Muslim Suicide Terrorism Game

Muslim Suicide Bombing Game: Correlating Factors Showing the Prevalence of Suicide as a Terrorism Tactic Today, suicide bombings take place on a daily basis throughout the Middle East, and it is clear that the tactic has assumed a new level of importance for many terrorist organizations. It is not necessarily the religion directly but perhaps the corruption of the religion is used to by the terrorist organizations to recruit vulnerable subjects to commit terrorism. They are used as tool for terrorist groups to gain politically.

The religion does play a role and there acts are justified (martyrs) but perhaps not much more than the other factors. If it was the religion they would all be doing it but they are not. But why is it so prevalent amongst Muslims today? All the factors the research identifies seem to fall under the umbrella of "belonging" or solidarity in terms of how it affects social inequality and oppression, including the use of perverted religion as a tool to further organizational goals.

Although it is not possible to generalize about the religion, it is possible to discern how there are those who "corrupt" with movements and fatwas of the religion that are able to recruit these suicide bombers. To this end, this study develops a game theory model to determine and analyze human conflict in general and Muslim suicide bombers in particular.

It also proposes a game based on game theory was used to define correlating factors of Muslim suicide terrorists and to help identify ways to stop them from killing themselves and others. A summary of the research, salient findings and relevant recommendations for policymakers at all levels are provided in the conclusion. Review and Discussion Background and Overview.

The chances of a young person being recruited to become a suicide bomber for a terrorist organization in the Middle East today are greater than ever, and the recruiting tactics have become both more effective and the inducements more economically attractive for many young Muslims faced with few jobs prospects, fewer educational opportunities and perhaps a family wracked by poverty. In this regard, Cohn (2002) suggests that, "The killing of innocent civilians by suicide bombers must be roundly condemned.

But individual terrorist acts by people living in hopeless despair cannot be compared to the State terrorism" (p. 25). Notwithstanding the political issues involved, the moral implications of using suicide bombers as a terrorism tactic are truly profound. According to Ayman Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's chief lieutenant, Islamic extremists have established a list of terrorist principles in their book, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner (2001).

This recent publication specifically proclaims that the Islamic extremist goals include the need to "move the battle to the enemy's ground to burn the hands of those who ignite fire in our countries"; also emphasized in this book is "the need to concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen in terms of casualties" (cited in Noor, 2003 at p.

200) Because martyrdom is emphasized as a perquisite of service to Islam in the recruitment video, Noor (2003) suggests that it is also reasonable to assume that terrorist attacks in general and suicide attacks in particular will continue to represent a fundamental tool in the Muslim's arsenal in their war against the United States, United Kingdom and their interests at home and abroad.

In fact, this very point was emphasized by Suleiman Abu Gheith, a key spokesman for al Qaeda, who stated: "In rhetoric disturbingly reminiscent of the way that Palestinian terrorists describe their inevitable triumph over Israel Abu Gheith declared, 'Those youths that destroyed Americans with their planes, they did a good deed. There are thousands more young followers who look forward to death like Americans look forward to living'" (emphasis added) (Noor 2003, p. 200).

There are also some powerful economic incentives available to young people that may not have other viable employment opportunities available, with some Muslim organizations and states compensating their families to the tune of thousands of dollars if they are successful in their suicide attempt (Patkin 2004). Furthermore, the act of suicide in this religious context is not viewed as suicide at all: "Suicide bombers are not suffering from clinical depression or emotional difficulties; they perceive themselves as fulfilling a holy mission that will make them martyrs.

The action is not 'suicide' but rather 'martyrdom' and thus does not violate religious prohibitions against killing oneself" (Patkin 2004, p. 79). According to Patkin, suicide bombing as a terrorism tactic was first introduced into Palestinian areas beginning in the late 1980s. "Hezbollah pioneered the use of suicide bombing, claiming responsibility for attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (1983)," Patkin advises, "the hijacking of TWA flight 847 (1985) and a series of lethal attacks on Israeli targets" (p. 80).

Just as a number of other Islamist organizations do today, Hezbollah engages in both guerrilla warfare against Western military targets as well as terrorism activities that target civilian population (Byman 2003). There are some other discernible trends involved in suicide bombing as a terrorist tactics as well. For instance, membership in a terrorist group provides its members with a strong sense of camaraderie in the face of powerful external forces that are otherwise beyond the control of individual Muslims (Patkin 2004).

According to this author: The dynamics of the terrorist group shape individual behavior, giving many members a strong sense of belonging, of importance, and of personal significance. Suicide bombers often articulate a sense of personal, sacred mission. When Hezbollah introduced suicide bombing as a tactic in the mid-1980s, it soon became clear that the religious fervor of the bombers could help the organization compensate for its small numbers and inadequate military capabilities. (Patkin 2004, p. 80).

