Bureaucratic organization as a cause of Department of Defense intelligence failures

Intelligence Failures

In an ever increasingly complex governmental infrastructure, the importance of communication, mission and strategy are of the utmost importance. The Department of Defense (DOD) and all of its law enforcement agencies are in a pervasive struggle to attain both accurate and actionable intelligence in order to perform their duties to the best of their capabilities and intentions.

The purpose of this research paper is to explore the failure of the intelligence process due to extraneous levels of bureaucratic organization. This essay will attempt to explain the many failures of the Department of Defense law enforcement entities as a result of this type of organization.

In order to understand this argument, this essay will first look at the problem itself and try to identify the root cause of these failures. Past failures of intelligence gathering will be examined to help contextualize the argument and give credence to the idea that the system is inherently flawed. The argument will next focus on the specific failures of the Department of Defense. The essay will then explain how the intelligence structure is organized and how certain problems of governance arise due to this ordering.

To fully understand this issue, the idea of communication will be discussed to help ensure that these problems are in fact fixable and can provide a resource of growth and stimulation. Before concluding this essay will also examine the need for approval and how this mindset affects the everyday workings of DOD law enforcement officials. Solutions will be presented to help steer the discussion in the appropriate way according to this author. Some powerful suggestions will be offered that will certainly challenge the way we think and act about intelligence and the possibility that the problem is much worse than can be imagined.

The Problem

Trujillo (2012) suggested that intelligence failures are inevitable. This tough suggestion denotes a problem beyond control in many ways. He wrote "what has not been as well documented or even understood is why these intelligence failures persist after reforms and changes within the intelligence community, almost as if after each failure, reforms are made and then new weaknesses emerge, like playing whack-a-mole. While the history of these failures is well documented, there is little in the way of a systematic theory to explain why these intelligence failures persist." The problem is that the problem itself cannot be solved.

The federal government is at an incredibly large size and operates with little discretion, guidance or control. The bloviated mess that is the federal government is an impossible labyrinth to negotiate and seems like no one is really in charge. When someone does attempt to take charge, their expertise is immediately put into question by an opponent with a different political agenda. Howard (2012) wrote "The people who inhabit our national and state capitols, not only politicians but bureaucrats and special interest lobbyists, see themselves as agents, not principals. The job is to do what their "base" wants, not do what they think is right. Interest groups continue to cling to the status quo, even though they know something has to give."

The scenario is frustrating no doubt and those who are willing to help are often put into a very troublesome situation. Some may say the U.S. government has retreated to a crisis mode and is so confused it doesn't realize there is a problem. The power that bureaucracy creates has shoved in an unelected power base to the forefronts of decision and action. Many of the decision makers that are affecting intelligence policy are not held responsible for their actions, and when error is made, very little is done to correct the problem. Looking back its seems obscene that not one high ranking officer, in DOD or elsewhere, lost their job due to gross incompetence after 9-11.

Since the government is so large it is easy to hide or ignore mistakes. In many instance unelected officials have undermined the dedication to upholding the republic by many within the DOD including law enforcement entities. America is weak and tired of war. Many who have been tolerant are losing faith and it is quite obvious that a new approach is very necessary in order to grasp the totality of the situation and allow for a new era of growth, expansion and peace. Things that this country has been missing for a very long time now.

A History of Failure

There is now enough evidence, circumstantial, historical and otherwise, to suggest that America has had problems with their intelligence services since their genesis earlier in the 20th century. The apparent lack of preparedness for the current problems throughout the world and specifically in the Mideast and Central Asia is not considered an intelligence failure on the same level of other more obvious and conspicuous lapses of the past seven decades, but it does serve as a reminder of blunders that have embarrassed many in the FBI DOD and CIA.

Pearl Harbor

The problem is not new and has been around for quite awhile. Since the invention of intelligence as a force multiplier it has been expected that counterintelligence could rebuff such efforts and so error is obviously possible if not likely. Modern intelligence assessment failures date back to the 1940s, beginning with the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, brought America into the war and revealed a significant failure on the part of the U.S. intelligence apparatus.

As subsequent investigations found, intelligence had been handled in a casual, uncoordinated manner, and there had been insufficient attention to certain collection requirements. The lack of coordination among agencies, principally the Army and the Navy, resulted in a failure to provide timely dissemination of relevant information to key decision makers.

