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Despite there being a "Federal Response Plan" in place, the bureaucratic machinery took a long time to activate. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which was supposed to implement the Federal Response Plan, was hardly in a state to respond adequately to the situation. The Agency was still geared to respond primarily to a massive nuclear attack and saw its main responsibility as distributing federal loans and grants to help rebuild an area after a disaster. It would not issue direct aid to a state until it was given a specific request by the governor, and the state was unable to issue specific requests for aid because it had no one was available to assess the damage (Franklin). Federal help was so slow in arriving that a frustrated director of Dade County's Emergency Office made the famous remark, "... Where the hell is the cavalry on this one?" (Quoted by Lerbinger, 61) the quote captured the overall sense of frustration and helplessness that disaster victims felt. Stung by the criticism of the federal response to the emergency, President Bush created a presidential task force headed by Transportation Secretary Andrew H. Card, Jr. For jump-starting the entire disaster response process. Although Card took important measures that helped expedite the delivery of governmental assistance; but by bypassing existing policies and processes, these measures ultimately proved disruptive and expensive and caused greater confusion and hindered a coordinated response to the disaster (Schneider, 100).
In addition, as if two cooks were not enough to 'spoil the broth' the federal government sent in a third -- the military. It is true that the military performed important tasks in the disaster relief process following the hurricane. It quickly assessed the seriousness of the situation and airlifted in tons of food, supplies, and equipment to the affected areas; it cleared debris from the streets and airports; it used mobile field kitchens to serve meals to hungry citizens and relief workers; erected tent cities to house the homeless; and it operated clinic facilities that provided emergency medical care to local residents (Ibid.) the army and marine troops also helped to stabilize...
Yet the military often acted independently of other organizations and agencies and bypassed the official disaster-response structure -- the FEMA -- as well as the "unofficial" presidential emergency operation -- the presidential task force -- adding more confusion to an already haphazard disaster relief effort.
Conclusion
Hurricane Andrew was one of the costliest natural disasters to have hit the United States. It affected the southern part of Florida most severely. Although some measures such as timely evacuation of people along the coast helped to minimize the loss of lives, the uncoordinated and sluggish response of the government and disaster relief agencies to address the aftermath of the storm, aggravated its impact, especially in Florida.
Works Cited
Franklin, Daniel. "The FEMA phoenix - reform of the Federal Emergency Management Agency." Washington Monthly, July-August, 1995. September 21, 2008. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_/ai_17263136
Lerbinger, Otto. The Crisis Manager: Facing Risk and Responsibility. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
Preliminary Report -- Hurricane Andrew." National Hurricane Center. Updated December 10, 1993. September 21, 2008. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html#FOOT1
Schneider, Saundra K. Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis Situations. Armonk, NY M.E. Sharpe, 1995
An additional 25 lives were lost in Dade County, Florida from the indirect effects of Andrew
The state governor grossly underestimated the severity of the situation. For example, he apparently thought that the Florida National Guard could handle the situation. So he did not initially request federal military support
Measures such as, for example, ordering of relief workers to make immediate eligibility determinations for individual assistance without waiting for the normal inspection of damages; and doubling of the maximum amount of money that storm victims could receive for making repairs to their homes
Hurricane Andrew
Works Cited
Franklin, Daniel. "The FEMA phoenix - reform of the Federal Emergency Management Agency." Washington Monthly, July-August, 1995. September 21, 2008. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_/ai_17263136
Lerbinger, Otto. The Crisis Manager: Facing Risk and Responsibility. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
Preliminary Report -- Hurricane Andrew." National Hurricane Center. Updated December 10, 1993. September 21, 2008. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html#FOOT1
Schneider, Saundra K. Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis Situations. Armonk, NY M.E. Sharpe, 1995
Although it had lost some pop, Andrew was still a Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale Category 3 hurricane on the second go around. but, the first round was enough to know that Andrew was bad. From a business perspective, Hurricane Andrew crippled the offshore oil facilities on its second approach throughout the gulf coast and in Louisiana where the storm added another billion dollars in damage. These financial losses did not even
These groups, Flaherty asserts, provided the first organizers in shelters, and continue to support the homeless and luckless victims of Katrina. Meanwhile, an article in the journal Reason laid out the race and class dynamic with forceful simplicity: "Obviously, race and poverty are intertwined in America, and to that extent race was related to who survived in New Orleans" (Young, 2005). And when there are problems connected to the Republican
This city, so dependant upon the hospitality sector for its economic lifeblood may have permanently lost jobs and entire facets of its entertainment and hospitality industry. This reality suggests there are further long-term costs to the local population and the national economy at large, again exacerbating the spiraling effect of the damage from Katrina. Particularly if the city's ills such as looting, health hazards posed by poor sanitation, poor drainage,
Folkman, MI. California Engineer Sees Fears About New Orleans Levee system Come True, 2005 The author writes about the thoughts and experiences of Robert Bea, civil engineer at the University of California in Berkeley on the recent killer hurricane in New Orleans. Bea studied the city's levee system since 1954 when began working for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, He discovered that it was not high enough and that parts
Planning Efforts to Reduce Future Disaster Impacts This paper looks at options for programs to be put in place before to a disaster to avoid major and often poorly-managed expenditures after a catastrophe and to offer suitable protection against the risk of those large losses which do occur. It is important for the government to provide programs that enlightens the citizens on how to deal with the hazards that come with
Hurricane Floyd was deemed to be a Category 4 storm with 145 mph winds. It was also seen to be bigger than the hurricane Andrew, which had struck south Florida in 1992. Andrew caused a huge disaster and left 26 dead, 160,000 homeless, and property damage of $25 billion. Floyd was determined to be bigger and potentially more dangerous than Andrew, which caused people to panic. Officials had reported by