Iran Hostage Discussion Questions: Middle

Iran Hostage

Discussion Questions: Middle East History

Compare and Contrast the reform policies of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Khan.

In the aftermath of World War I, the world had begun to experience massive structural change, with a wave of imperial collapses producing a groundswell of nationalism and independence movements. The once mighty and respected Ottoman Empire was among these, with decades of retraction and dictatorship unraveling into widespread discontent. So too would be the Kingdom of Persia find itself on the cusp of change, with an historical rule of clergymen and local warlords coalescing into disorder. In these circumstances, Mustafa Kemal and Reza Kahn would emerge to bring about the existence of modern Turkey and Iran respectively.

The great military and political leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk would seize on the discontent permeating the former Ottoman Empire to help bring about the establishment and independence of Turkey. Under his leadership, events would be set into motion producing one of today's more politically centrist and globally compatible Mid-East nations.

Indeed, Ataturk's efforts as a general would be fundamental to the National Struggle as would be his ideological disposition that "a nation's right to full independence is fought for, not granted." (OISO, 1) It was on this premise that he gained the loyalty and nationalist fervor of the nation's soldiers, ensuring that the true base of power was now with the people and no longer providing foundation to the increasingly unstable sultanate. This would pave the way for the secular reforms that have made Turkey such a prominent partner to the West in a region otherwise frequently isolated from the global community over the following century.

The approach taken by his declaration and underscored by his achievement of uncontested military authority would produce independence, but Kemal's own education and ideology would help to reform the former Empire into a uniquely diplomatic presence in the region. Accordingly, "ever since the foundation of modern day Turkey in 1923, this country with a predominantly Muslim population has been a secular democracy closely aligned with the West. Turkey was a founding member of the United Nations, and a member of NATO (since 1952), the Council of Europe (1949), the OECD (1961) and an associate member of the Western European Union (1992)." (LD, 1)

Similar to the circumstance here created through reform in Turkey, the coup d'etat the brought Reza Kahn to power in the burgeoning state of Iran would make what is today seen as a clear enemy to the west a close ally in modernization of the region.

For many decades, the United States enjoyed normalized relation with Iran. The Persian state was ruled by the Shah, by then self-named as Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. (Khorammi, 1) Though the nation had achieved some degree of prosperity under his leadership and through the cultivation of meaningful diplomatic relationships with nations such as the U.S., the Shah's domestic tactics are reported to have been extremely repressive of both the democratic political process and the rights to freedom of expression and demonstration. Though his rule was secular, repressive tendencies toward the press and political opponent would differentiate Kahn's rule from that of Kemal. Perceptions of the Shah's inequitable rule were stoked by Muslim clerics, who managed to swell both intellectual public resentment into a full-fledged coup. Iran's government had become indefensible against the mounting opposition of its dominant ethnic population.

This points to perhaps the most significant distinction between the two figures at the center of our discussion. Namely, Kahn's background afforded him a strong sense of nationalist identity but saw him as lacking in any meaningful formal education. For Kemal, education and intelligence were key doctrines of his life and rule, leading to a host of enlightenment-based principles of progress that evidence suggest have been far more lasting in Turkey than the developments in a now fully theocratic Iranian state.

2. Describe the key points (goals and actions) of the Zionist position and key points of the Arab position regarding Palestine between 1918 and 1939.

Though the resolution of World War II and the revelation of the horrors of the Holocaust, perpetrated against the Jews, are largely seen as the pivotal causes for the creation of a Jewish National Homeland in Israel, the first half of the twentieth century paved the way for the nature of the state as we now know it. In terms of both its current status as a Jewish nation and as a tense hotbed for ethnic bloodletting, its course was set in the mismanagement of its colonialist occupiers. (Rabinovich, 3) The period of British Mandate over the territory then referred to as Palestine coincided with a massive influx of Zionists during what are known as the First through Fourth Aliyah. Eastern European Jews, encouraged by the 1917 issued Balfour Declaration which conceded to the 'favourabilty' of the territory as a possible future homeland for the Jewish people, began to arrive in the tens of thousands. (Rabinovich, 3)

In the Balfour Declaration, the British has essentially signed off on the inevitability that Palestine could soon become a Jewish homeland independent of foreign occupation. This would place the British in an awkward position vis-a-vis the political demands of the Arab inhabitants who had occupied the land for centuries. Now the British were, by government-issued doctrine, committed to the ambition of the Jews toward statehood, and yet, remained stationed in the region and thus, beholden to the demands, or at least to the threat of Arab inhabitants.

