Heuer/De Bono -- Fallacies. L.

Heuer/De Bono -- fallacies.

L. Jones

Edward de Bono's Critical Thinking and Richard Heuer:

brief comparison

Many argue that an individual's ability to "think outside the box," or to use his or her ability to see an issue from an unorthodox perspective can provide great power and insight into that issue that few "typical thinkers" can harness. This is definitely the case for professional "thinkers" Richard Heuer of the CIA and Edward de Bono. Although both logical analysts demonstrate some differences in their approaches concerning the "science" of thinking (with regard to the process by which one reaches judgments or conclusions), they hold striking and profound similarities.

Richard Heuer was one of the great "thinkers about thinking" within the CIA. He believed that "...Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning processes. They should think about how they make judgments and reach conclusions, not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves." In other words, Heuer was one of the first to note that intelligence analysts face additional challenges to their interpretation of intelligence that is not presented by the data itself. Instead the way in which the analyst regards as well as interprets the information can cloud his or her final analysis just as much as the actual "truth" contained in the data -- whatever that truth may be.

In short, Heuer suggested that, "The mind is poorly "wired" to deal effectively with both inherent uncertainty (the natural fog surrounding complex, indeterminate intelligence issues) and induced uncertainty (the man-made fog fabricated by denial and deception operations)." Thus, Heuer believed that being "aware" of the limitations of one's thinking was not enough to counter the natural limitations of the human mind. Therefore, he believed that the consistent use and application of "tools." These can:

Tools and techniques that gear the analyst's mind to apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex issues on which information is incomplete, ambiguous, and often deliberately distorted. Key examples of such intellectual devices include techniques for structuring information, challenging assumptions, and exploring alternative interpretations.

Much like Heuer, Edward de Bono also believed that the mind or method of thinking can distort one's view of an issue. However, unlike Heuer, de Bono points out the erroneous nature of logical thinking in and of itself in a much more direct way -- namely, by dividing the concept of "thinking" into two methods -- "vertical thinking" (which is logic-driven), and "lateral thinking (which is intentionally unorthodox "another angle" thinking). Further, de Bono seems to depart slightly from Heuer in his emphasis of "creative thinking" even if they are a result of a "systematic process" much like the "tools" referred to in Heuer's writing.

Interestingly, Heuer and de Bono are strikingly similar in their assessment of the human mind as naturally lacking in the skills necessary for the analysis of a complex issue. According to de Bono, "Our minds are trained to find typical and predictable solutions to problems. You can master the tools for innovative thinking." Although Heuer might take issue with the idea that one can "master" the tools for innovative thinking -- in effect making them a kind of "built in part" of one's thinking process (after all, many would argue that "mastery" would remove the need for varied (or any) tools in the analysis process), the fact that both recognize the inherent problems within the human mind when it comes to the analysis of complex issues places them in the same camp with regard to the "science of human thought" -- a camp that not only recognizes the limitations of "logic" in its common sense (removed from the forces affecting one's perception of logic in itself), but the necessity of using contrived and intentional "tools" to circumvent these limitations as much as possible.

Stubborn Analytical Fallacies

Although both Dick Heuer and Edward de Bono recognize the limitations of human reasoning in thought in its most common form, clouded both by the "fog" of complex issues as well as the fog of the prejudices and preconceived notions of the human mind, they placed great emphasis on the fact that much of this fog can be cleared from the analysis process via the use of "tools" specially designed for that purpose.

Specifically, Heuer advocated the use of tools that help the thinker to "...clearly delineate their assumptions and chains of inference," and to "specify the degree and source of the uncertainty involved in the conclusions." Thus, Heuer advocated the use of analytic debate, devil's advocate arguments, brainstorming, competition between analyses, peer review and outside "points-of-view." Edward de Bono, on the other hand, specifically emphasized the value of creativity in the development of a "new way" of thinking of problems from non-logical angles -- in effect, using the creative mind to compensate for its areas of deficiency in the logical or perceptional realm.

Unfortunately, however, there are some forms of mental "problems" or analytical fallacies that are famously resistant to even the best "tools" or creative thinking -- "learned" or no. Further, because both men consider the real issue at hand to be the problem presented by the "lenses" through which the information under analysis passes, one could suppose that even one's choice of the appropriate tool is also clouded by the very same "lens." Further, if others in the same position (for instance the "peers" utilized in the peer review, debate forums, etc.), are supposed to have much of the same perceptual baggage (much of which can be expected in peer groups of similar background), one wonders if the utility of those tools is really as great as one might suppose.

Take, for example, Heuer's concept of "Analysis of Competing Hypotheses," or ACH. In this tool, many plausible hypotheses are held up to intense scrutiny or "gauntlet of testing for compatibility with available information." In this method, each possibility is tested, leaving only the strongest to survive (which are then subjected to more testing). Although some issues may seem easily solved by this method (particularly, perhaps concerning statistical fallacies), those in which more personal points-of-view can cause the greatest interference (especially in cases that may involve propaganda or irrelevant facts (two aspects of subconscious acculturation), can cloud the tool as a process -- thereby turning the analysis issue into one that may seem more clearly defined in terms of competing hypotheses, yet actually only one that is "strung out" into issues that are still nothing more than the product of the analyst's (or group of analysts) collective cultural, social, and political lenses.