National Interest as a Key Determinants in Foreign Policy Internationally

National Interest as a key determinant in Foreign Policy

National Interest and Foreign Policy

National Interest Defined:

The national interest is, very simply, the objectives of a country ranging from the macro goals i.e. economy, military to the micro goals like social use cyber space. National interest is an integral part of international relations as it is a concept based out of the realist school of though. This will be discussed in more detail in the paper.

Foreign Policy Defined:

Foreign policy, very simply, is the strategy that guides all international dealings and associations of a country

When dealing with national interest, one has to wonder about the degree to which domestic politics is vital for the comprehension of that country's foreign policy. Domestic politics is not of immense significance; this has been depicted by an eminent assumption related to structural realism, global association. The systemic vigour of the global supremacy division propels a country's foreign policy formulation over the domestic politics, as mentioned by structural realists. Hence, on the basis of this presumption it can be explicated that a foreign policy is influenced by external milieu. An eminent learned personality has mentioned even before the Cold War that realism seems to be the solitary and vital constituent in our logical wallet (Walt, 1998, pg. 43) for comprehending global politics. However, recent discoveries related to democratic harmony has propelled eminent learned personalities to deduce that domestic politics is a vital constituent in the formulation of a country's foreign policy (Souva, 2005).

The discussion associated to discerning the significance of domestic political constituents on global associations is vital when the focus is to segregate the chief casual methodologies pertaining to a set of occurrences, discerning the chief inspiration of the political leaders, and precisely scrutinizing calamity negotiation conditions. For example, if structural realism is precise then policy formulators should accentuate competences and equilibrium of influence in the process of negotiation with an opposition. Nonetheless, if domestic political dialogues are more astute and intuitive, then the policy formulators initially require comprehending the domestic condition of the opponent nation and based on that formulate their own foreign policy (Souva, 2005).

Responding to the query associated to the vital nature of domestic politics is exigent for a couple of motives. Foremost what reckons as a domestic political elucidation of foreign policy hinges on an implied distinction to elucidations that are not domestic or political (Fearon, 1998, 291). It is not adequate to explicate that a domestic-level constituent is rationally considerable in explicating that national political elucidations supplant systemic elucidations, while a few systemic elucidations entail domestic-level constituents (Souva, 2005).

Secondly, majority of the investigations has not utilized apposite statistical experimentations for scrutinizing diverse and deviating abstract representations. The customary technique for judging non-experimented representations is to coalesce each and every constituent in to a solitary representation and then determine which of the elucidations are noteworthy. As mentioned by Clarke (2001, 2003) this methodology is an abstract form of judging non-experimented representations and it is unbeneficial to progressing scientific comprehension. Alternatively, investigators should commence a "three-cornered brawl" (Lakatos, 1970, 115), judging the diverse and deviating representations analogous to one another along with the facts, and after that scrutinizing these diverse representations by utilizing apposite statistical experimentation methodology. Essentially, investigation conducted by Clarke specifies that the verification in opposition to realism . . . is distended (Clarke, 2001, 724). Realist representations have the tendency of surpassing their opponents.

A technique to scrutinize analogous domestic political and systemic assumptions is to comprehend the condition and position of the political atmosphere. It is a universal phenomenon that a nation is always thoughtful for its safety from any peril or intimidation; hence the political personalities and figures should always be considerate when formulating a foreign policy because it serves as a roadmap to tackle associations in a global spectrum. This abstract standpoint has a representation in American political milieu: two presidency assumptions proposed by Wildavsky's (1966). Wildavsky mentioned that on the subject of foreign policy the president seems to gain a bilateral buttress due to the fact that global milieu persuades Congress to take an opposite stance to that of the president. As discussed by structural realists' the stoppage of political leanings at the water's periphery regarding the foreign policy assumption is a prime example of this, and in such conditions two-presidency is precisely the subject which should be explicated (Souva, 2005).

Nonetheless, in modern times, the two-presidency assumption has been confronted. It is mentioned that preceding the termination of the Vietnam War there might have been occurrences of two-presidency assumption, and foreign policy subjects has been dictated by political leanings since that phase (Meernik, 1993; Prins, 2001). Regardless of these assertions, I have to mention that not a single investigation has adequately scrutinized the political leaning assumptions and it has judged this assumption in the light of the systemic realist ideology.

