Hezbollah: organizational structure and political influence

Hezbollah

Augustus Richard Norton's book Hezbollah: A Short History attempts to provide a balanced and nuanced view of the Shiite Islamic organization. Concerned primarily with the issue of self-rule and self-determination within Lebanon -- at least at the time of its founding -- Hezbollah has come to be labeled as a terrorist organization by many world governments, and Norton critically examines this identification and the events and perspectives that have led to this conclusion. Much of what Norton describes in the book is a simple matter of fact, but his interpretation and analysis of these facts is at times somewhat controversial. This paper will examine Hezbollah: A Short History through the lens of certain critical scholars that reviewed the wor, in order to determine the general consensus (or lack thereof) that exists in the academic community regarding Hezbollah's status.

Defining Terrorism

In order to understand Norton's argument that Hezbollah not be considered a true terrorist organization, an understanding of how he defines terrorism must be achieved. The vast majority of Hezbollah's violent action has taken place, in Norton's view, against military targets, and this fact rather than the fact that the group operates out of civilian centers and has no real military installations makes them more a paramilitary/rebel group rather than a terrorist organization.

This is an oversimplification of Norton's argument, but is still the central view that he takes of Hezbollah and of its violent actions against primarily the Israeli military.

Norton also notes the abundant charity work the Hezbollah engages in, and cites the primarily religious nature of its guiding principles and philosophies insomuch as they can be currently determined.

Other scholars appear to agree with this general assessment, at least if the general praise given to Norton's work as a fair and well-balanced view of the organization in its current iteration is to be taken as a validation of his central arguments (which seems a fairly necessary conclusion).

There are others, however, that disagree either with Norton's scholarship generally or his conclusion regarding terrorism specifically.

Though Hezbollah may be a charitable and paramilitary organization, its dependence on violence rather than diplomacy makes it a terrorist organization far less able to blame its decisions and actions on other countries than Norton indicates, in this view.

The Israel Problem

Another major issue with considered Hezbollah a paramilitary rather than a terrorist organization is found in its treatment of Israel. Like certain other entities in the region, Hezbollah refuses to recognize Israeli legitimacy despite largely adhering to certain "rules of the game" that keep it from attacking civilian targets in Israel (with some very notable exceptions), and this lack of flexibility is both a problem in and of itself and a demonstration of the lack of political traction that is possible with Hezbollah, demonstrating with some clarity that it is not simply a religious/charitable organization fighting for independence -- there is a specific agenda that the group has, and its violence is a part of that agenda.

In addition to causing problems with Israel, this stance of Hezbollah's creates tensions with the international community as it creates an untenable situation especially if Hezbollah should achieve greater official political power, as is beginning to occur.

This could suggest possible political motives for Israel's allies (namely, the United States) to label the organization as a terrorist group in order to keep it from achieving international political legitimacy. This is not discussed by the authors reviewed here, however, though the resistance to Israel generally as a source of tension in the region and with Hezbollah specifically is certainly exploited by the organization, and truly creating a fear or "terror" of the Jewish state is a definite part of Hezbollah's ultimate goals in certain of its actions and policies.

The Reviews Are In

Understanding the true legitimacy of Norton's claims is difficult for the novice student in the area, and a reliance on other critical views of Hezbollah: A Short History does much to question a work that otherwise comes across as quit definitive. Many others express a great deal of approval for the book, though even those with generally positive comments tend to take issue with the level of simplicity with which Norton describes and analyzes specific events and issues.

This was difficult to discern during an initial reading of the book, but the brief descriptions of missed complexities provided by the reviewers cause one not necesarily to doubt but certainly to question Norton's conclusions on certain subjects.

One reviewer that begins with a fairly positive comparison of Norton's text with two other works on the subject ends with a relatively scathing denunciation of the lack of real scholarship in Norton's work, citing not only a lack of in-depth and/or innovative analysis but also a great number of errors, omissions, misattributions, and other factual concerns that call into question many of Norton's foundations for analysis.