Intelligence: definitions, theories, and applications

Intelligence

The first step in identifying and updating the intelligence requirements that must be answered in order for operational personnel to refine a Noncombat Evacuation Plan (NEO) for a future contingency in the Democratic Republic of Congo is contextualizing this plan according to the desired objectives, the means to achieve these objectives, and the hierarchical structure of both ends and means that will characterize the actual planning and execution of any possible noncombat evacuation operation. While every evaluation of a preexisting noncombatant evacuation plan using the Strategies-to-Task (STT) paradigm likely need not consider the entire chain of command when addressing the need for updated intelligence, for the purposes of this exercise, it is useful to start at the top, if only to highlight the top-down nature of the STT approach, the complexities involved in a plan such as this, and why "a strategies-to-task framework is ideal for identifying the complete range" of necessary information contained within a noncombatant evacuation plan (Rhodes, Hagen, & Westergren, 2007, p. 9). In the case of noncombat personnel in the Democratic Republic of Congo, this means determining where their safety and well-being falls on the hierarchy of objectives and strategies for achieving those objectives.

Firstly, it is worth pointing out that placing the safety of noncombat personnel in the DRC in a hierarchy of objectives should not be taken as the relativization of human life or safety, but rather part of a process of identifying the most suitable means for achieving the given objective. In order to do this, one must identify where that objective falls within the hierarchy of objectives and the strategies that link them, because the goal of the Strategies-to-Task paradigm is:

To provide an audit trail from the broadest national objectives down to operational activities at the tactical engagement level. It explicitly disaggregates these activities into key functional elements encompassing the tactics, organizations, and systems that enable the successful execution of missions; it also gives high visibility to the interrelationships among these elements. […] it can help expose systems and functions necessary for executing missions, and it links them hierarchically to national objectives. (Thaler, 1993, p. 1)

In the general hierarchy of objectives outlined by the RAND Corporation when it first developed the Strategies-to-Task concept, the evacuation of noncombatants would fall under the category of operational objectives, or those subordinate objectives which directly support the overall campaign objective, itself a subset of the national military objective (Thaler, 1993, p. 42). In 2011, the United States Africa Command outlined its primary national military objectives for the region, highlighting the need to cooperate with its African partners in order to disrupt the various transnational terrorist and criminal groups working in the region (Ham, 2011, p. 10). This need for cooperation at the level of national military objectives is reflected at the level of operational objectives as well, and this may be seen when considering the role of the State Department in the planning of noncombatant evacuation operations.

Locating the evacuation of noncombatants at the level of operational objective presupposes a number of things, including the presence of a well-defined set of campaign objectives concerning whatever events or developments that precipitated the need to evacuate personnel from the DRC in the first place. Furthermore, while the evacuation of noncombatants will be carried out by the Department of Defense, the steps leading up to an evacuation require the intervention of the State Department, and as such any evaluation of an evacuation plan must take into consideration the upper levels of the hierarchy of objectives aside from just national military objectives, and in particular any relevant national political objectives that might influence the particular tactics used (DOD, "Noncombat Evacuation Operations," 1990). As discussed above, recognizing the interconnected nature of objectives and the means for achieving them is a key component of the Strategies-to-Task paradigm, and this is nowhere more true than in situations like the one discussed here, where sometimes ostensibly mutually exclusive military, diplomatic, and political objectives meet and must be integrated in order to achieve the task at hand.

As noted in the 2007 update to the joint publication covering noncombatant evacuation operations, "while the protection of U.S. citizens being evacuated remains paramount, NEOs will probably be conducted in an environment where political concerns and constraints are key considerations" (DOD, 2007, p. II-1). This is especially true in a country like the DRC, because various border disputes and human rights issues require any actions taken within the DRC be measured against the potential political and diplomatic ramifications (CIA, "Republic of Congo," 2012). Thus, while the actual evacuation is located at the level of operational objectives, approaching the issue within the Strategies-to-Task framework reveals that the basis of the evacuation plan may actually be traced all the way to the level of the President, who ultimately decides the country's national security objectives, which includes economic, military, and political objectives. Recognizing this fact will be important for appreciating the various topics that must be covered in a noncombatant evacuation plan, because the interconnected nature of these objectives means that success depends not on one strategy or operation, but rather on the smooth and seamless cooperation between a number of disparate organizations, individuals, and goals. As will be seen later, a failure at one level can cascade throughout the hierarchy, ultimately undermining national security as a whole.

Locating the evacuation plan in the hierarchy of objectives and strategies allows one begin determining what topics would likely be covered in a noncombatant evacuation plan and thus what intelligence needs updating in light of a future contingency. Firstly, the plan would likely include information regarding the State Department's presence in-country, because "U.S. Embassies and consulates are required to have emergency action plans for the area under their cognizance," and these emergency action plans must be integrated into the overall noncombatant evacuation operation in order to ensure that the operation proceeds as smoothly as possible, and that all necessary personnel are accounted for (DOD, 1997, p. ix). While anyone responsible for participating in a noncombatant evacuation should already know the regulations governing who may be evacuated (especially in regards to non-U.S. citizens), this information would likely be included as a part of the evacuation plan dealing with coordination between the State Department and the DOD, especially because the local embassy ultimately designates "those authorized evacuation assistance," and is responsible for making these designations clear to the DOD representatives engaged in the operation (DOD, 2009, p. 4)