Indeed, in the years after World War I, this influx of Jews and the implications of the Balfour Declaration caused widespread discomfort amongst Arabs. This was followed by "the establishment in 1920 of a British Mandate over Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River. During the next three decades, Arabs and Jews fought over rights and control." (Rabinovich, 3) Though they had not yet established independent claims to the land, the Zionist movement and its achievement of British endorsement certainly threatened any possible future prospects for Palestinian self-determination or Islamic statehood. This conception instigated ongoing and intensifying clashes between pioneering Zionists and militant Arab populations within a region given by name to the authority of the British. In some cases, these hostilities would escalate to large-scale riots and massacres, where considerable casualties were claimed for both sides, where even British soldiers were eventually among the targets of hostilities. (Gerner, 1)

In 1936, this tension had reached a volatile pitch. Relations between Zionists and Palestinians were increasingly negative, with both groups employing violent guerilla and terrorist tactics against one another. Civilian settlements by both sides were equally vulnerable to militia hostility. This was supplemented by the heightening unpopularity of the British with both sides, who viewed the foreign occupiers as being least entitled to the land up for dispute. For wavering to the point of ineffectiveness regarding the rights of either group to the lands which it claimed, the British became military targets for both the Palestinians and the Zionists, soon finding that the territory had become far more trouble than opportunity. (Gerner, 1)

The general state of violence between the three parties instigated the Peel Commission, in which the British dispatched a commission to report on the best course of action for contending with the situation. In this mission, the British determined that "the international recognition of the right of the Jews to return to their old homeland did not involve the recognition of the right of the Jews to govern the Arabs in it against their will." (Gerner, 37) Here, the British recognized that by issuing the Balfour Declaration, enabling unfettered Zionist immigration and failing to acknowledge the interests of the significant Arab populations there present, they had created an incongruous circumstance with no concrete resolution. This, of course, was a step back from the Balfour Declaration, and reflected yet further waffling on the part of the British. This highlighted their uncertainty on how best to resolve the situation and illustrated to the Arabs and Zionists that the British were committed to neither the agenda of Jews or Arabs. Thus, the Zionists would be moved to the resolution that whether through armed conflict or political diplomacy, claiming Israel would be an act of independent will, and would be unlikely to come willingly from the British.

From this discomfit proceeded the British Partition Plan which, after a full generation of wavering and indecision, was inevitably headed for rejection. Its moderation had arrived far too late, with tensions over land claims bubbling beyond British control for well over two decades. (Rabinovich, 4) When the Partition Plan unveiled the intention to place the Palestinians in a territory to be merged with Jordan while drawing a restrictive demarcation around the proposed Jewish territory, both parties found the agreement untenable to their interests. At this juncture, an Arab revolt erupted, citing British and Zionist targets in the interests of disrupting what the population viewed as a Jewish-British alignment against the Palestinian cause. (Rabinovich, 4) This provoked the British to officially cap Jewish immigration to Palestine on the crucial year of 1939, as Hitler began to deport Jews to concentration camps around Eastern Europe. Here, the British are implicated in a number of ways which are obvious and damning with respect to the fate of European Jewry in the coming years.

3. Examine the events in Palestine 1945 to 1948. Why, in your opinion did the United Nations propose the partition of Palestine? (2 pages)

After World War II, when the full extent of the horrors of the Holocaust had become apparent to the global public, the Zionist movement gained significant momentum. Upon the world's revelation that more than 6 million Jews had been sent to the gas chambers, the campaign to make Israel the Jewish national homeland earned the full sympathy and support of the United Nations, the United States and Great Britain. Moreover, the intense pressure which had come to be placed upon the world community with mounting violence between the Zionists, Arabs and British troops in the Palestenian territory would force the hand of the United Nations. Indeed, Great Britain, consistent with its irresolute behavior in the region, would look to remove its self from the question of Palestinian determinism. According to the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) (2002), "the British requested that the recently established United Nations determine the future of Palestine. But the British government's hope was that the UN would be unable to arrive at a workable solution, and would turn Palestine back to them as a UN trusteeship." (MERIP, 1)

Certainly, this was not the intention of the UN nor was it the outcome. Quite instead, the UN established what it viewed as the only viable solution for a future of peace in the region and called for a partition of the territory into separate Jewish and Palestinian states. After sending an envoy to investigate the region's demands in 1947, the UN General Assembly voted in support of the partition, to the begrudging acceptance of the Zionist movement and the outright hostility of the Arab community. The latter viewed this as a validation of the Zionist movement, which it perceived as nothing more than a settlement community in historically Arab lands. The former viewed this as a point of entry with expectations that it could either diplomatically or militarily extend its borders at the appropriate time.

