European enlargement and the development of EU security policy

NATO and the European Union

The Cold War period represented an important time in the history of the European continent and in the development of the concept of security and the way in which it was dealt with at the level of the national security strategies. The bipolar system that succumbed following the fall of the Iron Curtain had established up to that point a security structure based on the alliance system, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, when the Pact no longer represented an adversary for the Northern Alliance, the major problem for NATO as well as for the European Union became obvious in the lack of threat such a construction must face. At the same time, the challenges facing the new, emerging, international environment included the issue of nationalistic pressures coming from former Soviet states as well as former communist countries.

In terms of NATO and the European Union, the security aspect was considered essential to be dealt with at the level of the alliances and the future partnerships these organizations had to engage in order to insure the success of an equilibrium that at the time was fragile. In this sense, although during the Cold War the European Union had attempted create a certain security dimension, after the end of the bipolar security structure, this became an imperative need. Therefore, the evolution of the European Union, in relation to NATO as well as from the perspective of the European security dimension must be seen in the framework of the historical evolutions after the Cold War due to the fact that the European Union found it essential to address issues such as Russia, Turkey, the Ukraine, and their role in the security environment of the post Cold War era.

The present paper will try to assess the impact of the European enlargement process on the development of the countries it entangles as well as on the European Union's Security and Defence Policy. From this point-of-view it is important to consider the history of the security initiative developed by the European Union, on the one hand. On the other hand, an essential role in the evolution of this segment of the European integration is the background and the framework in which this development took place. Thus, a special emphasis will be placed on the challenges the EU had to face and which determined its answer in the form of the enlargement of the ESDP. Secondly, throughout the history of the European Union, any attempt to improve or at least increase the institutional framework or the political environment among the member countries or the partners in the neighbouring area, has concrete consequences on the way in which developments take effect. Therefore, another important dimension for analysis is the actual consequences of the political initiatives that led to the expansion of the ESDP's role. This retrospect view however must take into account both the internal effects on the EU countries, as well as the external impact, on the countries that are targeted by these attempts to increase the security space in Europe and in the Mediterranean area. This analysis will include views on the role of Russia, Turkey, the Ukraine, as well as Mediterranean countries. Finally, it is important to consider the potential future evolutions of the ESDP, not so much from the perspective of concrete predictions, but rather from a political point-of-view and taking into account possible internal evolutions in member countries and recipient countries.

History and challenges of the ESDP

First and foremost it must be pointed out the fact that the ESDP is the result of a traditional structure, which is the international organization. In this sense, the realistic theory argues that although there is a need for states to keep their sovereignty, it is important for them to have a certain form of cooperation that supports political relations. At the same time, the structure of the EU and implicitly the existence of the ESDP are justified through the neorealist perspective. In this sense, taking realist and neorealist points into account, it can be said that the birth of the ESDP was a matter of power calculus; thus, "states must look to themselves to survive" hence they must engage in strategic alliances or forms of cooperation that would ensure them the ability to maintain a certain balance of power and, as structural realists argue, their relative power. In this sense, the creation of the European Union and the establishment of its security dimension was a well thought of affair, taking into account the perspectives after the Second World War and the need for a strategic and political balance of power. The actual creation of the ESDP was more difficult than the issue of the First Communitarian Pillar because of the specificity of the European Union which does not fall in the traditional category of the international organization, but rather its supranational character determines state to share sovereignty, a factor which determined several member states to be reluctant to address the issue of security at a supranational level.

