Terrorists, Politicians, Social Reformers, Paramilitary,

Terrorists, politicians, social reformers, paramilitary, liberators; Hezbollah has worn many hats. The most striking feature of this organization though is the incredible evolution the world has witnessed since its inception in 1982 (Kalibi, 1988). Initially, Hezbollah emerged as a liberation minded militia following the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Though the organization merely hundreds strong flew under a banner of peace and rightful restoration of national sovereignty in fact it was Hezbollah which first utilized suicide bombers as strategic military ordinances in an effort to affect the outcome sought.

This initial violence and bloodshed though begot a multifaceted organization which has actually taken a stand not against militia action against "imperialist or Zionist" forces per se but against the unnecessary loss of civilian life (Ajami, 1986).

Though born of terror, in the intervening twenty eight years between its inception and present day Hezbollah has evolved from a grassroots movement whose primary mode of effecting organizational objectives was kidnapping, suicide bombing, and the unfair death and/or detention of civilians to an organization which has openly stood against the suicide bombing of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 putting them at decided odds from organizations such as Al- Qaeda and Hamas who condone acts of violence against civilians and civilian targets (Byman, 2003).

Though Hezbollah has evolved conspicuously from its beginnings, it is still to a degree a paramilitary organization engaged in active conflict. Their continued refusal to disarm as well as their anti-Zionist stance makes them a real and present threat to any country, organization, or demographic which pledges support to Israel. Hezbollah has grown in number from an organization of merely hundreds of members to one which can command demonstrations numbering in the hundreds of thousands (Halliday, 2005).

Additionally, previously a strictly Islamic organization, in the last four years Hezbollah has begun talks with a number of other religious groups within Lebanese society stating openly that the cultural, religious, and political freedoms of Lebanon are sanctified and should be supported. The one caveat to that stance though is in the instance of organizations or institutions which openly support Israel (Coban, 1987).

The targeting of a country as opposed to a specific religion is another noted difference between Hezbollah and the multitude of other paramilitary organizations currently active in the region. Though anti- Semitic statements and leanings have been attributed to the group, group leaders do identify that it is the sovereignty of Israel which they do not recognize and not specifically Judaism (Hollis & Shehadi, 1996).

Organization: Though historically it was propagated by Hezbollah that there was no official infrastructure within the organization, as it has emerged as a valid political party and force for social change, that veil of mystery has been thoroughly dispelled. Scholars who have spent significant portions of their careers studying the organization have uncovered multiple layers of accountability and access not unlike any full fledged national government or large corporation. At the head of the organization sit a committee of twelve senior clergy (Hamzeh, 2000).

Though to those individuals raised with a western concept of governmental hierarchy the concept of having clergy in the highest position of authority is foreign, this honored practice is in keeping with the concept of "Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists." That phrase means simply that in any organization which claims to be Islamic in creed, there must be a member of clergy at its head (Hamzeh, 2003). In the case of Hezbollah there are twelve.

These men sit on a consultative committee which oversees all activities carried out by the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon. Directly below the consultative committee is another governing body composed of eleven senior clergy members who are charged with the specific decision making processes which will govern the rest of the organization (Hamzeh, 2003). These twenty three senior clergymen are effectively responsible for all of Hezbollah both ideologically as well as strategically.

Though considering the size and wide reaching spread of the organization it would be naive to believe that those twenty three individuals were directly involved in the activities of each of the groups incorporated under the banner of the Hezbollah organization it is the strength of the ties within the Islamic community specifically for organizations advertising a strict adherence to the laws of Islam and fighting for the liberation of Lebanon from Israel which is so pervasively respected without question that the adherence to Islamic law in this instance effectively regulates the behavior and organization of members spanning not only regions but even countries (Hamzeh, 1993).

Below these higher governing bodies are individual specialized committees addressing each of seven key areas identified by Hezbollah leadership as crucial to successful achievement of organizational goals. These seven committees include; ideological, financial, military, educational, judicial, social, and informational (Halliday, 2003). Though there'd only one consultative committee and one deciding committee these smaller specialized committees exist in triplicate one residing in each of the three primary regions of influence within Lebanon.

The multiplicity of these smaller more specialized units allows for the further specialization of organizational leadership to the particular needs and challenges of individual regions (Khalaf, 2002). The three regions are Beirut, Bequaa, and The South. Associated Organizations: Though "Hezbollah" is the permutation of the organization's name most widely used currently there are a significant number of associations and organizations either linked to Hezbollah or which exist as smaller offshoots of the larger primary group.

While many of these organizations such as Hezbollah Bayat al Mal or Jihad Al Binna are reasonably innocuous financial and social welfare operations respectively there are quite a few unsavory connections which have been connected to Hezbollah as well (Kamrava, 2005). The IRSO (Islamic Resistance Support Organization) while appearing on the surface to be a simple fundraising body of the organization in fact harbors a number of unseemly benefactors of their donation collection.