Furthermore, not only have a growing number of Islamic organizations resorted to the tactic, there has also been an increase in the number of volunteers - including females - and while the recruiting techniques have become more sophisticated, the planning for suicide missions has become less rigorous than in the past (Patkin 2004).

Some of the Islamic extremist groups that have been known to use suicide bombing in the past include: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Islamic Resistance Movement, Umar al-Mukhtar Forces, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Salah al-Din Battalions (Patkin 2004). Hamas, in particular, has embraced suicide bombing as a terrorism tactics in a major way. According to Thackrah (2004), "Their [Hamas'] favourite method of attack is suicide car bombing on 'soft' and military targets and individual suicide attacks.

Hamas, works round family ties and some of its operations in Lebanon have been partially aimed at gaining freedom of imprisoned family members. The worry for counter-terrorists is that suicide bombers are not likely to be deterred by security measures which only threaten their lives once they have carried out an attack" (p. 112).

Although specific tactics and targets may differ from group to group, a common Islamist agenda that is shared by many of these organizations has resulted in a "second intifada" period during which suicide bombings have increased (Patkin 2004). According to Haddad (2004), "The beginning of the second Palestinian Intifada on 28 September 2000 led to a new wave of suicide bombings that dwarfed its predecessor in terms of number of attacks and human deaths.

This ferocious and unremitting round of terror has caused a surge of conflicting interpretations of the motives of suicide bombers and the role of Islam as a facilitator of terrorism" (p. 337). This author emphasizes that the increase in the incidence of suicide bombing is a direct result of the deteriorating social and economic conditions and suggests that an increase in income per capita and a reduction in the unemployment rate would reduce the incentive for young people to take this route (Haddad 2004).

In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the U.S. On September 11, 2001, there has remained a paucity of timely research concerning the inadequacy of the social and economic variables that can account for the increase in the incidence of terrorist activities in general and suicide bombing in particular. Based on the extant evidence, Haddad cites research that suggests, "Suicide bombers clearly are not motivated by the prospect of their own individual economic gain.

Although it is possible that the promise of larger payments to their families may increase the willingness of some to participate in these lethal missions... Their primary motivation instead results from their passionate support for the ideas and the aims of their movement" (2004, p. 337).

Other authorities, though, discussed further below, disagree with this assessment and argue that many young people are being attracted to these terrorist organizations and becoming a potential suicide bomber because they do not understand the implications of their actions and because of the enormous peer and other social pressures at play.

In this setting, it is perhaps difficult or even impossible for many Westerners to conceptualize the various factors that might contribute to the decision of an individual Muslim to pursue suicide as a terrorism tactic, but game theory provides a useful framework in which this can be accomplished, and these issues are discussed further below. Game Theory Overview.

Game theory was invented in order to satisfy a mathematical curiosity; from the outset, though, the problem was to identify a theoretical solution to the problems posed by uncertainty in games of chance (Schmidt 2002). In his chapter, "Bluff and reputation," Sorin (2002) reports that game theory is basically concerned with strategic behavioral interactions as opposed to individual maximization, typically found in decision theory: "Thus each participant attempts to maximize a function (his above-mentioned "result") of which he does not control all variables.

This is certainly no maximum problem, but a peculiar and disconcerting mixture of several conflicting maximum problems. Every participant is guided by another principle and neither determines all variables which affect his interest" (Sorin 57). Therefore, in order to analyze a situation in terms of a game, the first step involved would be to determine exactly the strategy spaces of the agents and, in particular, to specify the information upon which their respective actions can reasonably be said to be based (Sorin 2002).

Furthermore, it must be remembered that the strategic interaction involved in a given setting is fundamentally different in the case of a game than in the case of individual decision making. According to Sorin, "This is well-known, at the behavior level, due to classical strategic game theory, but this also holds at the information level.

Indeed, research has suggested that it is not necessary for a perturbation to be common knowledge for the reputation effect to appear, the fact that there is no common knowledge of the true situation is enough" (p. 70).

Because every individual is unique, though, and the social, political and economic environment in which such decisions take place are dynamic, predicting the outcome of any given interplay between a given factor and the tendency of a person to resort to suicide as a terrorism tactic remain problematic, but these factors can nevertheless be expressed in terms of likelihood.

According to this author, "This observation leads to a study of questions related to propagation of uncertainty where 'domino effects' occur: the lack of public knowledge on the moves leads each player to take into consideration a whole hierarchy of situations and decisions including a similar behavior on the part of his opponent" (Sorin 2002, p. 70).

