Hinsley\'s Power and the Pursuit

Hinsley's Power And The Pursuit Of Peace

Hinsley, F.H. Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States. Cambridge University Press. 1967.

In his infamous 1967 work, F.H. Hinsley examines the major peace proposals of the nineteenth century and beyond in a heavy criticism. Hinsely criticizes how motivation for these proposals was actually twisted, and was therefore failing to provide an efficient resolution for peace within a number of examples. Essentially, these proposals were being brought out of fear, fear that war was on the horizon. This was a foundational element of strategies for peace that failed to focus more on what really mattered, the actual consequences that would come about through the onslaught of war itself. As such, these strategies for peace are clearly seen by Hinsley as inefficient methods for avoiding wars. Many of the most infamous wars of the period can be attributed in part due to the failure to prevent them using much more efficient strategies that focused on more pertinent elements.

According to Hinsley, part of the problem is that the ongoing power struggles were impacting the international communities' judgment and later action. In this, his argument attacks the foundation for much of what contemporary international politics is built upon. Within the current structure of international relations, power determines the methods for finding peace on an international spectrum. However, power struggles and misappropriations often hinder the actual goal of bring peace efficiently. The power struggles and conflicts within international relations then hinder the ability to succeed in bringing about any sort of lasting peace at all.

He thus criticizes the international communities' blind acceptant of outdated peace strategies that are essentially tied to the common acceptance of the presence of these power divides. These divides now continue to manipulate international efforts based on skewed power levels that tend to favor personal biases and agendas. Peace schemes used even in the most modern context are still being influenced by formulas that originate from medieval times. In the modern context, we have accepted these power deadlocks. This only weakens our ability to combat international conflict and human rights violations because we are incompetent in such a divided state. This idea and general acceptance has long stopped the international community from implementing new strategies that do not rely on the same destructive power foundations that had hindered international efforts for years. Today, there is a complete ignorance of the information that has been presented to the international community through a number of examples that would help the international community adopt new methods of executing peace strategies. Without the confidence in trying out new strategies, the international community is simply relying on copies of older traditions that have proven time and time again that they fail to provide the most efficient peace strategies. Essentially, without adapting, the international community is condemning itself to commit the same mistakes over and over again.

Hinsley's argument is clearly in opposition of how many of us have been trained to think based on the continuation of the very strategies that Hensley is criticizing in 1967. Many might believe this to be too harsh of a criticism, as his argument is basically asking the international community to completely revamp their diplomatic policies that guide peace proposals and peace strategies. However, this is just a piece of the larger argument that Hinsely is making which is actually quite cohesive and tied to actual historical research and examples. The first chapters are very blunt, yet the second half of the work focuses on ways to readjust such failed policies structures, showing the capacity for Hinsely not only to criticize but to offer alternatives that might bring about greater chance for peace in the future. Hinsley tries to bring greater awareness to the absurdity of international policies and strategies. He attempts to place more empirical regulations and foundations within the study of international policy. Greater knowledge, Hinsely believes, may open up a broader attitude that will look past the strategies that are so limited by seemingly unsolvable power divides. This is an impressive element of his larger thesis, which helps give credibility to his overall voice.