Current developments in ESDP have arisen out of powerful historical forces arising on both sides of the Atlantic." In this sense, it is clear that the end of the Second World War had left a power vacuum that had to be filled with a political and security actor that would balance the power equilibrium on the continent. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had filled the security vacuum in Europe by providing the necessary guarantees to European states in their relation with the U.S.S.R. From this point-of-view, the European Communities were not politically motivated to increase their efforts to accommodate the sovereignty needs and at the same time the security needs of the member states. Thus, there was little progress made in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The first attempts to create a common position in terms of security and defence issues was the 1953 Rome Treaty which put the basis of the European Defence Community. However, this aspect of cooperation was left outside the supranational pillar precisely because it represented a sensitive issue for states who were not willing and politically prepared to share their sovereignty in a matter of national security. Thus, the Fouchet Plans for a European voice in security and defence issues were rejected as being possibilities for increasing the voice of Europe in the relation with the North Atlantic organization. One of the most fervent proponents of an independent defence policy was France's Charles de Gaulle who constantly supported the idea of a European defence, not a transatlantic one.

The major breakthrough in this sense was actually the fall of the Berlin War and the symbolic ending of the Cold War. That brought again to the attention of the political leaders the challenges the European Union, independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had to face. On the one hand, there was the matter of the lack of equilibrium in terms of the theoretical analysis of the post Cold War structure of power. Thus, as the U.S. had risen victorious from the Cold War, the international system became uni-polar in its distribution of power. However, the realist point-of-view, that was still dominating the scholarly environment considered that current state of affairs to be rather dangerous. Thus, there was a need for the balancing of the relations with the U.S. To such an extent as to create a new pole of power, which would offer the system a multi-polar structure, a much more stable framework for conducting politics. The emergence of the ideas related to the CFSP resulted in the official creation of the Second Pillar at the Maastricht Summit of 1992. That step enabled the European Union to have a stronger stand and role in the relations within the Union as well as by comparison with external factors, such as the U.S. Or the Russian Federation.

Another challenge Europeans had to face was the fall of the U.S.S.R. And the regional conflicts the EU had to face. "The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the subsequent process of German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Gulf War, the wars in the Caucasus and especially the wars in Yugoslavia combined to give new impetus to the process of European defence." These crises proved that the EU had "limit(ed) itself to the more popular and productive tasks of European construction; that it was an 'economic giant and political pygmy' (the same thing, not by coincidence, was often said about Germany); and the obvious point was made that the EU had no military component at all up to 1999."

The EU had to either limit itself in both initiatives and goals to a mere economic power, or establish a common and coherent foreign policy and to offer it the necessary tools to make a differences in war theatres of emerging democracies. Thus, "The European Union's European security and defence policy (ESDP) includes the gradual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. The European security and defence policy (ESDP) aims to allow the Union to develop its civilian and military capacities for crisis management and conflict prevention at international level, thus helping to maintain peace and international security, in accordance with the United Nations Charter." The Petersberg type missions done in association with the WEU were among the first steps taken to increase the voice of Europe on the international scene in the matter of security capabilities. However, they were abandoned or at least left aside due to the increased desire to develop the Union's own military capabilities and to become a relevant partner in insuring world security.

The most important challenge for the European Defence however came once the option of the war in Iraq appeared. In 2003 it was clear that there were different opinions arguing for and against the U.S. led military intervention. In this sense "the Iraq crisis has not only threatened the transatlantic ties but also produced intra-European divisions which have cast doubts over the future CSFP and ESDP of the EU." This turn of events in the international political life drew the attention on the various discussions that had already split the European countries in terms of deciding on common political stands concerning crises in the world.

The constant considerations of aspects such as common foreign policy or European defence has determined member state states to reconsider the traditional disputes related to sovereignty, political control, or the possible relation with NATO and other important actors of the international scene. The impact this evolution had on the member states, as well as on the institution itself is essential to the history of the EU. At the same time however, in order to establish itself as an essential played of the security environment, the European Union, through its ESDP had to take into account the entire array of influences, political and geographical spaces. In this sense, the Mediterranean Partnership, the relation with Russia, the Ukraine and Turkey are essential for the possible positive prospects of the European initiatives.

Effects on European countries

The issue of the ESDP is relatively complex because it entangles not only the member countries but also the neighbouring ones, especially Russia, the Ukraine, or Turkey. Also, the European Union also established through the Barcelona Process a new strategic Partnership with Mediterranean countries in order to increase the cooperation and the safety of the borders and of the sea that splits Europe from Africa. This is why it is important to consider each state in particular and assess the impact the establishment and enlargement of the ESDP has on the political decision making process in these countries.