These considerations are particularly relevant for the instant investigation concerning those factors that might compel one Muslim youth to become an active suicide bomber where another might avoid this life outcome altogether, depending on individual circumstances. In some regions of the Middle East, for example, "Young girls join boys at playing at suicide missions, and an eight-year-old girl may calmly sit at the dinner table and announce her intention to become a shaheeda.

Six-year-old girls in class offer their reasons for wanting to become martyrs: 'to have everything in Paradise.. To kill the Jewish.. To live near our God.. we never die' (Victor 2003, p. 185 quoted in Patkin at p. 80). This author cites examples of other girls as young as 12 years old that are even more adamant in their views concerning the efficacy of suicide bombing as a career path: "They hope to become martyrs in order 'to follow my brother..

In honor of Wafa Idris, who proved that women can do as much as men.. To give back to my country everything I can.. To free my people from occupation.. there is no hope for peace'" (Victor 2003, pp. 188-189). The twisted nature of the entire enterprise becomes clear to objective observers, though, who can readily discern when young people are being duped by those who would pervert religious teachings for their own or their organizational objectives.

According to Patkin: 'good' Palestinian girl may ask for an automatic rifle as a wedding gift, as did Jasmeen, who said, "I do not want gold, or a diamond ring, or jewelry, but rather a M-16, and if only I can acquire this I will wish for no more to be paid by my fiance.' But it is not clear that young children really understand the meaning behind the rhetoric about 'travelling to Paradise.' Shireen Rabiya, 15, who was captured by the Israelis before she could complete her suicide mission, says 'It sounded like fun.

It sounded exciting and so many others had done it or tried that I thought, why not me?' (emphasis added) (Victor 2003, p. 261). In this regard, then, it can be argued that such suicide bombers themselves are victims; however, they are not only victims of the terrorist organizations that recruit them for this purpose, but of the cultural conditioning that allows such practices to occur in the first place.

According to Patkin (2003), Islamic extremists convince these young people that their ultimate life purpose lies in an untimely death and military commanders for Hamas and Islamic Jihad consider the human bomb, both male or female, as being inexpensive, easily targetable weapon systems that are uniquely capable of striking fear in their enemies: "The more training a soldier receives, the more skilled he is at avoiding death, whereas the opposite is true for a suicide bomber" (Patkin 2003, p. 80).

In fact, the enculturation of suicide bombing as a norm in terms of terrorism tactics means that young people can achieve more by killing themselves than they can hope to through a lifetime of futile struggle in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds. From an organizational perspective, terrorists organizations have much to gain from such tactics as well: "The only needed supplies are readily available and inexpensive: gunpowder, nails, a light switch, a battery, mercury, acetone, a wide belt, and transportation to the target site.

Another cost-effective reason for scheduling suicide bombings is that they eliminate the need to arrange an escape plan-often the most challenging part of a terrorist operation" (Patkin 2003, p. 81). Indeed, the entire costs for a typical suicide bombing mission is approximately $150, not counting the bomber's life. Clearly, "The bombings are simultaneously simple and sophisticated, the ultimate poor person's smart bomb" (Patkin 2003, p. 81).

Notwithstanding the deadly implications of suicide bombing as a terrorist tactic, though, it is possible to discern some of the more compelling factors that may compel one person to turn to suicide brigades as a viable career path while others would not consider it, and these issues are discussed further below. Application of Game Theory to Islamic Suicide Bombers.

In any given situation wherein suicide could be reasonably selected as a viable (but final) career option for a given Muslim would relate to a number of factors that can be stipulated in advance if there is a preponderance of evidence to suggest that these factors have played a part in such decision-making processes for others in the past. The results of this analysis would then provide a basis for extrapolating how often an individual might elect to enlist in a suicide bomber brigade compared to other equally viable options.

The analysis could also be used to predict how frequently an individual would make the suicide decision absent viable alternatives in terms of education and employment, as well as the degree of economic need of the individual, the extent to which the exists a profound belief in the religious rewards involved, and the availability of compensation from sympathetic Muslim organizations and states.

One method that can be used to help identify these factors and how they relate to the decision-making process for suicide as a terrorism tactic is the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) model, which is one of the central concepts in evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1974, 1982 cited in Villena & Villena 2004 at p. 585).

Generally speaking, a strategy (phenotype) that is evolutionarily stable is considered to be robust to evolutionary-selection pressures in an exact sense: "The typical framework in which this concept is applied is one where individuals are repeatedly drawn at random from a large population to play a symmetric two-person game," the authors advise (Villena & Villena 2004, p. 585).