To make matters worse, intelligence analysts had grossly underestimated Japanese capabilities and intentions, revealing a tendency to misunderstand Japanese actions by looking at them with American cultural biases. This would be a common theme in subsequent intelligence failures. After the war, the resolve of America's leaders "never again" to permit another Pearl Harbor largely prompted the establishment of a centralized intelligence structure.

America's entrance into World War II created an immediate need for intelligence to support the massive war fighting effort that would concentrate the efforts of millions of people sacrificing much to the betterment of the nation. While the Army and the Navy maintained their own intelligence capabilities, none were prepared to provide the kind of support needed. To help strengthen and bolster this idea, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created in June 1942, under the recently established Joint Chiefs of Staff to succeed the Coordinator of Information. William Donovan remained in charge of the OSS In addition to assuming the analytical role of its predecessor, the OSS was chartered to carry out secret operations against the Axis powers on a worldwide scale. It was not, however, readily accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who remained skeptical of the value of OSS activities, and the new unit faced strong competition from the FBI and the Army's intelligence organization.

Khan (1992) summed up this situation in a way that sheds light on the problems with intelligence itself and the many conflicting interests that inherently await those wishing to explore the theoretical basis for its usage. He wrote " no reference to a raid on Pearl Harbor ever went on the air, even coded. The February and July situations misled traffic analysts. JN25b messages intercepted before the attack, but solved after the war, show that even if that naval code had been fully solved and those messages read before December 7, they would not have foretold the attack. And though war with Japan was indeed expected, that expectation did not-could not-imply knowledge of an attack on Pearl Harbor, for it is impossible in logic to leap from a general belief to a specific prediction." Here it is impossible for Khan to unveil the fact that is possible that factions within the government needed an impetus for war and that an intelligence failure was the necessary scapegoat for a reason to commence the American involvement in WWII.

The Cold War

In the 1950s American leaders were not always well served by the intelligence agencies that were there to help support the strategic mission of the country. President Harry Truman was on vacation and his entire foreign policy apparatus was caught napping when South Korea was invaded by the North in June 1950. Then Truman was staggered again when China violently entered the war later that year despite repeated assurances from General MacArthur and defense intelligence sources that they wouldn't do this even after repeated warnings by China of its intentions to do so should U.S. troops approach their border and after Mao had infiltrated hundreds of thousands of troops across the Yalu.

It is a wonder that Truman is respected as a competent leader. Regardless there is plenty of blame to share in these instances but what is significant is that there seems to be an ever present clash between the intelligence community and other branches of government that are designed to regulate and modulate their behavior and standards.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created in the wake of WWII and saw a further diffusion of power within the intelligence community itself. This agency made its bones as a force behind the cold war and was central in the conducting of those operations. The CIA consistently overestimated future Soviet nuclear capabilities with far reaching political consequences. It is now understood that the Soviet nuclear arsenal was not much of a threat and innumerable amount of resources were wasted during this time because of this error. Gusterson (2010) injects a substantial opinion about the misguiding of this time when he wrote " he tells us that their destructiveness has been exaggerated; that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were of marginal importance in ending World War II; that "nuclear weapons have been of little historic consequence," and that the United States and the Soviet Union would not have gone to war even in the absence of nuclear deterrence; that arms-control treaties are usually a waste of time and effort; that the dangers of nuclear proliferation are greatly exaggerated; that sanctions aimed at stopping countries from seeking nuclear weapons make it more likely that they will pursue them; and, finally, that "the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small."

The CIA's History of Failure

The CIA has always been an adopted child in the family of intelligence and many of the problems that the intelligence community as a whole can be attributed to the CIA. In many ways this agency has been significantly contributing misinformation and guidance to other agencies since the conception of its organization. Singh (2009) wrote "In one way or another, the CIA has been blundering since its creation in 1947, prompting President Eisenhower to remark as early as 1961 that the agency's shortcomings during his eight years in power would force him to leave a 'legacy of ashes.'"

What is remarkable is the CIA's defense of their repeated and continued failure which points to some root causes of the problem. The agency defends itself on its website by suggesting that "But intelligence has no crystal ball, and no one should be surprised that assessments of things that are hidden and projections about the future sometimes miss the mark. In this sense, intelligence failures are indeed inevitable, whatever steps might be taken to try to avoid them. A more interesting question is whether analysts succeed or fail in making the most of information available to them." In other words, intelligence at its core is unreliable and should be taken with more criticism and honesty that has been demonstrated throughout the history of this country and the way that we defend it from others.