In among the humanitarian fund raising efforts are fundraising for programs which pledge support to the families of martyrs. Though "officially" martyrs are defined as those individuals who have lost their lives in the support of Hezbollah objectives it must be remembered that initially those objectives included the strategic suicide bombing of military targets (Norton, 2000).

Effectively while this fund raising organization acquired money for projects involving schools and hospitals, even health care and when necessary water it was also directly supporting the initiative to not only care for the families of individual who have chosen to take up the mantel of "suicide bomber" but also additional efforts to finance and arm the paramilitaries operating within Hezbollah (International Crisis Group, 2005).

The Islamic Jihad Organization is one such organization which is a direct sponsor and advocate of terror activities which may or may not be affiliated with Hezbollah (International Crisis Group, 2003). Though Hezbollah has admitted that they are involved nominally with the organization they are not specifically involved in the day-to-day activities and running of the organization It is believed currently that Hezbollah trains the personnel and to a degree funds the activities of the organization.

However their specific involvement in the selection of targets, planning and execution of attacks, and overall fear-based propaganda are unclear (International Crisis Group, 2002). The U.S. State Department though maintains that any support or involvement in an organization which engages in terroristic activities is themselves involved in those same activities.

Though it is reasonably certain that Hezbollah is involved with IJO, their stance on the type of attacks preferred by the organization makes it difficult to determine not only their degree of involvement but also their actual control over the individuals they are ostensibly training (International Institute for Treategic Studies, 2000). Goals & Objectives: The most simple description of the goal of Hezbollah is a completely independent and sovereign state of Lebanon whose interests political, physical and ideological are protected.

Initially possessing of a basis in conservative Shi'a Islamism, the religious tolerance and democratic approach to politics employed by Hezbollah has grown exponentially in the years following the 1991 withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon (Jaber, 1997). That said the removal of Israel is still a primary goal within the organization.

Though the United Nations verified that Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon in 2000, the continued pretext of armament for Hezbollah has included a number of justifications ranging from continued Israeli occupation of Shebaa farms to the presence of Lebanese citizens in Israeli prisons (Qassem, 2005). Though those critical of the organization cite these justifications as merely excuses to continue the active military engagement and maintenance of power, the fact that Hezbollah has brought a great many positives to the war torn Lebanese people (Saad- Ghorayeb, 2002).

Social & Political Programs: Hezbollah is directly responsible for a great many social programs which have served to help reconstruct the civilian infrastructure of the country. These efforts include schools, hospitals, community centers, public parks, and even media centers. Hezbollah though not the first paramilitary organization to produce widely syndicated radio and television programs, is the first to fight legally for the right to maintain their media presence (Rubin & Keaney, 2002).

Hezbollah has committed itself to the betterment of societal Lebanon not just in the context of Muslim families and organizations but all those who stand for an independent Lebanon. They have also provided a great deal of assistance when conflict has rendered regions without electricity or water (International Crisis Group, 2005). It was Hezbollah who provided not only medical supplies and food to Beirut during the 2006 conflict, but they also provided electricity and clean water for the people left without such vital resources.

In a revolutionary move, Hezbollah even offers free medical care to every individual who pledges themselves to the organization. While it is clearly propaganda to further their cause, the access to free healthcare in a region plagued by poverty, starvation, and disease is truly radical and identifies Hezbollah as a militia genuinely concerned with the welfare of the people it is fighting to liberate (Fisk, 2001). Hezbollah has a satellite radio station as well as a satellite television station.

Somewhat sensationally dubbed the station of the resistance Hezbollah produces a great deal of news and educational content which is widely available and eagerly consumed (Picard, 1993). There has been concern though regarding the overall anti-Zionist message of a great deal of the programming. Some inflammatory reports even indicate that the programming is designed to encourage listeners to acts of suicide bombing against Israeli targets. Such an assertion though stands in direct opposition to the goals of the organization (Gronbech- Jensen, 1999).

Though it is true that in the manifesto of their operations, Hezbollah leadership indicate that they will not be able to rest until their Zionest enemy has fallen, it is also true that Hezbollah is very much against the unnecessary death of civilians or the destruction of civilian targets (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). It is likely though, that in the multitude of anti- Zionist propaganda which is put forth daily, there is a degree of anti-Semitic propaganda spread as well.

It is important to note though that Hezbollah clearly states that its enemy is the state of Israel, not the civilian population or their beliefs (Greene, 1984). Hezbollah currently exists as one of two primary political parties within Lebanon. As such it is necessary for continued political advancement for there to be significant infrastructure and socially reconstructive branches of the party. It has been remarked that Hezbollah presents itself as any other "government" would (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).