At the beginning of the model, everyone is considered to be genetically or otherwise "programmed" to play a specific pure or mixed strategy of the game; thereafter, it is assumed that a small proportion of the population will elect to pursue a different pure or mixed strategy and that those individuals are also programmed to play only that strategy (Villena & Villena 2004).

In this environment, the incumbent strategy is considered to be evolutionarily stable if there exists a positive invasion barrier, in terms of population size, that compels each such instance of a mutant strategy to not perform as well as the incumbent strategy in terms of rewards (Villena & Villena 2004).

"In other words," the authors add, "if a mutant strategy is played by a proportion of the population which falls below the invasion barrier, then the incumbent strategy earns a higher payoff than the mutant strategy, and therefore cannot be invaded by it" (Villena & Villena 2004, p. 586). For the purposes of this investigation, the use of suicide bombing as a terrorism tactic will be regarded as the mutant activity performed by Islamic extremists as a class of players.

A given strategy can be regarded as ESS if, once it has been adopted by the entire population, no mutation adopted by an arbitrarily small percentage of the population will be able to "invade" (i.e., enter and survive) by obtaining at least a comparable reward for the behaviors (Villena & Villena 2004).

In sum, then, "An ESS is thus intended to reflect a stationary situation in the evolutionary process in which the pattern of behavior prevailing in the species cannot be invaded by any mutation which is a better fit" (Villena & Villena 2004, p. 586).

Although the above-described evolutionary stability considerations are based on biological concepts, they can reasonably be extrapolated to include an interpretation of human behaviors in a broad variety of situations including many interactions in economic contexts; in such environments, evolutionary stability may be regarded as a norm or even an institution (Villena & Villena 2004). This point is made by Cooper (2004), who reports that, "One can compare the spiritually disordered suicide bombers of Al Qaeda to the adherents of modern ideologies in the SS or KGB...

All of them, however, can flourish in the context of a past and a tradition that is dead. All can see themselves at the beginning of new but still unaccommodating things, where the temptation of violence has perhaps its greatest appeal" (p. 25). According to Cooper (2004), a number of "Islamic teachings" exist in the form of commentary and hadiths that support the concept that that seventy-two houris, or virgins, are, in fact, part of the posthumous rewards for those who achieve martyrdom and dwell in Paradise.

No matter how the religious teaching are interpreted, though, from the perspective of their effectiveness in recruiting terrorist suicide bombers, the appeal appears to be sufficiently literal to be successful.

For example, Cooper (2004) reports the instructions given by one Hamas "dispatcher" to a potential suicide bomber as follows: "We focus his attention on Paradise, on being in the presence of Allah, on meeting the Prophet Muhammad, on interceding for his loved ones so that they, too, can be saved from the agonies of Hell, and on the houris" (p. 136).

This approach has clearly been effective as well; researchers spoke to one young man who was about to become a "martyr" but for some reason did not kill himself or murder others, indicated that his sense that Paradise was "very, very near -- " right in front of our eyes. It lies beneath the thumb. On the other side of the detonator" (quoted in Cooper, 2004 at p. 136).

Likewise, an official publication of Hamas, Al Risala, made public the will a suicide bomber whose June 1, 2001, suicide attack on a Tel Aviv disco killed twenty-three people, the majority of whom were teenage girls. In the will it was written, "Call out in joy, O my mother; distribute sweets, O my father and brothers; a wedding with 'the black-eyed' awaits your son in Paradise" (Cooper, 2004 p. 136).

In fact, in many regions of the Middle East today, where terrorism as a way of life is popularly regarded as the norm and suicide bombing as an honorable end to one's life but where such practices are viewed with abhorrence in the West, then, some of the factors that could reasonably be said to positively influence an individual Muslim's decision to resort to suicide as a terrorism tactic would include the following: The extent to which the individual was educated in a Muslim school that emphasized the strict interpretations of religious teachings over more Westernized approaches; Whether the use of Greater and Lesser Jihads as allowed in the Qur'an is taught in a given region (i.e., the greater jihad is allowed, and the lesser jihad is no longer tolerated but is exploited by these extremists); The extent to which the individual subscribes to modern Muslim tenets or wahabi; The extent to which the individual subscribes to Muslim tenets concerning being immediately transported to heaven and becoming a martyr to the faith (together with its well-known concomitant spiritual benefits); The extent to which regional differences exist among respective Muslims and their beliefs/history and background of the Middle East, including perceptual differences between Shiites and Sunnis concerning suicide, as well as fundamentalists' interpretations of these two branches of Islam; The lack availability of opportunities for gainful employment; The lack of available of opportunities for higher education; The financial status of the individual's family; The personal desire to actively participate in the perceived religious war against the United States and its interests;.