Ethical theory and foundational principles

Deontology and Consequentialism

An Analysis of "Rightness" from Deontological and Teleological Perspectives

Deontological ethics stems from the notion that one is obliged by duty to behave in a "moral" manner. There are a number of theories that range from moral absolutism to Divine Command theory that may be described as deontological, but each differs in its approach to "morality" even though each recognizes an "obligation" to attend to a set of rules. In contrast to deontological ethics are teleological ethics, which gauge the morality of one's actions by their consequences. A number of theories may be classified as teleological, such as utilitarianism, pragmatism and consequentialism. This paper will explore the ideas behind deontological and teleological ethics and show how an approach to "morality" must observe at least some objective standard, and that it is the objective standard that makes an action "right," and not the dutiful adherence to the standard or the "right" consequence of an action.

Applying Context

Jacob Ross argues from the standpoint of the classical intuitionist, who values the notion that moral truths are as real as mathematical truths: he asserts that both objectively exist and that neither can be changed simply because one's subjective will desires it to change. While this notion serves as a framework for the question of what makes actions "right," there are other considerations that must be observed before "rightness" can truly be gauged. While a mathematical equation such as 2+2=4 is simple enough to understand, it is nothing compared to a complex mathematical equation. Similarly, moral law contains truths that might be simply stated, but to understand them, one needs to understand the simple laws that surround them. Just as one cannot understand 2+2=4 without having a concept of addition, one cannot understand "rightness" without having a concept of transcendence. For this reason, Ross makes an appropriate starting point, since his school of thought stretches back to such classical intuitionists as Plato.

Ross argues that deontological theories provide more and better reasons for what constitutes "rightness" than teleological theories do. He asserts that consequentialism, for example, is simply a product of deontological ethics, and that without deontology, consequentialism simply cannot exist. Ross' point is rooted in an objective standpoint of ethics and morality. Ross views morality as an unchangeable law, something that is "imprinted" on the world, just as much as the law of gravity is.

Essentially, Ross asserts that "rightness" has an intrinsic value all its own. Such a notion would agree, conversely, with the idea that other actions can be intrinsically evil, meaning that they are evil in and of themselves. Furthermore, it is Ross' contention that these views of morality can be intuited. However, there is no narrowness to his argument, for he also asserts that an action's moral status depends upon a number of considerations, such as an action's consequences (its teleological ethics) as well as prior circumstances (its deontological ethics). In a sense, Ross reconciles deontological theory with teleological theory.

Ross suggests that without such deontological theories as Divine Command theory, in other words, a law of morality placed on human action from a law-giver, there can be no objectively real system of morality, much less a system that can be subjectively altered. If Divine Command theory, which judges "right" actions according to an objective standard stipulated by God, and a consequentialist judges "rightness" based on results, Ross asks the question: How does the consequentialist form an idea of "rightness" in the first place?

Does it appear that much of modern ethical theory approaches the question "rightness" without appeal to a higher, or universal, or transcendental, or objective notion of "rightness"? Not necessarily. The question of ideal "rightness" is still debated, as can be seen for example in the differences expressed by generalists and particularists, or in the hybrid theory of Scheffler. Still, what characterizes much of the debate is a lack of certainty, a reluctance to separate the subjective and objective and insist that the objective is knowable by the intellect. This lack of certainty may be a result of the Hegelian dialectic, in historical terms. Whatever its causes in individual cases, however, this paper can make no claims. The point of the matter is that an objective essence appears to exist but that subjective perception of that essence seems to make it impossible to know what it is. The conclusion of such a point is that "rightness" is forever to be debated and cannot be known anymore than pragmatism or absolutism permits. But is this the case?

Intuition and Agent-Centred Restrictions

Plato explores the idea of "rightness" in Phaedo and Meno, and so it seems does Scheffler in "The Defense of Agent-Centred Restrictions." Essentially, Scheffler asks whether there is "a principled rationale for agent-centred restrictions" (83). Without entering into a discussion about what absolutists and non-absolutists suggest about agent-centred restrictions, one can at least assert that if Scheffler, and Socrates, are correct in asserting that intuition, or "recollection," as Plato calls it, then truth and "rightness" can objectively exist and must not be merely the result of subjective perceptions.

