Guns Butter Military and Economic

Guns Butter

Military and Economic Policy

One of the reasons that the War on Terror has, to this juncture, been such a general failure of policy is because of its persistence during a time of general economic decline and recession. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the attention dedicated to certain aspects of waging the war against terrorism naturally detracted from the ability to retain domestic infrastructure and civilian defenses. The text by Collinge and Ayers is revealing on this point, demonstrating that the successful waging of war must be based on the ability to engage combatants wherever necessary while simultaneously ensuring a symbiotic functionality of the domestic economy.

During the Bush Administration, which initiated the War on Terror, a set of negative economic policies concerning imbalanced and untimely tax breaks and an aggressive transition into deficit spending would help to undermine our ability both to fight the war and to ensure safety, security and maintenance at home. The conflict in Iraq would especially be revealing of the need for a strong economy, with a shortcoming of body armor, troops and other crucial resources resulting from limited funding and contributing to combat disadvantages.

Simultaneously, the dedication of resources to the war effort would leave many aspects of the local economy strapped for infrastructural needs or crisis management needs. This would be most amply demonstrated by the failures relating to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Here, the city of New Orleans would lack both the infrastructural protection against powerful storms and the vehicles and personnel for emergency management necessary to contend with the storm due to the diversion of resources to the War in Iraq. The outcome would be a deadly lack of preparedness that demonstrated the need for a strong economy to coincide with terror war initiatives.

Military spending is rarely if ever restrained. However, there are some historical contexts in which we can observe that the military has sought to conduct operations based on the opportunity for financial efficiency. This is an approach which is generally more feasible during times of relative peace, meaning that the prospects for a more cost-effective effort than a full-scale war may be available. As Collinge and Ayers indicate, this is a condition which is often deeply political in nature, denoting the military policy and military spending are often shaped by party affiliation.

Thus, we can see that in instances where we have been at general peace but have been required to maintain military presence, some measure of efficiency is commanded by the highest levels. One such instance may describe U.S. policy toward Iraq in the years leading up to this most recent conflict. In over a decade, which passed between the two Iraq wars, the policy of sanctions and no-fly-zone limitations would be used to contain the threat represented by Iraq to its neighbors. This would entail the use of a modest encampment of American and U.N. personnel placed their for preventative measures. This approach would prove effective in preventing Iraq's functioning as a danger to its region and would also defray the modest const of containment amongst international parties.