There are plenty of mistakes the CIA has continually been involved with that have had some devastating effects on the country and the well being of other innocent people around the world who have unjustly felt the wrath of our defense powers due to misinformation provided by agents of this organization. The CIA orchestrated the overthrow of an elected president in Iran 1953 . This move eventually led to the installment of the Shah in his place. Since that time the disastrous future consequences have been felt throughout the middle east. The CIA apparently missed the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, and were taken by surprise by the swiftness of Castro's rise to power in Cuba in 1959.

The intelligence failures continued throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s -- the most egregious examples being: the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, the 1968 Tet Offensive, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the birthing and nurturing of the Mujahedeen in response, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the failure to identify Pakistan's clandestine sharing of nuclear technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Recent Failures

More recently the U.S. has been unprepared for a number of terrorist acts originating on foreign soil, including the 1993 attack on the Twin Towers, the 1996 attack on a U.S. Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa, the 1999 attack on USS Cole in Yemen and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.The three most recent intelligence failures; the inability to anticipate the 9/11 attacks, the shoddy intelligence on WMDs, and the rise of the insurgency in Iraq, were some of the worst moments in CIA history.

The CIA's inspector general concluded in a 2007 report that the failure to foresee the 9/11 attacks was a "systemic failure," noting that while 50 to 60 CIA officers were aware of intelligence reports in 2000 that two of the 9/11 hijackers may have been in the United States, none of those officers notified the FBI about the potential domestic threat. The murkiness surrounding the intelligence on Iraqi WMDs, one of the key rationales for the Bush administration to invade Iraq in 2003, still resonates as an embarrassment to the human race .The hope that the majority of Iraqis would greet us in the streets as liberators instead of occupiers was immediately shattered when we failed to restore order, or electricity, anywhere outside of the oil ministry building in the early days of the war. After that Abu Ghraib and rising sectarian violence fueled a building insurgency that caught analysts and our leaders off guard.

The Department Defense's Role in Intelligence Failure

The Department of Defense itself is teeming with confusion with regards to the intelligence operations it pursues and relies on many differing sources to present a coherent picture to the leadership of the nations who needs such information to pursue ideal actions towards sustainment and growth.

There are three major intelligence agencies in the Department of Defense that compose the organization. These include the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) The NSA is responsible for signals intelligence and has collection sites throughout the world. The NRO develops and operates reconnaissance satellites. The NGA prepares the geospatial data - ranging from maps and charts to sophisticated computerized databases, necessary for targeting in an era dependent upon precision guided weapons. In addition to these three agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is responsible for defense attaches and for providing DOD with a variety of intelligence products. Although the Intelligence Reform Act provides extensive budgetary and management authorities over these agencies to the Director of National Intelligence, it does not revoke the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense for these agencies.

It is very difficult to lay blame at the feet of certain entities within the DOD for their failures within these processes as the mission itself is confusing and convoluted. Clear ideals, and clear objectives are missing in the halls of the Pentagon and have been since the 9/11 attacks. Something was lost during that time that has put the entire system in state of shock, demonstrating an intense aversion to self-awareness, wisdom and reason in many instances.

Intelligence Structure

To begin to process the problematic information it is important to know how the intelligence community is structured. The structure itself reveals much about the operational potential of any such organization, and in this particular case, the complexity and diversity of opinion may have reached a point of imbalance.

Chart 1. National Intelligence Hierarchy

Chart 2. Example of one agency's (CIA) hierarchy.

The visual representations depicted above point to some revealing facts about the way the government organizes its intelligence assets. What is most apparent is the obvious diffusion of power and interests residing in the chart. Represented within each one of the boxes that represent an interest are literally hundreds of smaller sub-offices that all contribute, or distract from the objectives of the strategy.

To help illuminate this idea, examining the CIA's basic structure points to this idea of diffusion and weakness. There are 8 executives on the CIA's leadership branch suggesting a very diverse set of opinions and ideals. The unifying ideals that are inherent with government serviced such as duty and honor, are that much more important in an organization that is diffused and spread out. These unifying principles and the moral fiber which brings everyone together for a common purpose. The difficulty in maintain this structure with efficiency will be addressed later in this essay, but the glaring complexity of the basic framework is quite remarkable and presents unique and special challenges to everyone working in this field and requiring extra learning and effort to help reach some acceptable conclusions.

17 Agencies

By performing a finer examination on the intelligence community we find that there are 17 behemoth agencies or organizations that compose the community. It is generally accepted that the role of these organizations are to contribute to the providing of timely and useful information to U.S. policymakers, leadership and military personnel. Information is used as the primary tool to help contribute to the cause. This information is collected analyzed and then communicated to appropriate channels in a cycle of effort.