The agent-centred restrictionist, for instance, could argue as Plato does that the understanding or recognition of truth in reality is derived from the "recollection" of truth in the soul, upon which is imprinted a moral code, which in turn points to the existence of a code-giver or God. It can be argued, in other words, that the recognition of truth, points to the objective existence of "rightness." A teleological theorist, on the other hand, may reject this proposition by arguing that the recognition of truth is not dependent on "recollection," which is cause merely for subjective analysis, but is rather "self-evident," as Locke illustrated in his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" during the Age of Enlightenment, a time and culture from which flowed much of modern ethical theory, from Kant to Scheffler today.

The modern question of "rightness" may therefore be approached from the rather ancient perspective of "intuition." The ability to intuit agent-centred restrictions, as Scheffler suggests, can be taken as a rationale for the existence of "rightness" beyond the subjective faculty of the mind. Such a conclusion is not irrational, as consequentialists might argue, but actually quite rational -- when considered in the light of first causes.

Here, it is possible to suggest that for cultures to develop and progress, humanity must operate for the "common good," which is in direct contrast to the idea of operation for the Self, which underpins the subjectivist ethical theories of teleological systems. The "common good" points to the acceptance of virtue ethics, but barring an exploration of that particular system of ethics at this moment, it can be asserted that "rightness" is a universal concept that applies to all mankind. Such an assertion is not to suggest that there are no exceptions to the universal "rule," for experience shows that there are exceptions to quite possibly every "rule." What is needed in this discussion is a sense of moderation and reluctance to fly from one extreme, like absolutism, for example, to another, like Kantianism.

The Subjective Problem

For an ethical theorist like Susan Wolf, the idea of universal "rightness" is repellant. As she herself states, "I believe that moral perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive" (419). Her dissatisfaction for universal "rightness" or "moral perfection" as she calls it seems to stem from a personal dislike of the "moral saints" she believes best represent such "rightness." Her subjective preference does not match the so-called universal standard for rightness that they project; either they are wrong or she is wrong, and she asserts that they are wrong.

Wolf essentially argues for a more subjective morality, a less universal "rightness." She is not arguing for the "exceptions" to the "rule," but rather for the idea that there is no "rule" and need not be one. She is arguing out of the long modern tradition of liberty, which is indeed a cultural development in the West that finds expression in the Age of Humanism, Protestantism, Scientific Revolution, Enlightenment, Romanticism, Capitalism, Socialism, etc. Liberty from universals, from universal "rightness" moreover serves as the basis for Wolf's ethical system. Her basis is different from Plato's, which was situated in intelligent observation. Socrates admires "rightness" because he perceives it to exist. He does not try to "justify" rightness because it "works" for him. It appears that there is a difference in outlook. The ability to intuit an agent-centred restriction, as Scheffler observes, is the key to identifying the universal "rightness" impressed upon the soul. The agent-centred restriction, in other words, is a sign of a universal moral law. That Wolf dismisses such a law because it does not appeal to her subjective tastes is irrelevant. If a law of "rightness" exists, the deontological theorist can rightly say that it is one's duty to observe the law and that his "rightness" may be gauged by how strictly he does so.

It is here, however, in the face of the argument of the deontological theorist, that one might reasonably defend Wolf's distaste for such strict adherence. Indeed, there seems to be a kind of Puritanical strain in an unthinking, rigid adherence, without deference to "intention," "consequence," or fruit. One of the core tenets of Christian ethics, after all, is the idea that "by their fruits you shall know them," which is to suggest that one's "rightness" may be gauged in a teleological manner. Indeed, one of the appealing characteristics of Christian ethics is the way it which it approaches several different ethical theories at once and synthesizes them into a coherent whole: in it one finds a kind of deontological Divine Command theory as well as a sort of Scheffler hybrid consequentialism. Most importantly, however, it emphasizes the objective reality of a "code" or "rule," conformity to which produces "rightness" in the individual, barring the exception to the rule, of course. Christ, after all, was no legalist.

