Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia

Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (1990)

What is genocide?

When it comes to genocide there is a lot of disagreement amongst legal scholars as to what is enough to qualify as genocide. But basically genocide is described as the logical, structured, planned attack or in other words the deliberate destruction of a national, religious, racial or ethnic group. The said destruction could be in whole or in part. Scholars of the legal system have long since debated as to what is enough so as to qualify as genocide. The 1957 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) has laid out what it believes to be a precise definition. As described by article 2 of 1957 (CPPCG) the act of genocide is described as any act that is mean to destroy in entirety or in part any racial, ethnic, or religious group by the following acts; causing members of the said group to suffer serious mental or bodily harm, or murdering members of the group, or forcing the group members to live in a certain way, or a calculated or methodical enforcement that is designed to cause harm or destruction to the group. The acts also include the prevention of continuity of the generation in the said group[footnoteRef:1]. Simply put genocide is the intent to cause the destruction of a group. The intent could be the destruction in entirety or in part. However for a crime to be termed as genocide the intent must be proven. Otherwise the crime, no matter how heinous, will not constitute genocide. [1: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2008). Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, The Wayback Machine.]

What is humanitarian intervention?

Simply put, humanitarian intervention is the use of military force against another state to end human rights violations practised by the state against its citizens[footnoteRef:2]. Humanitarian is a much disputed subject. There exist multiple definitions and descriptions of the term. The definition chosen depends a great deal on the lens through which the subject is currently being viewed. The term has different limits if viewed through the lens of politics, law and ethics. There exists a whole variety of reasons for the difference in definition. Some of the reasons accounting for the differences are discussed below[footnoteRef:3]. [2: Marjanovic, Marko. (2011). Is Humanitarian War the Exception?, Mises Institute.] [3: Ibid]

One reason is that there is a demonstrated absence of agreement from the host state. Another reason that becomes a factor is the question of whether or not humanitarian intervention is restricted to actions of punishment. Another case that causes much disagreement is whether intervention is limited to cases where the United Nations Security Council has given explicit authorization for the use of military force[footnoteRef:4]. On the other hand there is some agreement when it comes to the general traits of the term[footnoteRef:5]: [4: Welsh, J.M. (2004). Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. Ed. Jennifer M. Welsh. New York: Oxford University Press.] [5: Alton, F. (2000). Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.]

One feature that is agreed on is that Humanitarian intervention entails the use of military force. This is an intervention in the sense that the rights of a sovereign country are violated by another country in the sense that the aggressor violates the country's territory or air space. This in when the sovereign state has not committed any acts of aggression against the state that is committing itself to the intervention. This act is undertaken when the aggressor is under no threat by the sovereign states polices. It is done purely in the interest of humanity. The issue of humanitarian intervention is a bright topic of interest when it comes to foreign policy of a state. The issue has seen more debate ever since NATO intervened in Kosovo in the year in 1999. This brings to light two different principles. The two principles stand in stark contrast to the UN's two policies of state sovereignty and international law[footnoteRef:6]. The issue has created several long running debates. These debates include the discussion of whether it is feasible to use military force in response to a situation of human rights violation. Questions abound such as when the said intervention should take place, which should intervene and others[footnoteRef:7]. [6: Tharoor, S. And Daws, S. (2001). Humanitarian Intervention: Getting Past the Reefs. World Policy Journal 2001.] [7: Ibid]

The issue represents different things to different people. For people who are all for the intervention it is a symbol of hope. To them it is a military intervention in light of human rights abuses. To them it marks the end of human rights violations. But to the people who are against the intervention is viewed as an excuse for the achievement of ulterior motives. The humanitarian intervention excuse was used with increasing frequency after the end of the cold war. Some people thought that it was a new form of politics. However that theory has now been put to rest with the war on terror that the United States has declared following the September 11 attacks[footnoteRef:8]. [8: Cottey, A. (2008). Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: The New Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention. Contemporary Politics: pp. 429-446.]