EU relations with Russia

The relations with the Former Soviet space represented an important pivotal point for the development of foreign relations of the EU. This is largely due to the fact that the European Union, until the end of the Cold War relied heavily on the power and influence of the NATO structure and institutional framework for the import of security. However, the demise of the Soviet Union brought the issues of the URRS, especially the conflict situations, closer to the borders of the EU. Consequently, "Russia and the former Soviet Union were designated as one of main priorities for the Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Lisbon European Council in June 1992." This was in reaction to the fact that Russia was in a political disarray and the European Union could not afford to exclude its Eastern neighbour from a future strategic partnership and vision. Therefore, efforts have been made in order to include the Russian Federation in the group of countries that receive special attention from the EU as "Russia is the only country with which the EU has regular biannual summits, in addition to the more typical annual foreign ministers meetings and ad hoc ministerial meetings."

At the level of the EU-Russian relations there have been increased contacts between the two sides. The political framework also included the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994. On the one hand, the interest of the two parts is visible at the level of the meeting of heads of state, on the other hand at lower levels such as the parliamentary diplomacy conducted between the EU and the Russian Duma. However, the way in which politics is conducted at the level of the EU-Russia partnership is often compared to the level of intensity of the EU's other relations, especially with CSI countries. This is considered to be an important aspect in analysing the relations with Russia because it points out the political perspective that drives forward the process of cooperation with the Eastern bloc. In this sense, "Russia first'- strategy has been criticised by some analysts and CIS diplomats as being based more on old fashioned real politik than a sober assessment of the relative progress of the transition process in Russia and other CIS states and their respective aspirations vis-a-vis the EU. Relations with CIS countries other than Russia are thus seen as a function of policy towards Russia, rather than being developed on their own merit." Thus, there is a certain tension on the way in which the Russian side views enlargement and the future consideration of EU relations in terms of diplomatic contacts with CSI countries and on how the evolution of the situation in the former communist countries is stable, durable, and reliable for the European Union.

The enlargement process was viewed by the Russian Federation as a crucial step not necessarily from the point-of-view of the economic strains ten new members and an additional two put on the communitarian integrated system; it was viewed with increased attention because of the limited space for manoeuvre the Russian Federation would come to have following the enlargement. After 2007, the EU shares a close space with Russia, especially from the perspective of Ukraine's proximity to Romania. This is why, there were several incentives being proposed at different EU-Russia summits that preceded official meetings of the EU. Even so, there are voices that Russia is not yet a democratic partner for dialogue. Thus, "Western media, many Russia scholars, politicians who are not in power and much of the public see President Vladimir Putin moving Russia further away from democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as they are understood in the West. The critics may disagree about whether today's Russia can be described as a "managed democracy," an "authoritarian state," or a "new totalitarian state." But they all agree that the political system President Putin has designed and erected during the past few years no longer has much in common with western democracy. Many of the critics conclude that the European Union and the United States cannot develop a partnership, let alone a "strategic partnership," with Russia, as long as there is such an evident lack of "common values."

Despite these visions on the situation of Russia, it considers a privileged partnership its relation with the EU. In this sense, officials have argues that "the EU develops some of the most intense relations with the Russian Federation and that the framework considered by the European Neighbourhood Policy offers to little space for the development of the bilateral relations." Thus, the incentives for an increased partnership are both from the political level as well as from the strategic ones. The energetic field also plays a major role in the establishment of in-depth relations because of the UE dependency on the Russian energy supplies. This is one of the reasons for which the political incentives are stronger and stronger. At the same time, the strategic implications for an increased partnership revolve around the issues related to the West Balkans or the former Soviet space.

