Like Midgley, Bailey would expect the company to conduct its operations and make the same decisions that would be required in its native society. More importantly, Bailey would likely also argue that the company has a moral duty to respond to the situation even if it were the case that its native society recognized no such moral obligation. Both Bailey and Midgley would probably require the company to consider the nature of the harms caused by its product and to take reasonable measures to prevent those harms completely irrespective of any obligation or expectation in that regard by any society. Their view would be that morality is a matter of objective principle and not subjective values and that allowing the types of harms described as a result of profit-making enterprises is always immoral and always imposes a moral obligation, by objective principle, on the manufacturer to take appropriate measures to mitigate those harms.

Application of the UN Commission on Human Rights' Moral Perspective

In spirit, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights would support the position that the company may not engage in business practices in one nation that would be prohibited in its native society. However, because the Declaration pertains primarily to fundamental rights and freedoms (p. 258) of individuals as opposed to any specific obligations on the part of any entity to avoid causing harms unrelated to those fundamental rights, the document can be applied to this case only by considering its provisions very loosely and broadly. Specifically, one would have to rely on language about the dignity and worth of the person (p. 257), the spirit of brotherhood (p. 258), and on references to standards of health and well-being (p. 261) to apply the UN principles to this case.

Application of Berlin's Moral Perspective

Berlin offers a perspective that is decidedly unhelpful to the prospect of recognizing objective...

He suggests that wherever two individuals espouse diametrically opposite positions on an issue, it does not necessarily follow that the truth of one view means that the other is untrue (p. 266). Berlin seems to offer a complex justification for moral relativism, largely by focusing on the types of cases where (admittedly) a perfect solution is most difficult. However, he seems not to recognize that these can be regarded as exceptions to general principles that provide the morally preferable (if not necessarily perfect) solution. Therefore, Berlin might argue that nobody likes the idea of street children being harmed by their misuse of the company's product but that virtually any solution to that dilemma would impose harmful consequences on the company, such as by limiting its rights to conduct business manufacturing a legal product.
Conclusion

I would applaud the UN Declaration for its intention, disregard Benedict's, Bailey's, and Berlin's positions, and apply the arguments of Midgley. Certainly, the "perfect" solution may often be impossible, as it might very well be in this case, as pointed out by Berlin. However, it is possible (as demonstrated by the UN Declaration) to recognize and uphold objective moral principles that transcend the facts of any specific case considered in isolation. I would apply the same conceptual approach of the UN Declaration with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms and apply it to two other moral issues: First, that entities may not pursue or perpetuate activities in foreign societies that are expressly prohibited (or that trigger moral obligations reflected in law) in their nations. Second, that entities causing unnecessary harm to any human beings be held morally accountable for those harms and responsible for mitigating them, compensating victims, or, where appropriate, ceasing those activities altogether in light of the magnitude of the harms with which they are associated.