It is possessing of an armed branch as well as branches concerned with economy, social welfare, environment, and education. Hezbollah is even making strides in beginning to interact diplomatically with the world at large. Making the first genuine foray of any former revolutionary militia still regarded as a militia and not a formal government into the world of international politics (International Crisis Group, 2002). The political protests of 2006 perhaps mark the most striking departure from Hezbollah of the 1980's and 1990's to the Hezbollah in power currently.

Though joining the government officially in 2005, Hezbollah leaders opposed a number of perceived sectarian policies demanding a government which would be representative of the entire population (International Institute for Strategic Studies). When such an agreement could not be reached rather than resorting to violence as would have been their past position, senior ministers in the Hezbollah organization resigned their post and rallied hundreds of thousands of protesters to peacefully demonstrate against the incumbent government.

The rallies lasting from 2006- 2008 mark the first step in the shift of Hezbollah from a terrorist organization to a political one. Though eventually in late 2008 fighting did erupt as a result of the government assertion that Hezbollah telecommunications were illegal and the removal of an airport security chief with ties to the organization. Even then, the violence was at a bare minimum leaving only eleven dead in small street skirmishes (Rubin, 2010).

Hezbollah seized control of key neighborhoods in Beirut but promptly then handed control back to the Army in an effort to secure military sympathy. Their bid worked and the government not only revoked its suspension of Hezbollah broadcasting but agreed to the original political requirements of Hezbollah on the new government. Hezbollah was granted veto power and its opposition allies were all given seats in parliament (Rubin, 2010).

Funding: The 1991 launch of Hezbollah's television and radio stations through the support of Iranian financial backing identified Iran as a significant contributor to the coffers of the organization. historically Hezbollah has identified only the donations of Muslims worldwide as the source of its income, it has been conclusively proven that this is not entirely the case. It has been estimated that approximately $200 million dollars annually is funneled into the organization via the Islamic Republic of Iran (Halliday, 2005).

Though this financial assistance is ostensibly only used for political and social programs such as hospitals, schools, and election campaigns it cannot be conclusively proven that such is the case. Further it has been observed that an increasingly large amount of money is being brought into the organization through a number of illegal methods in and around North and South America. In an operation called "smoke screen" a multimillion dollar cigarette smuggling operation was uncovered whose profits were going directly to Hezbollah (Halliday, 2005).

Additional to more mundane operations such as cigarette smuggling there are also reports of smuggling actual individuals into the United States and South America for the purposes of fund raising. Though it is currently unclear as to how accurate that assessment is in that those individuals seeking to move to the United States may well be doing so for reasons other than strictly raising money for the organization, it has been confirmed that people are among the wide range of commodities smuggled by Hezbollah (International Crisis Group, 2005).

Additionally a significant amount of narcotic production and transportation has been linked with the organization. It is believed that a significant amount of high quality hashish as well as heroin produced in the region is coming from fields likely operated by the Hezbollah organization. It is estimated approximately $10 million dollars per annum is filtered into Hezbollah as a result of international drug trafficking.

However, because the primary region in which Hezbollah distributes its product is so rife with competition from other illegal organizations which are paramilitary in their own right it can be difficult to establish the precise bounds of the drug smuggling and disbursement operation (Haddad & Jamali, 2003). Though smuggling can be rather lucrative, it is not the only illegal means through which it is suggested that Hezbollah turns the type of financial profit necessary to fund its continued social and military activities (Fisk, 2001).

While reports of kidnapping for ransom and even counterfeiting abound it is entirely more feasible that degrees of extortion are employed in areas where Hezbollah forces enforce law and order. It is also probable that since their supply of munitions and weapons is steady and furnished willingly by the Islamic Republic of Iran that arms dealing is another means through which Hezbollah supports itself (Saad- Ghorayeb, 2002).

While the illegal funding options are perhaps more interesting to investigate the contribution of the very many wealthy Shiite's whose portfolios are at the beckon call of the organization cannot be underestimated. Though the small contributions made by individual citizens around the world are important their use is more as a sign of solidarity and public opinion barometer than an actual reliable source of income (Qassem, 2005).

Chapter 2 Arming of Hezbollah: Though the story of Hezbollah specifically begins in 1982, the social and political climate which fostered such a group begins nearly forty years earlier with the establishment of Israel as a country through the Un General Assembly Resolution 181 which established effectively a partition in the country formerly known as Palestine in which a Jewish state and a Muslim state were established (Greene, 1984).

Following the mass displacement of World War II, the international community established Israel as a sovereign country which could offer refuge to the millions of displaced Jews who survived the concentration camps of the Nazi party, this position was cemented through the 1948 Israeli Declaration of Independence, a move supported by the international community (Kalibi, 1988). Though in theory an excellent and effective resolution to a serious international crisis, the area which would become sovereign Israel was already inhabited by citizens whose national allegiance was Palestinian.