Objective "Rightness" and Subjective "Intention"

As Steven Sverdlik notes, it is widely held in schools of moral philosophy "that the motive of an action never determines whether it is right or wrong" (327). Such a belief appears to be a very obtuse way of gauging "rightness." While an objective standard can exist, there still must be the subjective "intention" which gives a character to an action that might otherwise be gauged as "right" or "wrong." Sverdlik goes on to consider whether motive can "affect whether (an action) is right or wrong," but one point that should be observed is that an action can be viewed as objectively "wrong" and subjectively "right," or even as objectively "right" but subjectively "wrong." Medieval scholastics in the school of moral theology have stated as much and their understanding of "rightness" and "wrongness" appears to be just as rational today as it was then. Sverdlik implies as much when he quotes Aristotle (a major source of learning for Aquinas): Sverdlik observes Aristotle's rationale that "acts are called just and temperate when they are such as a just or temperate man would do; but what makes the agent just or temperate is not merely the fact that he does such things, but the fact that he does them in the way that just and temperate men do" (328). What is important in this passage is the emphasis on "the way that just and temperate men" perform actions. Implicit in the expression is the idea that every action carries with it an interior disposition. An action, objectively speaking may conform to the objective standard of "rightness," but internally or subjectively speaking an action may not conform to the standard of "rightness." For example, a man might help his neighbor cross the street, a simple "right" action. If he does so, however, grumblingly, he does not carry within himself the "right" disposition and therefore may be said to have lost the "rightness" of the action.

Such a distinction of a complex notion opens the ethical theory of "rightness" to an entire range of possibilities. The idea that one may "act" rightly on the outside but "act" wrongly on the inside, and vice versa, harmoniously brings together the objective and the subjective perspectives. It neither confirms one over the negation of the other, nor gives one a higher position than the other. What it does do, however, is observe the distinct perspectives of each. It does not deny an objective "rule," nor does it deny a subjective "intention."

Such a distinction supports the idea of "supererogatory actions," which in itself raises the question, as Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons note, that if "supererogatory actions are notable because they are morally good, indeed morally best, actions…why aren't they morally required, contrary to the assumption that they are morally optional?" (29). This lee-way, so to speak, in the realm of "rightness" is possible only if "rightness" objectively exists and subjective "intention" matters as a condition of an action's having "rightness."

These distinctions eliminate at a stroke the extremism of utilitarianism, pragmatism and consequentialism, as well as the narrowness of Divine Command theory and moral absolutism. Such distinctions do not take away from the notion of universalism, but rather depend upon it in fact.

The consequentialist argument nonetheless may be asserted as a measuring stick or gauge for "rightness." As Drier asserts, "by consequentializing a theory we can make it consistent with the Compelling Idea (that it is always permissible to do what will have the best outcome)" (115). In other words, by viewing rightness in terms of consequences, one is abiding by nothing less than the Christian ethic, which may be taken as deontological theory. An acceptance of Dreier's consequentialist argument does not mean that one must deny the deontological aspects of "rightness," nor base one's perception solely on subjective or objective platforms. On the contrary, a careful observation of "rightness" reveals how several different approaches to the idea can find acceptance in a harmonious way, without negating the other or contradicting the other. There appear to be so many facets and levels of interpretation of "rightness," that to limit oneself to what may be a superficial understanding would be to deny an aspect of truthful "rightness." Perhaps it is for this reason that the Christian ethic warns, "Judge not lest ye be judged": apparently, even Christ meant to supply His followers with a doctrine that would not show his followers as prejudicial, superficial, narrow-minded non-thinkers. The easiest way around judging a man's "rightness" is to not judge him at all.