I have also scrutinized the congressional foreign policy and the global association manuscripts. This scrutiny recommends a couple of prevalent and contending representations of bilateral political leanings in the subject of foreign policy voting, a domestic political representation and a systemic realist representation. After that, I have experimented with the contending representations by scrutinizing the activities of the American House of Representatives. Whilst, preceding investigations have judged these assumptions by scrutinizing solitary constituents, I have judged them by analyzing the representations by means of a non-experimented representation methodology. The pragmatic investigations have depicted that the domestic political representation supplants the systemic realist representation. It is advisable that the priority should be given to the domestic political constituents rather than to the structural influential constituents, if the aim is to comprehend the nature of those constituents which instigate global associations (Souva, 2005).

Theoretical Perspectives: Systemic Realism vs. National Interest

Two kinds of domestic and systemic political assumptions have been discerned by Fearon (1998). S1- is a kind of systemic theory which illustrates nations as united and logical performers. The systemic theory of this particular kind is common and might incorporate component-level traits. S2- is the other kind of systemic theoretic assumptions which also accentuates nations as united and logical performers, although this kind does not incorporate component-level traits to explicate communication amidst nations. Waltz's (1979) structural realism has been discerned by S2. D1- is a kind of domestic political theory which responds to S1, by mentioning that nations are non-united performers along with domestic politics is the rationale due to which suboptimal foreign policy formulation arises. D2- is the other form of domestic political assumption that responds to S2, by mentioning that nations are non-united performers and relies on component-level traits.

The impending ideology of the above categorization accentuates that the domestic political assumptions of D2 might be analogous to the systemic theoretic assumptions of S1, due to the fact that the latter might incorporate component-level traits. Hence, as a deduction it is not adequate to elucidate that a domestic constituent is statistically noteworthy to discern that domestic politics is vital, for a few systemic theories for national interest can entail domestic constituents. Alternatively, the prime dissimilarity amidst S1 and D2 theoretic assumptions is the notion that the component-level constituents instigate a suboptimal foreign policy and national interest strategy. Therefore, a much more reliable methodology is to accentuate on the nature of the representations which explicate a particular reliant constituent rather than on the solitary variables, when judging domestic-political and systemic representations of national interest and foreign policy. On the basis of this assumption, I have illustrated the congressional national interest and foreign policy voting manuscripts to explicate contending domestic-political and systemic realist representations of national interest and foreign policy political leaning (Souva, 2005).

A Systemic Realist design of the National Interest and Foreign Policy Voting

When dealing with the national interest and forigen policy notions, it is first important to know what are the precise stimuli required by the nations from the systemic realist standpoint. The answer is simply -- security. Albeit the systemic realism accentuates on nations as prime performers in global politics, the micro foundation of the assumption speculates that any person when encountering an analogous condition will perform in analogous conduct i.e. wherever agents and agencies are conjoined by vigour and opposition as a replacement for influence and regulation (Waltz, 1979, 117). The common insinuations of the above mentioned assumptions of the political leaning activity and politics are atypical in their involvement in the national interest strategies and foreign policy paradigms (Souva, 2005).

The rationales for this dual action towards national interest and foreign policy are: foremost, every person will perform analogous computation concerning the methodology of formulating a national interest policy that complements the foreign policy (Waltz, 1979, 117). Policy location does not instigate from insularity disquiet as far as the national interest policy is concerned. Moreover, computation founded by these stresses can ascertain the formulation of those policies which will be of immense magnitude for a nation, internally and, in the long run, internationally (Waltz, 1979, 117). Secondly, interior squabbling, or political leaning, grants an opportunity to opposing countries a prospect for targeting a nation. Hence, such condition debilitates a country's stance of negotiations with its peers; therefore political figures should not indulge in political leaning when formulating a national interest strategy or a foreign policy.

In an investigation conducted by Gowa (1998, 321), on the implementation of American armed forces in foreign territories, has asserts that a country's status relating to its utilization of armed influence overseas is a vital constituent of its national security. Because status can diminish swiftly, endeavours to manoeuvre the implementation of force overseas for short-run aims can impose hefty long-term costs. Hence, when the subject of national security crops up then there is a phenomenon of, tactical political leaning cessation (Gowa, 1998, 307).