Preceding the effects of World War II on the mass exodus of Jews from Europe, the demographics of Palestine were such that the overwhelming majority of the population was Muslim followed by Jews and then Christians who combined numbered less than half of the residential Muslims. By 1947 though, this demographic balance had shifted such that there were nearly equal numbers of native residential Palestinian Muslims and displaced European Jews vying for political control of the region (Cobban, 1988).

The establishment of a new country effectively within an existing country resulted in the further displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the following twenty years to surrounding countries. This exodus exacerbated by a number of serious political and military events which not only forced Palestinians from their homes but also served to radicalize them within the countries where they sought refuge (Ajami, 1986).

The Palestinian Liberation Organization which was officially founded in 1964 was the culmination of more than a decade of relatively unchecked violence and displacement for the people who had inhabited the former Palestine. The PLO was born within the community of more than one hundred thousand Palestinian refugees who took refuge in Jordan following the violence of the 1948 Arab- Israeli conflict and the Six Day War (Haddad & Jamali, 2003).

Though Palestinian refugees should have found safe refuge in the country of Jordan, their militancy ultimately resulted in a serious clash between the Hashemite King and the fledgling PLO. Though the individuals native to Jordan had the majority of political power, they were outnumbered almost two to one by Palestinian refugees.

In September of 1970, King Hussein determined to quash this radical and violently militant group began a campaign of violence which resulted in many thousands of deaths as well as the expulsion of more than three hundred thousand additional Palestinian refugees the majority of whom claimed allegiance to the PLO into Lebanon (Piccard, 1993). Rather than crushing the PLO, the actions of King Hussein coupled with the already volatile feelings of international resentment and displacement only served to harden the PLO and garner more supporters to their cause.

Though in the National Pact Lebanese government officials declared support for religious tolerance and democratic governing the huge influx of militarized Palestinian refugees into the south of Lebanon quickly presented a problem similar to that experienced in Jordan. Though refugees, the Palestinians particularly those involved with the PLO were ideologically opposed to many of the more progressive governmental policies adopted by Lebanon and as such developed a secure and isolated internal government within southern Lebanon (Kamrava, 2005).

This was further exacerbated by the existing tensions between the Maronite Christians who had formerly comprised the majority demographic within southern Lebanon and the political leanings of the Muslim Lebanese. The Christian population was in support of Western influence specifically in the form of the Baghdad Pact whereas Muslim Lebanese sought official allegiance with the United Arab Republic which had been formed by Egypt and Syria (Khalaf, 2002).

Though previously the number of different ideological and religious demographic parties within Lebanon had coexisted in relative harmony, As the demographic makeup of the country shifted so too did tensions increase specifically in the context of interfaith violence. The PLO representation in southern Lebanon pushed consistently and effectively for Lebanese inclusion in the United Arab republic, a move sorely resented by and provocative to the Maronite Christians.

Shortly thereafter it was from the PLO stronghold in Beirut that border incursions as well as smaller scale attacks on Israel targets were deployed from the PLO in Lebanon as well as Syria (Byman, 2003). Necessarily the shelling of pumping stations and canals though unsuccessful was highly publicized by both sides of the conflict in an attempt to recruit more followers to the cause as well as sending a clear message to the other party as well as the international community that the uneasy peace had come to an end.

Israel's response was immediate and bloody, in response to the small scale attacks perpetrated by a militia force not officially aligned with the Lebanese government, Israel IDF troops shelled border towns mercilessly resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties. As the conflict intensified, Palestinian and Israeli commandos engaged in numerous armed conflicts within the Lebanese border. These skirmishes though resulting from guerrilla actions by both sides of the conflict served to devastate the south of Lebanon.

Civilian lives, livelihoods, and homes were lost in the conflict resulting in the displacement of still more individuals as well as the militarization of the Maronite Christian population which had formerly existed in a majority in the south of Lebanon. This population was now on the receiving end of extreme political and residential fallout from conflicts which they were not only opposed to but also not directly involved in. Residents of the area were incensed at the governments non-reaction to conflict within its borders (Norton, 2000).

The subsequent polarization of the Lebanese community ultimately resulted in the civil war. This civil war which raged roughly from 1975 till 1990 resulted in hundreds of thousands of fatalities as well as upwards of one million injuries (Norton, 2000). The location of Lebanon has made it a crucial strategic alliance during conflicts between Syria and Israel. The government, overwhelmed, allowed not only the skirmishes resulting from the small scale attacks perpetrated by the PLO to continue unchecked but also the movement of Syrian and Israeli troops throughout the country (Halliday, 2003).