Background to the Somalia intervention in 1990

It was an unfortunate dawn of May 1986 when Mohamed Siad Barre, the President of Somalia, met a serious road accident in heavy rainstorm[footnoteRef:9]. It was a life threatening situation created by clash of a car and a bus. He got head injuries, a serious shock and few of his ribs broke[footnoteRef:10]. During his treatment at Saudi Arabian hospital, Lt. Gen. Mohamed Ali Samatar, who was the Vice President of Somalia at that time, assumed the position of head of the state. After few months, Barre started recovering and tried to take the charge himself. He participated in elections on Dec 23rd, 1986. His opponents included his Vice President Lieutenant General Samatar and his son-in-law General Ahmed Suleiman Abdille[footnoteRef:11]. People doubted his performance and power handling on the grounds of poor health. He could not succeed in his efforts to win election of President for the coming seven years. [9: World of Information (Firm). (1987). Africa review, World of Information, p.213.] [10: National Academy of Sciences (1988). Committee on Health and Human Rights, Scientists and human rights in Somalia: report of a delegation. U.S. Committee on Human Rights, Institute of Medicine. National Academies, p.9; Arthur S.B., Muller, T.C., Overstreet, W. (2008). Political Handbook of the World 2008, CQ Press, p.1198.] [11: Ibid 9; Arthur S.B., Muller, T.C., Overstreet, W. (2008). Political Handbook of the World 2008, CQ Press, p.1198.]

It was the time, when Barre had lost his power and control in SRC (Supreme Revolutionary Council). During the decade of 1980, his rule gradually declined and Cold War got to an end. Somalia lost its strategic significance and many citizens disapproved military dictatorship in the country. The resistance movement continued to spread far and wide in the country as government became more and more totalitarian. Ethiopia supported the resistance movement and it turned into a civil war in 1991. There were few other supporting entities like SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Front), SNM (Somali National Movement) and USC (United Somali Congress), etc. Somalia National Army (SNA) was disbanded. There were few others political oppositions who were non-violent in nature but supported the rebellion movements. Their names include SMG (Somali Manifesto Group), SDM (Somali Democratic Movement) and SDA (Somali Democratic Alliance). All these entities joined hands to weaken the rule of Barre and they succeeded in their efforts as well[footnoteRef:12]. [12: Arthur S.B., Muller, T.C., Overstreet, W. (2008). Political Handbook of the World 2008, CQ Press, p.1198.]

During the last few days of the dictatorship, it had been impossible to settle on a political solution. It is due to this fact that the capital was taken over violently. Though there had been efforts made in that direction, they left behind consequences. A manifesto was published by a group on politicians in the spring of 1990, which called for the resignation of President Siad Barre and for the national conference to be summoned. Their call had gone unheeded; in fact any chance of transition of power in an orderly manner was lost as many faced detention by the crumbling regime. At any rate the scheme had probably been unclear: on one side members of Siad Barre regime were concerned and aimed at protecting their own survival. On the other side, it attracted the moderates, those who were apprehensive about the armed takeover in Mogadishu and its consequences. The Manifesto group gathered around its numerous survivors or moderates looking for an escape, this was because both Egypt and Italy had encouraged the idea of a settlement conference, in Cairo, till right at the end. In 1990 they found a common ground quite quickly, with the USC branch in Rome. USC, since the beginning of 1989, has been split into branches; an internal one stationed in Ethiopia and an external one stationed in Italy. In Oct 1990, the SPM, the SNM, and the internal USC were signatories of an agreement to not proceed without discussing with one another to create a new political headship and to not negotiate with the Siad Barre regime. As the only one who was actually involved in the fight in opposition to the regime General Mohammed Farah Aydeed, the internal branch was under his control. The collapse of the dictatorship and the disorder that followed lead Ali Mahdi Mohammed being proclaimed by his close acquaintances as the president, even though he was one of the Manifesto participants as the leader of the external USC. Married to the public health adviser of the former president and owner of one of the best hotels in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi was a rather unfamiliar figure. Several veterans such as Ahmed Jilow, formerly the head of Secret Police and Mohamed Sheikh Osman, the Finance Minister for quite a long-term, belonging to the former regime surrounded Ali Mahdi. Almost soon after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime on January 29th 1991, civil war started amongst the winners because the SPM, General Aydeed and the SNM didn't accept Ali Mahdi's so-called election. This lasted 18 months and ultimately led to foreign forces intervening[footnoteRef:13]. [13: Ibid]