The following is a comprehensive list of the 17 agencies that are part of the intelligence community and play a significant role in its operations:

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Analysis

Department of State, Intelligence and Research

Department of Treasury, Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), part of DOD

Drug Enforcement Administration

Federal Bureau of Investigation

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, part of DOD

National Security Agency, (NSA), part of DOD

National Reconnaissance Office part of DOD

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

U.S. Air Force, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

US Coast Guard Intelligence

US Marine Corp Intelligence

US Navy Intelligence

US Army Military Intelligence

Problems of Governance

In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Strickland (2012) suggested that a stronger interaction between agencies can be effective in minimizing a problem but essentially the challenge is extreme. He wrote "The Community's mission to understand the world; warn of crises; and support national security actions - often against cunning and destructive threats - is a difficult mission, putting it mildly. We can describe the problem of managing intelligence in practical terms by considering two aspects of the problem - integrating the functional intelligence disciplines, and applying the intelligence enterprise to the range of national security problems and questions."

It is likely that the intelligence community is actually skilled at gathering data and information but the problem becomes evident as the second of the aforementioned aspects of applying this intelligence to the proper audience. The problem is though, that there is no clear proper audience for much of this information. The tendency to over-classify information and make too many secrets may have reached a tipping point and it is time for the governing aspects of this system take some charge and make sense out of a tremendous resource that appears to be wasting money by the trillions as the continually trip over the same mistakes over and over with no real urgency to reform or atone for the mistakes of the past.

Command and Control

The problem can begin to be addressed when command and control issues are understood and each agency, if deemed appropriate, knows its role in the larger scheme. This is an executive operation that needs to be overseen by Congress and ultimately managed by their powers. Congress is in a rather pathetic state since the beginning of the war on terror, and may represent the biggest casualty of the attack. Ineffective and dubious, this crew is nearly an embarrassment to the human race. Many are puppets of power hungry cabals who have perhaps persuaded to serve in this capacity to reach ulterior motives.

Regardless of the perceived incompetence from Congress, there is ample opportunity for anyone within the community to step up and become a leader in this situation. Control is a fleeting state of existence and the ability to use it in a productive manner is a very difficult task and requires some levels of confidence and persuasion to pull off many of these arduous tasks.

Communication Issues

Unlike the teamwork that characterizes most work in both corporations and government agencies, intelligence work is still largely an activity that an individual analyst or collector conducts independently. For example, performance metrics tend to be based on numbers of intelligence reports from individuals. It become obvious that communication is the central issue in finding a solution to the many problems. Attitudes and principles need to be adjusted to a more open and flowing stream of information, where the individual recognition is disregarded for the greater good of the objective.

Communication is very vague and nebulous term that can be applied in many different ways. Too often we think of communication as merely a positive, execution of energy. A new frame of mind should be adopted where a more receptive and open attitude is integrated. Narrow ideals are dangerous and myopia is the serious contributor to this issue as compartmentalization is threatening as it is necessary. The sectioning off of so many different aspects of the intelligence community requires a communication plan that satisfies many different branches of government, all with their own special words, lingo and procedures that further distorts information.

Listening and receiving information should be treated with more integrity and respect. Too often, much in part due to human nature, we are not listening to one another and are merely waiting our turn to speak or present information. The battlefield changes rapidly and leaves limited time for contemplation. This further suggests that the ability to listen, and then incorporate new information into existing information is critical for success and the eventual survival of any entity.

A Soulless America

After reviewing much information and data, it is obvious that intelligence failures are directly related not to external happenings, but rather the internal mechanisms of the individuals that compose the community itself. It takes a special kind of person to work for the government and specifically in the odd and strange world of intelligence and defense. It may be necessary to consider the idealistic tendencies of such a group in order to get the most out of them.

War is unfortunately a very good motivator for people as the polarization effects have the ability to bring out the best in people. Also, the worst in people is no doubt brought into the environment as well during times of war. Perhaps the solution lies in changing the understanding of war, and dismissing it as an essential fabric of our well being, war, at least how it is presently viewed appears to be obsolete in many different ways and a new paradigm is desperately needed to ensure that we don't all blow up one another.

As a collective entity, America is given way too much responsibility in terms of maintaining justice and peace around the world. The Monroe Doctrine in the early years of this country sought not to get involved with any issues that are not in close proximity to our own nation. This may be something to reconsider and revisit. The impossibility of preventing every injustice is dangerous and flat out ignorant of the basic facts of life. Fixing the world's problems is a fool's errand that disguises a more dangerous and potentially threatening occurrence.