With the Arab rejection of the partition plan, this time would arrive quite a bit faster than anticipated. MERIP reports that the Arab population significantly outnumbered the Jewish population but that expectations based on the events of World War II and the Holocaust were that massive numbers of Jewish immigrants would soon be arriving. Thus, the partition awarded the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Palestinian people, leaving another 77% of the land to Jewish control. (MERIP, 1) When the Arab community revolted against this decision, increasingly well-armed and organized Zionist troops began to assume occupation of the lands awarded to them in the partition settlement. Sensing this as an indicator of the mounting tensions that would soon erupt in outright conflict, the last of the British troops left the territory, essentially conferring the land to Zionist control.

In 1948, Israel declared itself independent with the reluctant backing of the world community and, conversely, the outright condemnation of the Arab nations which surrounded it. (Rabinovich, 5) Upon its independence, Israel was promptly invaded by Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with the endorsement of Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Led by its first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, Israel emerged victorious against its aggressors and gained an even greater expanse of land for its statehood.

Research Essays: Iranian History

1. Life (Character Sketch) of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Born in 1902 in a small town in rural Iran, Rouhollah Mousavi Khomeini was reared by a family of religious scholars. Thus, he was raised in dedication to the principles of the Koran and the notion that these principles should define public and private life in Iran. In this regard, he would from a very young age be molded into the figure that would one day define Iran well into the present day. To this point, Khomeini may be even be said to have spent much of his life in preparation for this eventual role as the head of a religious revolution and the theocracy created thereafter. For the larger part, the first portion of his life would be spent in dedication to his Islamic studies. Accordingly, "Khomeini did not engage in any political activities during the 1930's. He believed that the leadership of political activities should be in the hands of the foremost religious scholars, and he was therefore obliged to accept the decision of Ayatollah Haeri to remain relatively passive toward the measures taken by Reza Shah against the traditions and culture of Islam in Iran." (ICS1, 1)

That said, Khomeini would begin at this point in his life to view with hostility the established secular authority represented by the Shah. The Pahlavi Dynasty had explicit sympathies toward the West, as an increasingly intimate relationship would develop therewith in the years immediately following World War II. It was at this juncture that the simultaneous hospitability of the Shah to the United States and emergent Israeli statehood would inspire fury amongst the religious factions to whom Khomeini was an increasingly influential figure. By the early 1960s, several of the figures who outranked Khomeini by seniority had passed on, leaving him to assume a more aggressive control of the Islamic movement to oppose the Shah's secularization of Iranian society.

Therefore, the increasingly popular religious clergy would begin to conduct public speeches condemning the Shah and predicting his overthrow. One such speech in 1963 was particularly instigative and implied that the time would soon come that the Shah would be exiled from Iran. As the Iran Chamber Society (2010) notes, "the immediate effect of the Imam's speech was, however, his arrest two days later at 3 o'clock in the morning by a group of commandos who hastily transferred him to the Qasr prison in Tehran. As dawn broke on June 3, the news of his arrest spread first through Qom and then to other cities. In Qom, Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad and Varamin, masses of angry demonstrators were confronted by tanks and paratroopers. It was not until six days later that order was fully restored. This uprising of 15 Khordad 1342 marked a turning point in Iranian history." (ICS1, 1)

At this juncture, Khomeini would become a living martyr to the cause of Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Shah's policies continued to push for a secularization and Americanization of Iran, and in doing so, continued to gather the ire of the growing student movement of which Khomeini had become a figurehead. The following decade and a half would see Khomeni first released, then once again apprehended and, ultimately, exiled from Iran. In his absence, his influence would only grow, with the exile producing a sense amongst Iran's Islamic movement that the government intended to suppress its religion in favor of American imperial ambitions. First in Turkey, then Iraq, and ultimately in Paris, Khomeini gained status as a revolutionary figure, with the anniversary of his exile becoming an occasion for ever larger public demonstrations in Tehran. It would be these demonstrations that would lead to the departure of the Shah in 1979, just as Tehran collapsed under the weight of a popular Islamic uprising.

The Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shi'a population's spiritual and political leader theretofore exiled in Paris, returned to his country on February 1st. (Khorrami, 1) The Shah went into hiding and the Ayatollah ordered hundreds of his supporters executed.

On April 1st of 1979, "Ayatollah Khomeini declared an Islamic republic with a new Constitution reflecting his ideals of Islamic government." (ICS, 1) This act gave birth to the nation which is presently known as Iran. Inbuilt to this new nation were the policies of denouncement of the West and its corrupt invasion of Islamic holy land, especially as such was carried out by America's unwavering support of Israel. In demonstration of its hostility toward the U.S. And its pursuit of interests in Iran, a group of radical Islamic students with sanctioning of the Khomeini government, stormed the U.S. embassy and took its personnel hostage. This touched off an international crisis for the United States and signaled the beginning of the modern age of terrorism. To date, the Iranian transformation is a touchstone to those with ambitions toward turning the entire region to the laws and courts of Sharia.

That this impulse already existed amongst the people in Iran is suggestive that the impulse is embedded throughout the Shi'a Islamic world, which stretches across the Middle East and is dominantly populous in many nations therein. Therefore, the threat of the Iranian revolution to the rest of the region may said to be continuously underway now, where the War On Terror has highlighted many of the movements in settings such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Palestine to establish revolutionary Islamic tactics as a means to gaining power and influence with mainstream but disaffected people. In this regard, the ideology and political position popularized by Khomeini would set a template for the sense of inherent conflict between the United States and the Islamic world.

As point of fact, a disaffection can be seen at the roots of the movement that would ultimately fell the Shah. One of the reasonable argued points to be counted in realistic discussion on the Shah's downfall might incline that the popularity of Khomeini as a spiritual leader to the people whom he had subjugated under secularist and nepotistic interests already weakened the position of his rule. With Khomeini in exile from Iran in the years of the coming of the revolution, the Shah would still be afraid to act in a manner of determinist aggression against the widely apparent threat that the Ayatollah would promote against his rule. An incident which bespeaks this disposition is described in a 2002 text on the topic, where the author asserts that "on 6 October 1978, Khomeini left Iraq for Paris. On Khomeini's unexpected arrival in France, the president of France, on two different occasions, asked the Shah what he wished France to do with Khomeini. The Shah had opposed both suggestions by France for 'his elimination' and his 'deportation.'" (Ganji, 67) Even as from his remote location the Ayatollah continued to endorse the violent revolutionary dismantling of the Shah's standing regime through public means, the Shah was reluctant to be viewed as possessing a returned hostility for Khomeini. Certainly, he believed, a dead Khomeini would be a martyr to the discontent felt by the hordes of disenfranchised Shi'a Muslims, and thus would be equally as likely to foment revolution, if not moreso, than a living Khomeini.

This is merely speculative history though, with the Shah's failure to act simply manifesting in an extremely brief forestalling of what this account demonstrates was an irrevocable path toward the Islamic revolution spurred by the influence of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

A feature of the revolution which may easily be dismissed in a perspective on history which views Islam as a religion with a history of violent radicalism is that this moment in history would be the beginning of the transition from peaceful mainstream Islam to revolutionary Islam in a country with a history of westernization and intellectual pluralism there prior. The convergence of collective resistance and the support of Khomeini's theocratic agenda was not accidental but strategic, for "as the demonstrations [against Pahlavi's government] began to gain momentum, Khomeini's disciples, acting at the behest of their leaders, embarked on a campaign cajoling the remaining quietist clergy in order to insure themselves greater access to the mosques." (Zahedi, 136) This tactic would help significantly to move what was seen as radical and isolated political opposition into the popular front. In doing so, Khomeini would prove himself a man adept of the real political motivators in Iran. In this manner, he would be successful at portraying what would soon transition into an aggressively theocratic and counter-democratic government as a reflection of the people's will. Frustration with the Shah would reinforce this provable though nonetheless manipulative political platform, bringing Khomeini's supporters to a common ground with the otherwise non-revolutionary Islamic masses of Iran.