This relative free reign brought death and destruction to thousands of native inhabitants of the country as well as identifying Lebanon itself as a high priority target in the ongoing Arab Israeli conflicts. Though international peace keeping forces both on the ground and remote brokered and renegotiated numerous cease fires and uneasy peace treaties none of them lasted long in that the small armed militias not officially affiliated with any one government offered no allegiance to or acknowledgement of such peace keeping efforts (Halliday, 2003).

Further, already endangered minority groups such as the Maronite and other Christian populations became pawns in the larger power struggles occurring in the region. In response to both political manipulation by Israel and increasingly brazen attempts at a renegotiation of the National Pact of 1943 which was viewed as a direct attack on the Christian position within the framework of Lebanese society the already fragile balance of religious tolerance cracked (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).

Where previously the Lebanese government had been divided three ways to represent an equal distribution among the three largest demographic groups represented in Lebanon, as a result of continued Christian alliance with Israel and the west Muslim residents and resident refugees began to mistrust the Christian officials both in the government and other governmental institutions such as the official Lebanese army. Soldiers began defecting to armed militias and the authority of even high ranking government officials such as the President was called into question.

The stalemate was broken when the Christian President of Lebanon reached out to the United States for assistance in regaining control of the country (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). At that time the United States was actively engaged in the Cold War and was unable to render assistance to the crumbling government.

With a clear indication that there would be no assistance arriving from the west, the free reign of Syrian, Israeli, Egyptian, and assorted other armies throughout the country and the increasing tensions between armed sectarian militias, collapse was inevitable. Israel seized this opportunity to ally themselves with the Christian militias and begin not only arming them but also training them even at IDF training camps (International Crisis Group 2002).

This alliance was an attempt by Israel to eliminate the PLO problem from its eastern border occupied conspicuously by Lebanon which had been effectively overrun by armed Muslim militias sympathetic to the cause of the PLO. This alliance however only served to exacerbate the tensions resulting in increased armed conflict among the militias as well as a weakening of the central government by the increased incursion into Lebanese sovereign space by foreign armies (International Crisis Group, 2002).

Where previously the population native to Lebanon had expressed sympathy to the plight of the Palestinian refugees, quickly that sympathy degraded in the face of the extreme violence and chaos which PLO attacks on Israel brought down on the country specifically the south. As Muslim support for the Palestinians began to wane and militias began forming alliances outside Lebanon the country was poised on the brink of disaster (International Crisis Group, 2002). Regionally militias began fighting the armed Palestinians.

These smaller internal conflicts began initially in smaller road blocks or kidnapping however quickly escalated to full scale city massacres and guerrilla attacks on civilian targets (Qassem, 2005). These attacks increasing in intensity and frequency in turn resulted in further stigmatization of the Lebanese people. While the PLO though technically still refugees in a foreign land asserted their right to fight Israel from the south of Lebanon through the establishment of a secluded city state within the borders of the country which had previously provided them refuge from persecution (Qassem, 2005).

Rejectionist activities not only resulted in an increase in PLO activity against Israel which was largely ineffective and resultant in extreme indiscriminant retaliation from the better equipped IDF, but also in many religiously motivated attacks against Christians and even other Muslim militias. After many months of fighting militias began realigning themselves forming alliances between the Palestinians and the Sunnis as well as between the Sunni and the Druze (Rubin, 2010).

Though throughout the course of the conflict allegiances and treaties would be betrayed several times ultimately allying each militia with each other militia at least once it was the ever changing nature of the conflict which in face ultimately helped to perpetuate it (Rubin, 2010). After years of fighting, uneasy peace was reached in 1977. Lebanon had been effectively divided between those groups allied with Palestine and those groups pledging allegiance to a united Lebanon. Between the years of 1977 and 1982, Lebanon existed in relative equilibrium (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).

However, in the south of Lebanon extending to the west of Beirut, the PLO and sympathetic armed militias were coalescing and training which resulted in once again rising tensions between the Palestinians and Palestinian sympathizers within Lebanon and Israel. The relative peace however was marred by several cross border incursions on either side of the conflict. In 1978, Palestinian militia crossed into Israel hijacking buses and terrorizing the Haifa- Tel Aviv road before being gunned down by IDF forces.

In response to this incident, Israel invaded the south of Lebanon occupying much of the region held by Palestinians and Palestinian sympathizers (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). Though the UN called for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces the first and perhaps most significant blow to the uneasy peace accord had been struck. UN security forces established a buffer security zone of control however that was only marginally effective and served only to escalate the existing tensions between Israel and Palestinian Lebanon.

The security zone was ultimately held by the South Lebanese Army (SLA) which was not only funded and armed by Israel but also Israeli trained (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). Violent skirmishes began immediately with the installment of SLA troops in the security zone. These skirmishes involved the PLO, SLA, and Israel. The PLO continued shelling cities in the north of Israel as well as posts held by the SLA. The SLA was backed in part by Syria despite the general Christian make up of the Army.