It is maybe of use at this point to analyse the division of the country, by the range of band organizations of a political nature, amongst themselves[footnoteRef:14]. These should neither be viewed as traditional tribal structures (given that it was only in 1990 that most of them had surfaced) nor as political organisations that are modern. Popular organisations are what they tried to pass themselves off as, whereas in reality they were 'bastardized' entities, established on clan enrolment (even though distant from including all members of the clan). They attempted to the trade the limited capacity they had in their residential areas in exchange of a way in to attaining foreign aid; and they all had the support of customized armed militias. Some were predominantly defensive (especially in the South, among the inactive peoples of the inter-riverine area), but the majority were offensive and signified a sort of revolutionary side of their people as well as a fascination for the disaffected anomic youthful fighters called mooryaan (the cast out ones), who aroused fear evenly in both friends and enemies[footnoteRef:15]. [14: Jobson, B. (2008). Islamists thrive as Somali leader quits. Reuters, The Financial Times.] [15: Ibid]

Renewed Civil War (1991-1992)

Victims and oppressors

Due to the uncertain circumstances, the SNM was enforced by the major pressure in the past British colony to quickly announce the independence in the month of May 1991[footnoteRef:16]. Though the circumstances varied greatly in the North and South regions, but due to the announcement of independence, the uncertain conditions got settled to some extent into the indigent quasi-government. On the other hand, beneath the SSDF leadership, the northeast area remains out of the brawl that excludes the fights with the Aydeed's branch of USC, which was Belet Weyn. Moreover, this situation did not remain for the longer time as this spreads out to the borders of Kenya, which was completely under violence[footnoteRef:17]. [16: Chothia, F. (2011). Could Somali famine deal a fatal blow to al-Shabab? News Africa, BBC African Service] [17: Chothia, F. (2011). Could Somali famine deal a fatal blow to al-Shabab? News Africa, BBC African Service]

It is identified that the circumstances got worse with the passage time in Mogadishu when the conquering Hawiye killed non-Hawiye occupants in the region. The non-Hawiye occupants included public figures like the Issaq, who could be termed as the adamant supporters of the past regime. The people who were mostly victimized were those who belonged to different clans of the Darod family which includes Majerteen, Ogadeen, Dolbahante, Marehan and etc. This spell of brutal killing got into prominence from the activities of the offending young soldiers of Hawiye who were at that time known and popular as the mooryan[footnoteRef:18]. [18: Ochami, D. (2011). Somalia government supports Kenyan forces' mission. The Standard, Standard Group.]

The cruel slaughter of innocent people widely spread that one of the liberators Colonel Omar Jess being an Ogadeen Darod was unable to stand and overlook the extensive killings of his people and he decided to take an action against his so called dear former friends or alliances. Colonel Omar was badly beaten in the Afgoye and he had to move back to the South due to the strong pressure imposed by Hawiye[footnoteRef:19]. [19: Ibid]

The atrocious circumstances of the country at the time insisted Colonel Omar in April 1991 to join back the forces with the enemies of SNF in opposition to USC allies. They made the strategy of attacking the north region. The fights in the north and the south region destroyed inter- reverine areas which affected and destroyed the crops and forced several people to turn into expatriates. Once the situation got stabilized between the regions of Gedo and Bay, which was previously in control of the forces of SNF-Siad Barrre and which came under the alliance of Aydeed- SDM-USC, Colonel Omar took advantage of the situation and reconciled with General Aydeed so that he could get his support against the forces of General Morgan. This reconciliation between Omar and Aydeed allowed the Colonel to return to the harbor of the Kisimayo in South[footnoteRef:20]. [20: Ibid]

In the South where the situations got more stabilized, the tension and the strain flared up again in the south capital, as a consequence, among those opponent or rival branches of USC who were about to bury all their differences so that they can together face the threats given by SNF enemies. To fight with SNF enemies, a conference was arranged in 15-21 July, 1991 in Djibouti so that the political situation, as termed by Somaliland President Abd-er-Rahman Ali Tur, was a surrealistic construction that can in no way be put into the practice. The total of 83 government men selected in the conference to make up the intervening government was positioned under the command of President Ali Mahdi Mohamed but this governement, again, existed only in the paper form and not in real[footnoteRef:21]. [21: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2012). Joint Communique - Operation Linda Nchi. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed March 3rd, 2012 from: http://www.mfa.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=399:joint-communique&catid=35:news]

The defeat of Siad Barre had taken place when the military operations in the Gulf war were gone unnoticed by the global actors. Afterwards in the year of 1991, the brawl had again started between the provinces of Lower Shebelle, Bay and the Lower Jubba. Again it did not gain any attention from the world as in these provinces there was not even a single foreigner or journalist. In the same year of 1991 in the month of November, a Mogadishu War, which was fought till the early subsequent year of 1992, finally highlighted the Somali conflicts and got the attention of the whole world[footnoteRef:22]. [22: China Daily. (2010). Kenya agrees to join AMISOM. Accessed March 3rd, 2012 from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-12/07/content_14225808.htm]