In the human body, disease works from the inside out. In America, much of the same is happening. What is most tragic about the demise of the American way and the valuable principles the nation once stood for, is that its destruction is self-imposed. Lazy and complacent, America has assumed that its own history will carry it forward into a new promised land of milk and honey. The constant outsourcing of the tasks and responsibilities that make a nation strong has significantly weakened the core or the country and decadence and spoils are omnipresent. Questionable alliances and mysterious contracts define our intelligence community with no real tangible results. When will the masses wake up and notice that the emperor has no clothes.

What is missing in today's intelligence community is a rational and reasonable soul. Too often sycophantic mangers want nothing but approval and praise in anticipation of promotion and material reward. This has become the norm in society as well and we have lost the appreciation of the hidden meanings and the internal bounty of happiness. We struggle to stay on top even though there appears to be little to be gained from this perspective. Balance is ignored for sheer power and might, and the subtleties of life are ignored, instigating confusion and more strife.

Danger is Lurking

The greatest threat the intelligence community has to its existence is the American people themselves. The naive and willing collective population can only take so much before all hope and trust is diminished. The intelligence community's recent move to begin focusing the American people as possible threats is a daring and bold move. Collecting information on the people who these actions are supposed to protect, seem fair in some ways, but will ultimately lead to revolution and violence. Faust (2013) echoed this warning "The political tide is shifting against the intelligence community, as more Congressman who until very recently publicly supported the NSA and collection efforts turn coat to demand it be restrained. But this is the box Obama is being boxed into. He's facing terrible choices, either completely upending the intelligence community or trying a halfway measure that might mollify some but not all countries with whom we work closely. Either way, the intelligence community gets thrown out to sea for doing its legally-mandated job, and the country loses out in the long run. "

Solutions

The approach to warfare and conflict resolution are important components in any solution to lessening the effects of intelligence failures as a result of communication failures. It appears that new modes of communication and exchange need to be explored to help find these avenues of peace and growth. Many of the terms used in intelligence community are confusing and connotations run wild in the minds of the imaginative.

Some have suggested that adding levels of transparency accountability and legality may be the right option to correct the problems. Hurlburt (2014) wrote "Congress needs to act on two fronts. First, it must push this and future administrations to ensure transparency and oversight, such that Americans and global publics believe that targeted-killing programs are effective, ethical, and accountable. Second, it has to establish the principle that legitimacy for such operations can flow only from an openly debated and articulated strategy for U.S. counterterrorism policy -- one that can be changed through democratic political processes." This seems like a good idea, but appears to be the same old philosophy dressed in a new outfit. A pig in lipstick.

Prioritization is a must. The highest priorities for U.S. intelligence collection-and, in most cases, analysis-for the foreseeable future include the following: the status of nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union; developments in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; potential terrorism against U.S. targets in the continental United States and overseas; unconventional weapons proliferation; and political and military developments in China. Other targets could be added to this list temporarily if, for example, U.S. forces were to be deployed in significant numbers.

The best way to ensure high-quality analysis is to bring high quality analysts into the process. Analysis would be improved by increasing the flow of talented people into the intelligence community from outside the government. Greater provision should be made for lateral and mid-career entry of such analysts as well as for their short-term involvement in specific projects. Closer ties between universities and the intelligence community is desirable in this regard. Careerists would benefit from greater opportunities to spend time in other departments and nongovernmental organizations, including those involved in commerce and finance.

The most important function for the clandestine services is the collection of human intelligence, that is, espionage. Such intelligence can complement other sources and, especially in closed societies, be the principal or sole source of information. In so doing, it will at times prove necessary to associate the United States with unsavory individuals, including some who have committed crimes. This is acceptable so long as the likely benefits for policy outweigh the moral and political costs of the association.

It is not that likely that any formal process of setting requirements for intelligence collection or analysis can be made to work well. Senior and even mid-level policymakers will invariably be too busy to take seriously the exercise of preparing and updating lo ng-range requirements. The best hope for managing this problem lies in less formal relationships. Requirements must constantly be updated. Policymakers have the responsibility to keep intelligence producers abreast of their needs. This may mean, for examp le, letting them know about the state of a particular set of negotiations. The purpose is not to politicize intelligence but to make it relevant. At the same time, intelligence producers have to make clear to policymakers the choices, that by collecting o r analyzing to fulfill one requirement they will devote less time and effort to another.