However, when news of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel reached Syrian officials they immediately withdrew support from the SLA and began supporting the Palestinians and Palestinian sympathizers fearing that their economy would become jeopardized by such a potential alliance (Rubin, 2010). Not only though did Syria switch allegiances, they also began actively attacking the militia which they formerly had supported.

This lead to direct conflict between Israel and Syria clearly illustrated in the April 1981 skirmish which brought Israeli fighter jets to Beirut and ultimately resulted in the placement of Surface to Air missiles on the borders of the hilly and crucial city of Zahle (Rubin, 2010). This escalation ultimately lead to the Israeli bombing of apartment blocks in Beirut during which several hundred civilians were killed and several hundred more were injured.

Despite the international fallout from such a decision Israeli officials began planning yet another mission into Lebanon with the intention of driving the PLO out of Lebanon and destroying their leadership. Though technically there was an cease fire in effect still, the PLO did not acknowledge the effect of the cease fire in that they stated it governed Lebanon which they were not a part of (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).

As long as the PLO were in Lebanon, they would continue to engage Israel and Israel would continue to retaliate ultimately destroying the resources, economy, and population of the area. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon again, this coming as a result of the Abu Nidal association's attempt to kidnap and assassinate an Israeli Ambassador in London. In a previous meeting with United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Haig had stated that Israel could only invade on the clear and unmistakable provocation of the PLO (Rubin, 2010).

Despite the fact that the Abu Nidal association did not claim allegiance to the PLO and had in fact kidnapped and assassinated a number of ranking PLO officials as well as made attempts on the life of Arafat himself this most recent attempt was blamed on the PLO despite the PLO having condemned the leadership of the Abu Nidal association to death (). Further U.S., British, and even Israeli intelligence agreed that the incident was likely sponsored by Iraq and completely unrelated to the PLO or the conflict in Lebanon.

This incident which was simply another in a long string of attempted kidnappings and assassinations was the incident which Israel had been waiting for (International Crisis Group, 2005). On June 6, 1982 Israel launched "Operation Peace for Galilee" which was intended to drive PLO forces and their ballistic capabilities out of range of Israeli targets (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). In a first twenty five kilometer push civilian casualties were massive and internal fighting erupted elsewhere as a result of the support of Maronite forces and leadership.

The blueprint for invasion indicated that the troops were tasked with heading directly towards and ultimately seizing the city of Beirut (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). The UN immediately issued an order that all parties involved in the conflict withdraw and cease fire. Ignored, a second resolution UNSCR 509 was enacted which reaffirmed the initial order.

A third time a cease fire order was drafted however the United States finally took action in the conflict utilizing its veto power to quash the order the implications of this action were the tacit approval of Israel's actions by the United States Government effectively sanctioning the invasion and positioning the United States firmly in opposition to the PLO and its sympathizers on an organizational and national scale (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).

When the Israeli bombing raids on west Beirut began, Arafat finally joined negotiations for a withdrawal of PLO from Lebanon (International Crisis Group, 2005). Though these negotiations took several months and occurred while fighting continued ultimately a cease fire and evacuation of PLO forces was arranged. Though the safe and peaceful removal of PLO and Syrian fighters was underway, Israel asserted that there were existing threats to the peace treaty hiding within the remaining Palestinian refugee camps bordering Beirut.

Without the consent of the Israeli cabinet or any conference with International Peace Keeping officials Israeli forces transported large numbers of Israeli allied troops into the camps under cover of night (Kamrava, 2005). These troops remained in the camps for just under three days during which time up to three thousand Palestinian refugees were slaughtered, none having apparent affiliations with the PLO or any other armed militia (Kamrava, 2005).

Though there was call for a final international agreement to cease fire, the relative evasion of actual consequence by then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Rafael Eiten left lingering resentment among the Muslim population of Lebanon who saw the May 17 agreement as an effort by the west to wash its hands of the affair and by Israel to maintain a stronghold in the south of Lebanon (Kamrava, 2005). From these conditions, Hezbollah was born.

Initially a small band of disaffected Shi'a Muslims who were ideologically neither allied with the Palestinians nor the Christians found resonance with the Iranian revolution of 1979 which propounded a form of radical Islamism which appealed to the conservative Shi'a culture (International Crisis Group, 2005). The Hezbollah organization emerged as a group of Lebanese individuals intent on wresting their home land from foreign invaders.

These invaders included residual members of PLO as well as Israeli troops and any other invading power which sought to take control of Lebanon or further manipulate the country as a strategic tool of war (Byman, 2003). Though small in number it was made immediately apparent that Hezbollah was a force that more than compensated for its small size with training, strategy, and conviction of cause. By 1987 Hezbollah seized control of several parts of Beirut from the Syrian Backed Amal militia establishing itself as a serious force in the capital (Picard, 1993).