The major reason behind the Mogadishu war was the competition for controlling the capital between the two under-fed and the over-armed opponent groups of the related tribes. The thing that finally exploded the two rival groups was a very minor contention on controlling the airport. This war lasted for the 3 months under the drastic conditions of savagery. Both the rival camps for the three months routinely used the heavy weapons in the streets without considering about the safety and security of the civilians of the capital. During the three months there were around 14000 casualties because of the blind attacks made on the prisoners, ambulances and etc. In contrast, the attack on the Siad Barre forces just a year prior to Mogadishu war had only 4000 casualties[footnoteRef:23]. Thus, at the end it is noticed that there was not a single benefit of fighting for either party and finally the war ended dividing the capital between southern zone, which was controlled by General Aydeed, and the northern zone that was controlled by the Ali Mahdi. [23: Physicians for Human Rights. (1992). No Mercy in Mogadishu. London: Physicians for Human Rights.]

The last fight between the two capitals drastically weakened the branch of USC which includes different segments of Hawiye tribe; and the SNF forces of pro- Siad Barre took the hearts of people in South zone. The former regime after getting the heavy weapons from South Africa via Kenya[footnoteRef:24], under the guidance of General Mohamed Said Hersi, the 'Morgan', initiated an enormous attack on the north zone in the year 1992 in March. In April 1992 the Morgan and his army made it to the capital and forced the two generals, Aydeed and Ali Mahdi, to reconcile on temporary basis so that they can together face the threat of the new emerging force of 'Morgan'. The forces of pro-Siad barre were defeated badly in the attack and moved towards south. Even the SNF forces were chased all the way back to the border of Kenya and the two armies who were struggling, looted the inter-reverie area once again and gave rise to more expatriates[footnoteRef:25]. [24: Africa Watch. (1992). 'Somalia: Beyond the warlords', News from Africa Watch, Vol. 5, No 2, p.6.] [25: Ibid]

In the summer of 1992 the circumstances got completely disarrayed and more than half million of Somali civilians were relocated[footnoteRef:26]. Some dwelled within the land of Somalia in Mogadishu or in the far south, while some relocated to different lands of Yemen, Ethiopia, Europe, North America and Kenya. The circumstances got so worse that the people had to face the incredible shortage of food especially in the Lower Shebelle and Bay provinces. Due to this, 90% of children suffered from malnutrition and 16.5% was the death rate at that time in June 1992[footnoteRef:27]. [26: Frontieres, M.S. (1992). Populations en danger, Paris: Hachette, pp 58-65; United Nations Special Emergency Program for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA). (1992). Updated Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, Geneva: United Nations; United States Agency for International Development USAID. (1992). USAID/OFDA Situation Report, No 13; Department of Public Information (DPI) and United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (1992). United Nations 100-day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia. Geneva: United Nations.] [27: Frontieres, M.S. (1992). Populations en danger, Paris: Hachette, pp 58-65]

Global intervention

It was due to the international neglect that one noticed an event which eventually triggered the intervention of foreign countries. In the month of September 1992, Mohamed Said Hersi initiated an attack of retaliation against the SNA forces of Aydeed. After he got the victory in the offensive attack in the second quarter of 1992, Aydeed created a federation of organization which was a free federation that worked below the USC faction. This federation brought different groups together like; the SSNM, Omar's SPM faction, SNU, SAMO and SDM for a while[footnoteRef:28]. [28: Department of Public Information (DPI) and United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (1992). United Nations 100-day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia. Geneva: United Nations.]

