political benefits like the ability to form strategic alliances with other nations. In particular, Saudi Arabia has strategic alliances with the United States and other Western nations, but since the 1970s, Iran has been fiercely anti-American and anti-West. The differences in opinion of how to manage oil reserves have prevented the Sunni and Shia powers from reaching a peaceful agreement.
Another cause of the proxy wars that are taking place now throughout the Middle East can be traced to the first and second Gulf Wars, in which Iran and Saudi Arabia stood firmly on opposite sides. Saudi Arabia supported the Saddam Hussain regime during the Iran-Iraq war, which itself led to major regional instability. Instead of coming up with a mutually beneficial solution to the problems posed by non-state actors and ISIS, Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to fight proxy wars because the current geo-political boundaries are tenuous at best. The modern nation-state model is relatively new, and not necessarily meaningful for most Muslims in the region, people whose allegiances are to family and community and not to government. Many of the modern nation states in the Middle East and North Africa are arbitrary configurations (Aras & Yorulmazlar, 2017). The geo-political boundaries do not reflect the actual political and ideological allegiances of the people living within those boundaries. For example, Shia enclaves in the Gulf nations like Qatar have caused further diplomatic snafus that increase tensions and volatility.
The causes of the current “cold war”-like conditions between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be traced back to centuries of historical, social, political, and ideological conflict. Misconstrued as religious differences, the Sunni-Shia divide is much more about politics and identity than it is about theology and faith. Sunni Arabs predominate throughout the Middle East, often usurping the rights of Shia minority communities within artificially designated post-colonial geo-political boundaries. Iran remains the only major Shia superpower, and has established itself as the only real champion of Shia minority groups. Unfortunately, being a champion of Shia rights has too often meant militarization and violence, instead of diplomacy and dialogue. The Arab Spring most recently resulted in disenfranchised Shia communities revolting with greater strength and grassroots power than ever before, enabling Iran’s Shia government to step in. Iran has armed and trained rebel and sectarian groups, and Saudi has done the same, with both nations trying to capitalize on existing local tensions. Hot spots like Yemen are added to the already dismal conditions in Syria: the most notable example of how the proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been fought on the ground. By arming and training sectarian and militia groups, Iran and Saudi Arabia are preventing an amicable, peaceful solution. The distal and proximal causes of the proxy wars include the Sunni-Shia cultural divides, the legacy of colonialism, the Arab Spring, and realpolitik fighting for regional dominance and economic control.





References

Arampatzi, E., Burger, M., Ianchovina, E., et al (2015). Unhappy development. World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704681468198531465/pdf/WPS7488.pdf
Aras, B. & Yorulmazlar, E. (2017). Mideast geopolitics. Middle East Policy 24(2): pp. 57-69
Hinnebusch, R. (2016). The sectarianization of the Middle East: transnational identity wars and competitive interference ' Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) , vol Studies 21 , pp. 71-75.
Shuster, M. (2007). The origins of the Shiite-Sunni split. NPR. 12 Feb, 2007. https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2007/02/12/7332087/the-origins-of-the-shiite-sunni-split