The overthrow of the Amal militia came on the heels of the "War of the Camps" during which Amal fighters raided and destroyed many Palestinian refugee camps in an effort to oust any remaining PLO members (Picard, 1993). While superficially this goal would appear to be in keeping with the ideology of Hezbollah, in reality the Amal militia was acting at the behest of Syria and killing hundreds if not thousands of already war torn civilians.

In this first act of dominance, Hezbollah not only established themselves as a genuine military presence but also distinguished themselves from the other militias in their abhorrence of foreign involvement as well as the unnecessary killing of civilians and attack of civilian targets (Rubin & Keaney, 2002). Following these overtures, there was continued unrest in the capitol city. Lines of dissent were drawn along religious boundaries and perpetuated by international backing of smaller militias.

Saddam Hussein of Iraq used the discord to develop Lebanon as a potential proxy for the ongoing Iran -- Iraq conflict (Rubin & Keaney, 2002). Syria also became involved in the politics of Lebanon again supporting Muslim militias to ounteract Iraq's support of the Maronite Christian forces and incumbent government. This political posturing culminated in the Syrian initiated October 13th attack which ousted the Christian Military government lead by Michel Aoun.

This final attack resulted in a 1991 peace agreement which pardoned previous political crimes and ultimately dissolved all existing militias with the notable exception of Hezbollah (Haddad & Jamali, 2003). Hezbollah having established itself as a liberation and defense force of Lebanon refused to disarm on the grounds of continued resistance to Israeli incursion as well as the defense of Lebanese natural resources which it perceived were in imminent danger of seizure by foreign powers.

Following the 1991 peace negotiation, Hezbollah evolved from a hard line revolutionary militia to an organization with interests in developing a democratic political presence as well as the reconstruction of the Lebanese state (Gronbech- Jensen, 1999). Endorsed by the supreme leader of Iran, beginning in the 1992 elections Hezbollah became an extremely significant political force which was ultimately able to acquire 10.9% of the voting power in Lebanese parliament which ultimately amounted to veto power (Byman, 2003).

They were also given sanction to remain armed in the defense of Lebanon and its resources against foreign incursion. These permissions were granted as a result of the continuing conflict between Hezbollah and Israel following the 1991 peace accord. Most notably because of the Israeli attempt to invade and eradicate Hezbollah in 1996. Though ultimately yet another peace accord was signed it too fell out of relevance in 200, and then again in 2006 (Rubin, 2010).

Though thirty four days after it began the United Nations was able to broker a peace agreement, the majority of Lebanese citizens did not believe that Hezbollah should disarm citing specifically the willingness of Israel to cross into Lebanon to purge the country of the Hezbollah organization (Rubin, 2010). Following the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah was relatively non-violent barring the 2010 warning that it would not hesitate to use weapons to defend the Dalit and Tamar gas field which was discovered by Noble Energy (Rubin, 2010).

Though the field lies within Israeli commercial property, Hezbollah claims that the field is theirs and any attempt at extraction will result in an armed retaliation. Though there may or may not be grounds for such a claim, it is evident that in the immediate future there will be no disarmament from Hezbollah and as such there will be no genuine peace in Lebanon (Rubin, 2010). Chapter 3 2006 Lebanon War: The 2006 Lebanon war was a thirty four day standoff between Hezbollah forces and Israeli Defense forces (Rubin, 2010).

Though the actual conflict did not start until July 12, 2006 it is believed that the raid which began the conflict was a response to the 2005 killing of Hezbollah operatives who were killed while surveying the IDF held Shebaa farms (Rubin, 2010). Since then, Hezbollah soldiers had sought to either kidnap or kill IDF soldiers not only in retaliation for that act, but also as the fulfillment of a promise to restore four Lebanese prisoners who were being held in Israeli prisons.

As a diversionary tactic Hezbollah soldiers fired Katyusha missiles at northern Israeli military posts while simultaneously attacking and armored convoy on the Lebanese side of the border (Rubin, 2010). In the initial attack, three soldiers were killed outright, two were mortally wounded or possible killed outright were taken back to Hezbollah headquarters to leverage a prisoner exchange.

The initial attack was dubbed "Operation Truthful Promise" as a result of the supposed breach in terms by Israel in the release of four Lebanese nationals being held "illegally." Another five Israeli soldiers lost their lives in the commission of a rescue attempt for the kidnapped men (Rubin, 2010). Israel considered the kidnapping an act of war and proceeded to declare that the crime had been committed by the country of Lebanon as opposed to Hezbollah specifically, as such the entirety of Lebanon would be fairly within range as acceptable targets.