But there is also evidence that the economic disinclination causing many among this mass to find sympathy with the growing political opposition was itself not a spontaneous or separate phenomenon. Instead, it is shown that members of Iran's business class had come to share a very close relationship with the Shi'a clergy, recognizing perhaps more ably than did the Shah the value of catering to this largest of groups. As a result, strong alliances would be founded that would be of considerable use in turning the economy according to the interests of the revolution. Ironic as it may be, "due to the modernization, urbanization, and commercialization of agriculture and the inflow of large sums of petrodollars into the national economy, the Bazaar had become the nerve center of Iranian politics and a vital and powerful element in the process of the national economy. During the very early days of the revolution of 1978-79, a sizable number of Bazaari sided with opposition movements." (Salehi, 20) The result would be an Islamic oppositional forces capable of instigating disruptive events such as labor strikes and funding opportunities which ultimately, the government could not match in terms control. As the revolutionary party would come to represent itself so authoritatively in the mode of economic manipulation, Khomeini would soon illustrate his movement to be the dominant seat of power in the country, even as the Shah remained upon his throne.

2. Iran Hostage Crisis.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, formed in its current state during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, is a nation which has long been at the center of the world's conflicts and complexities. At times a member of the international community enjoying favor for its provision of access to its wealth of natural resources, Iran has, since the time of its violent revolution operated under the auspices of a theocratic government which has routinely been condemned for widespread violations of human rights, international law and international treaty.

With the War on Terror well underway, Iran's strategic significance has been highlighted by a number of developments on the global front in recent years. As an undercurrent of the war, there is a philosophical and cultural divide at play which is distinguished by Western Capitalism and Eastern tribalism. America's consumer excesses are at tactical and ideological odds with the Islamic impetus which governs much of life in the Middle East. The implications of these divides are numerous, with financial determinants playing a central role in the relationship between the U.S. And key nation-states in the Persian Gulf region. In addition to economic factors, America's relationship with Iran and its umbrella region is directly impacted by the religious and philosophical conflicts between the two, especially as they center around issues such as terrorism and the right of Israel to exist. Thus, a matter which is of central emphasis to any discussion of the Islamic Revolution in Iran must dutifully acknowledge that its instigation may be in no small way attributed to the relationship prior between the United States and the monarchical leadership of Iran. With Iran's future outlook uncertain, there may be some illumination in the consideration of the factors producing its revolutionary movement as they concern the economic imperialism of the United States, the radicalization of the Islamic faith as a whole and the proclivity of the region under discussion toward theocratic governance.

At the approach of 1979, at least 90% of Iran's population was of the Shi'a Islamic heritage. Another 8% were approximately 8% Sunni Muslim and the remaining mix was constituted of "Bahais, Armenian and Assyrian Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians." (Metz, 1) With the Shah representing the Sunni minority, and with it a dominance based on cultural elitism rather than proper demographic reflection, an Islamic Revolution seemed bound to claim Iran from its leadership by force. But it was the relationship between the Shah's government and the United States that would most catalyze the interests of the student movement that would sweep Khomeini back into power.

Therefore, even with the Shah deposed from leadership by mid-1979, there remained a growing sense of public furor over the litany of offenses committed by the United States over time. These included its role in the assassination of a duly elected leader and the installation of the Shah in 1953 as well as its continued patronage of the government in exchange for a steady supply of Persian Gulf oil. This commodity has often been at the basis of American entanglement in the region. Khomeini's student movement would view this as foreign imperialism and would regard America as a secular invader intent on destroying Islam. Upon the return and instatement of Khomeini, the Iranian government had become sympathetic to this view on America. Thus, when the recently deposed Shah was diagnosed with lymphoma and traveled to the U.S. To consult American doctors in November of 1979, the young revolutionaries of Iran viewed this as a final interference on the part of the U.S. with its internal affairs. (OH, 1) A spontaneous demonstration saw roughly 500 students who called themselves Khomeini's Disciples storm the American Embassy in Tehran and take 66 American consulate workers hostage.

This would be the major rupture in American-Iranian relations and would set the tenor for the relationship between the states into the foreseeable future. Then President Jimmy Carter is particularly recognized for bungling efforts at gaining the release of the hostages and contributing to a further sense of humiliation for the Americans. Following the November 4th siege, "President Jimmy Carter immediately imposed economic sanctions and applied diplomatic pressure to expedite negotiations for the release of the hostages. First, Carter cancelled oil imports from Iran, then he expelled a number of Iranians from the U.S., followed by freezing about $8 billion of Iranian assets in the U.S." (OH, 1)