The integration of emergency action plans into larger plans for noncombatant evacuations would be conducted by the Regional Liaison Group for the area, which is "collocated with combatant commands" in order to "ensure coordination of emergency and evacuation planning," and as such, the NEO-would have to include information regarding the particular regional liaison group. Due to the unique requirements of noncombatant evacuation procedures, any plan would likely include information regarding the chain of command and a clear-cut delineation regarding which individuals are responsible for what elements of the plan, especially because any NEO-includes various emergency action plans. While the chain of command for NEOs is standardized according to Department of Defense guidelines, the specific plan for any given country or contingency would have to include the specific information regarding the State Department presence and duties as well as the relevant regional liaison group. This last detail highlights the importance of approaching the issue from the Strategies-to-Task perspective, because only by viewing the issue in the context of a larger hierarchy of objectives and means can one appreciate the various elements which go into the successfully planning of any effective evacuation operation, let alone one in a country as fraught with diplomatic, political, and military dangers and variables as the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Close coordination between the State Department and the Department of Defense is especially important somewhere like the Democratic Republic of Congo, because according to the CIA, the "primary [telephone] network consists of microwave radio relay and coaxial cable with services barely adequate for government use" and "intercity lines [are] frequently out of order" (CIA, 2012). While ideally both State and Defense department personnel would not be communicating via local phone lines, the lack of a substantial communications infrastructure in the country makes careful coordination and cooperation all the more important. Furthermore, while the actual operation will be carried out by the Department of Defense, the State Department is ultimately responsible for determining if "political or military actions within a country [have created] a potentially dangerous situation," and as such any noncombatant evacuation plan begins with coordination between the State Department and the DOD (DOD, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations," 1990).

Depending on the specificity of the contingency the noncombatant evacuation plan is being prepared for, it may contain a variety of evacuation options depending on the particular threat. However, in addition to the aforementioned information regarding coordination with the State Department, all noncombatant evacuation plans must include certain important information that will likely already be part of the embassy's emergency action plan. This includes, but is not limited to, the location of evacuation sites and meeting points, an estimate regarding the number of evacuees and any special medical needs they might require, information regarding key personnel and how to reach them, an account of accessible supplies, and a list of possible communication and notification methods, because as mentioned above, communicating evacuation orders may not be possible via commercial telephone lines (DOD, 1997, p. IV-3). Each of these topics represents a crucial part of the larger evacuation plan, because as will be discussed in greater detail below, each single element of the plan influences and affects every other.

All of this information should already be included in the embassy's emergency action plan, but it would likely be supplemented in a noncombatant evacuation plan with information and intelligence available via the Department of Defense and the relevant intelligence agencies and divisions, such as satellite imagery, more in-depth threat assessments, and more recent information regarding security forces and domestic military leadership. This last topic is particularly important, because in many ways the regional commanders of U.S. forces act as a kind of diplomatic corps to the military command of the country in question, so they would likely be able to contribute relevant information to the noncombatant evacuation plan that might not be available through other means. Once again, coordination between the State Department and the Department of Defense remains the defining variable that can make or break the execution of a noncombatant evacuation plan.

In addition, the noncombatant evacuation plan must include more detailed information regarding key military and combat personnel that will be conducting the operation, including the intelligence officer, responsible for coordinating and disseminating relevant intelligence regarding everything from the weather to hostile elements, the operations officer, responsible for coordinating with the State Department and assessing "the requirement for deployment of combat forces," the logistics officer, responsible for ensuring the logistical capability of the operation, and the communications officer, responsible for setting up and maintaining communications equipment as well as coordinating the use of alternative communications such as domestic phone lines (DOD, 1997, p. V-3,4). Depending on the particular operation, additional key personnel might be needed, such as explosive ordnance disposal technicians, fire support officers, psychological operations officers, and others. Every one of these roles must be determined and clearly defined in advanced so as to reduce the time between an evacuation being ordered and the plan being put in motion.

From a Strategies-to-Task perspective, one may view each of these different officers as representative of a different operational task, which are the individual actions that make up the overall operational objective (in this case, the successful evacuation of noncombatants), just as the operational objective makes up one part of the larger campaign objective. One of the most important aspects of the Strategies-to-Task paradigm is the way it highlights the "cascading" nature of these tasks and objectives, because a failure at any level reverberates throughout the hierarchy; for example, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 may be seen as a cautionary tale regarding the need for robust planning at every level of the objective hierarchy when it comes to evacuation planning, because not only did the crisis result in a failure at the operational task level culminating in the deaths of eight Americans, the effects of the crisis arguably reverberated all the way to the top of the hierarchy, costing Jimmy Carter his reelection (Ryan, 1985, p. 82-84). This is not meant to be a comparison of the death of eight Americans with a politician losing an election, but rather a means of demonstrating the interconnected nature of the hierarchy of objectives and the way in which changes or failures at one level may be felt throughout. Thus, robust information regarding each of the operational tasks represented by their respective officers listed above is crucial to the noncombatant evacuation plan, because the plan is only as strong as its weakest link, which in this case could be any of the wide variety of disparate tasks that go into executing the evacuation plan.