Though it is claimed that Prime Minister Olmerts specifically directed that civilian targets be avoided if possible it was made clear in a statement by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz that that order would not be adhered to (Rubin, 2010). This refusal to honor the Prime Ministers order was observed the very next morning at which time an Israeli bombing raid destroyed Rafic Hariri International Airport which was the only international airport in the country of Lebanon (Rubin, 2010).

Though Israel claimed that the airport was used to smuggle arms into the country, such reports have not been substantiated. Additionally the Israeli navy blockaded seaports and the Air force blockaded airspace. There were surgical attacks on primary roadways as well as on areas believed to be stockpiles of Hezbollah munitions. It was believed that the majority of Hezbollah munitions stored in stockpiles and reserves were destroyed in that first day of bombing (Rubin, 2010).

As the volley continued it was estimated though that Hezbollah forces were firing on average of 100 missiles per day towards Israeli targets. Additionally they bombed Hezbollah offices and training facilities all over the country including several key targets such as the offices in Beirut (Rubin, 2010). With these attacks, Hezbollah under the leadership of Nasrallah declared that there were not only ready for full scale war against Israel but that in fact they welcomed it.

They solidified this stance by destroying one of the Israeli navy ships enforcing the oceanic blockade (Rubin, 2010). The Israeli airstrike did not differentiate between the offices of Hezbollah and the residences of Hezbollah leadership. Beginning on the 15th of July, the Air force began targeting such homes as well as many of Lebanon's radar outposts on the coast. During these attacks targets central to civilian social infrastructure were also leveled within Beirut (Rubin, 2010).

Irreparable damage was done to many businesses and financial holding centers thus making good on the promise of Chief of Staff Halut to set Lebanon's clock back twenty years. Three patriot missiles were even deployed outside of Haifa by Israel.

In response to the assertion that this perhaps was a disproportionate response to the small scale shelling of military facilities and the death of approximately ten soldiers, Israeli officials remarked that no country in Europe would have responded as calmly as they were citing their near two day waiting period prior to the commencement of their air strikes (Rubin, 2010). It was not until the 17th July that Israeli ground forces were able to begin advancing into Lebanese territory.

In the one kilometer they were able to advance, armored bulldozers destroyed several Hezbollah outposts (Rubin, 2010). The response to this incursion was the destruction of an Israeli railroad depot which was apparently an accident as the missile was meant for the nearby fuel storage facility.

The city of Haifa in which the railroad depot had existed was also home to ship yards as well as oil refineries, attacking the city though not strictly adhering to the paradigm of only attacking military targets was in keeping with the concept of utilizing strategic individual attacks to maximize destabilization and damage while minimizing human casualty. Only eight railroad workers were killed in the bombing. Another stray missile from Hezbollah fighters demolished a hospital in Safed (Rubin, 2010).

Over the course of the following days the small skirmishes in and around the border continued in combination with heavy bombing from both sides (Rubin, 2010). Israel bombarded Lebanon by air and by sea while Hezbollah fired back from missile launching platforms dispersed throughout the countryside. As the bombing intensified Israel prepared for another full scale attack on Lebanon, seeking to invade and level more Hezbollah strongholds and areas of control as they went.

The town of Bint Jbiel would prove to be a crucial battle point as it was one of the areas in which Israeli and Hezbollah forces encountered close quarters combat as well as prolonged entrenched guerrilla warfare in hardened positions (Rubin, 2010). Both sides were launching hundreds of missile strikes per day resulting in extensive structural damage to many of the cities which were solely inhabited by civilians.

These missile attacks which though intended initially only for military bases and strategic tactical locations quickly devolved into a melee of indiscriminant bombing which all told would cost more than one thousand three hundred civilians (primarily Lebanese) their lives. It would also result in the destruction of more than one hundred thousand residences and several thousand centers of industry (Rubin, 2010). Four hundred miles of road way were destroyed, more than thirty bridges, and countless other places were demolished by the hailstorm of warheads which reigned down on Lebanon from Israel ().

That is not to say that Lebanon did not return fire, however Hezbollah missile attacks were restricted to long-range missiles which could be launched from the few platforms not destroyed by Israeli bombing raids. One factor in Hezbollah's favor is that Iran, the primary supplier of their weapons, kept a steady stream of high grade warheads and assorted other munitions streaming into the country throughout the course of the conflict (Rubin, 2010).

As many missiles and munitions stores as Israel blew up, Iran was ready to replace in an effort to perpetuate their anti- Zionist agenda and support their ally. Despite the overwhelming amount of bombing and combat both sides were reporting extremely low casualties in combat (Rubin, 2010). The average for daily battle was between ten and twenty with many days not seeing casualties on either side above ten.

Though it is impossible to determine how accurate these statistics are as both sides exaggerated their kills while minimizing their losses, the numbers presented support the position that despite both sides commitment to not end civilian life.