A couple of focal schemes are implemented to explicate the deviations in the foreign policy and national interest by the systemic realist assumption; intimidation and the kind of subject at hand. In a condition of an intimidation imposed by an exterior force, political figures who might usually contend to each other's opinions and stances will cease the political leaning to coalesce to tackle an opposition. This coalesce forms due to these rationales; foremost, in the condition of an exterior intimidation constituents of the Congress. This is usually the case when the Congress discerns that they are not adequately informed analogous to the president and there is inevitability for drastic measures, hence they incline to adjourn to the president (Wildavsky, 1966). Secondly, an exterior intimidation spawns a collaborative reaction. Moreover, as the exterior intimidation becomes crystal clear, interior lucidity escalates and foreign policy bilateral political leaning becomes imminent (Souva, 2005).

International system helps in coping up with the threats that occur from the external party. There is a dispute among the structural analysts that bipolar foreign policy system is more passive than a multipolar system. The reason of bipolar system being more passive is that it leads to low chances of having miscalculations regarding the potential of other countries. Moreover, there are fewer ambiguities in bipolarity and threats can be identified easily by which economies can determine probability of threat and the required foreign policy to avoid war. Another reason of bipolarity being peaceful is that it is easier as simplicity leads to certainty and certainty encourages peace (Mearsheimer, 1990, 17). A bipolar international system does not need more support as compared to a multi-polar system as it can run without much adherent behavior. As the threats can be easily identified by using the bipolar international system, it is perceived by the Americans that the troublesome issues and the political concerns by the followers are set aside for the concern of the national interest and harmony in foreign affairs and this belief was deteriorated by the decreased Soviet threat (Mearsheimer, 2001).

United States having control over the world comes up with the consideration of taking unipolar as the more appropriate system after the fall of Soviet Union. With this situation the affect of the threat perception in unipolar system on the leading economy is also highlighted.

Threats by third parties are stricken by the changes that occur in the defense expenditures (see, e.g. Prins & Marshall, 2001) which in turn largely impact the national interests of the country. It is also pointed out that a threat received while war time is expected, however it is not less than a shock in times of peace and harmony. Similarly, the expenses done on defense sector are more in times of war. However, when more spending is done in the defense sector during peace shows a concern and prevention for hard times as nation seeks and demands security, which is another big issue that both national interest and foreign policy cover (as highlighted before). It is shown by the water's-edge perspective that the people who join together for security purposes are expected to join hands in any unfavorable situation (Souva, 2005).

Another risky issue in water's-edge perspective is that of low voting rate for the national interest polices because of the security issues and it leads to higher bipartisan in the foreign policy. Moreover, there are various views regarding the politics with having national interest and love for the country. This leads to silent partisan and differences in the ideologies of states (McCormick & Wittkopf, 1992, 32).

This being the main reason has led leaders to differentiate various issues regarding foreign policy. Meernik (1993) categorizes foreign policy votes in three forms which are foreign aid, international strategies for economic growth, and all national interest issues. Further, Prins and Marshall (2001) classify foreign policy votes in three types as trade, foreign aid, and all other national interest issues like security. Among these three types trade and foreign aid are different as they cover issues of low politics whereas other national interest issues cover concerns related to high internal politics. This seems to be reliable with the argument of water's edge as the empirical researches cater the issues occurred. According to both Meernik (1993) and Prins and Marshall (2001) there is more partisan seen among foreign aid and trade votes as compared to other foreign policy votes. Moreover, McCormick and Wittkopf (1992, 49) figure outs that the issues of high internal politics extract higher bipartisanship as various foreign policy issues are catered by high internal politics i.e. national interest. It is thus concluded that other foreign policy issues are more partisan and high internal politics issues are less partisan as derived by the theoretical and empirical researches (Souva, 2005).

There are differences in the high and low internal politics which are divergent from the hypothesis of the two-presidencies. The two-presidency hypothesis is based on the assumption that more support is given to president by Congress on foreign policies rather than domestic policies (Wildavsky, 1966). The hypothesis is varied in two perspectives, one, as that of the category of interest called as test category. This category is concerned with the issues of high internal politics like issues of foreign policy as generalized by systemic realists. The two-presidency hypothesis considers test group as having issues of foreign and defense policies, both driven by the national interests. Another point is brought forward regarding the two-presidencies hypothesis that it does not caters a wider part (Meernik, 1993; Prins & Marshall, 2001) or only caters and provides support to the Republican presidents as stated by Bond and Fleisher in the 1990 study. As it is derived from the water's-edge perspective that foreign policy receives less bipartisan support as in low internal politics and high internal politics obtain more bipartisan support. It seems to be true according to the latest researches conducted which addressed the issues occurred with high and low internal politics (True, 2004).