The Counter offensive attack was considerably successful and Morgan had re-conquered most of its GEDO province and pushed the incursions to the outside of Kisimayo. Though from the humanitarian view point, the victory of Morgan was considered as the destruction as this contributed in creating expatriates in large numbers. They also caused the NGOs and the other services to leave the province. This in turn left the province with huge camps of expatriates of the South and the casualty rate also increased incredibly. This whole condition was documented in the U.S. press in the fourth quarter of the year 1992. The 100 day emergency plan of U.N. For Somalia was turned out into a big fiasco as only 9% food was distributed among people after the 40 days of the implementation of plan. Therefore, it was said that there was a great need of more radical actions to stable circumstances[footnoteRef:29]. [29: Ibid]

Foreign Intervention in the Somalia Crisis (1992-1995)

In the year 1992, U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution to get involved in crisis that hit Somalia. The resolution 733 endorsed the ban on the arms supply, official compassionate help from United Nations and a truce. Though, the actual implementation of the decision was more than negligible in reality[footnoteRef:30]. [30: Ibid]

Subsequently, another resolution (751) was passed on 24 April 1992, which proposed creation of United Nations Somalia Mission (UNOSOM) and deployment of 50 military bystanders to supervise the truce singed on 3rd March 1992. In this regard, Pakistani troops were deployed with a restricted domain of responsibilities. Their effectiveness got badly disturbed with constant danger of attacks and unfriendly environment. Mainly, the observers remained stuck in the international airport, with very limited work to do[footnoteRef:31]. [31: Ibid]

Due to increasing offenses by the troops of General Mohamed Said Hersi's, Security Council again passed another resolution (775) on 28th August, 1992. According to this new version, an increase in the number of U.N. military observers was proposed in the war zone and also proposed 4 offense zones. Though, the text called for a gentle assistance, but remained very unclear about the definition of an intercession because United Nations was still reluctant to go for a full-fledged involvement in Somalia[footnoteRef:32]. [32: Ibid]

At last, U.S. President Bush announced a direct American armed intrusion of Somalia, primarily to secure the aid distribution mechanism in the deteriorating conditions. However, there were few other considerations or motives behind the U.S. administration's decision to intervene in Somalia and some of these considerations included[footnoteRef:33]: [33: as cited in WRITENET. (1995). Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990 -- 1995. Refworld - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Refugee Agency.]

First of all, when Cold War ended, a major cut in the defence budget was inevitable, which was the main concern for Pentagon. On the other hand, newly elected President Clinton also vowed to come up with a new Social Security Plan that might have caused a major cut in military's budget, so a fresh military operation was a good idea[footnoteRef:34]. [34: Ibid]

The second element was related to image building. The operation; Desert Storm went successful; still, it earned a great criticism for United States. Conversely, a direct military operation on the pretext of saving children in a highly poor African country could have been a great tool to build a positive image in a Muslim dominated area, where Westerns in general and U.S. In particular were not liked at all[footnoteRef:35]. [35: Ibid]

The third major rational behind the operation was the operational test of U.S. Army, which despite some preliminary hesitation went happily into the war-torn area to test its Rapid Defence element. This helped them create a military base in the Diego Garcia Island that was never used for such exercises before[footnoteRef:36]. [36: Ibid]

Though, the technical and operational mechanism of this intervention were duly planned and sorted out, still the operation faced a major blow owing to mistreated official policy agenda. The militaries went into Somalia with the banner of United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF), but they were not aware of what was going to happen ahead? However, this was not the sole American problem because when U.S. announced military intervention on 25 November 1992, many Western countries also followed suit and jumped into the motion, with no serious planning of the future and expected results[footnoteRef:37]. [37: Ibid]

The then French Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs; Bernard Kouchner (also creator of Medecins Sans Frontieres) announced that he believed that this intercontinental involvement would meet its objectives because they are most likely going to meet a few armed teenagers with zero operational or military capacity which will make them flee away from the battlefield quickly[footnoteRef:38]. [38: Ibid]

He was not the sole optimistic diplomat in the west. Few voices which raised concerns were not paid attention to at all. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger questioned and demanded the detailed explanation of the intervention and the operational limits and time-frame for the operation, but in vain[footnoteRef:39]. [39: Ibid]

Jane Perlez was one of the journalists, who remained in Somalia and monitored the whole operation since the failed attempt of UNOSOM mission. He asserted that many U.N. representatives were left bewildered in Mogadishu, Somalia as to the reason behind U.S. administration's lack of attention paid to improve the flapping U.N. military operation before taking a direct intervention by U.S. army as the final decision[footnoteRef:40]. [40: Ibid]

Analysing the views expressed by Bernard Kouchner, we find a little egotism in few European and western powers, when they thought of Operation Restore Hope. The central idea of his philosophy was that Somalian crisis is nothing but an outcome of archival teenage criminals, who will not be able to fight back the heavily armed Western militaries, and will evacuate the field for them[footnoteRef:41]. [41: Ibid]