Another important aspect of the cooperation process between Russia and the EU is the establishment of a common security environment based on common values because it is considered that precisely this gap is the main impediment in the further strengthening of the bilateral relations. Thus, the term democracy fails to have the same meaning in both camps and it clear that democratic principles as understood at the level of the European Union are not consistent to the actual situation in Russia, especially from the perspective of the facts that constantly mark the Putin administration.

EU relations with Ukraine

Ukraine is considered one of the most important states in the region for the European Union, from a strategic point-of-view. This need for increased cooperation with one the essential pillars of the former soviet space was made official once the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed. However, it must be stressed the fact that the acceptance conditions were not distinct from the ones imposed to the Russian Federation. Thus, "The PCAs with Ukraine and Moldova (were signed) in 1998, and those with three Caucasus and three Central Asian states in 1999; as far as the question of values is concerned, all these PCAs -- "with minor adjustments -- "contained the same principles and objectives that the E.U. And Russia had agreed upon. It is therefore fair to say that the E.U. expected all post-Soviet states, including the Russian Federation, to develop into full-fl edged democracies and market economies with the assistance of the E.U." Therefore it can be said that the desire to increase the cooperation with Ukraine is rather powerful because it is considered to be a new start for cooperation in the region. However, although it is seen as having a special character, it is limited in importance by comparison with the Russian partnership.

EU relations with Turkey

Turkey is a special case in the history of the European Union. It is a constant subject for discussion at the level of the EU due to its intension of acceding to the EU in the future. However, this future has long been annulled or postponed. In this sense, the security relations between the two poles of political power consider it essential to establish security relations that will play a role in the eventual accession plan.

The issue of Cyprus which is from 2004 a member of the EU is relevant in the discussion with the Turkish administration. This is a constant topic for discussion even in the membership talks that have gone on for more than three decades now. Although the membership of the European Union is seen as an agent of change in terms of increasing the democratic deficit in Turkey as well as the security situation in Cyprus, the EU is still reluctant to consider Turkey more than a strategic partner in terms of security affairs in the region.

The wide interest the areas outside the European Union have come to receive from the Brussels based institution is an important political message sent to this region. It outlines the fact that the European Union has increased its attention in regard to the issues concerning this area and offers, through the means of cooperation, a certain incentive for development. In this sense, the Turkish case is worthy of mentioning. Thus, "Turkey has proven that it can change and reform itself to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In spite of a series of problems that erupted during the course of 2005, especially concerning freedom of expression, the government appears committer to see through the implementation of political reforms." Thus, it can be said that the prospect of the European integration represents a motivation for the Turkish system to improve and change. On the other hand, for the European Union the relationship with Ankara is a challenge for its foreign policy and its abilities to be flexible.

EU relations with the Mediterranean countries

The EU established comprehensive relations with the Mediterranean countries through the Barcelona Process in 1995 at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This is the result of the need to establish more coherent relations with the countries that have an impact on the security environment. In terms of practical details, "the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership comprises 35 members, 25 EU Member States and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has observer status since 1999." The first results that came out of this type of relation were seen in the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta in the EU member state category.

However it is widely considered that the ESDP of 1999 and the Barcelona Process were not directly related. Thus, "The partnership was obviously not established in connection with ESDP in mind - if only because ESDP did not exist yet at the time of the launching of the Barcelona process - but the Barcelona process clearly has security and defence implications and ESDP necessarily has a Mediterranean dimension." Thus the partnership came to be seen as a tool for the increased cooperation between the EU and states of West Africa and the Middle East.

Similar to the processed developed with Ukraine and Turkey, the Barcelona Process is also an incentive for the increase of democracy and the development of economic and political relations. Thus, the partnership is again a tool for improvement of the situation of the states concerned.

Conclusions

The future of the ESDP is rather hard to assess. There are various factors to be taken into account in this sense. On the one hand, there is the political evolution in member states. The United Kingdom's premier appears to be determined to establish a more European position, especially in relation to the defence aspects of the Community. Germany and France are also engaged in an ongoing process of supporting the ESDP. On the other hand, the states that receive the benefits and the tasks coming from the actions undergone in the framework of the ESDP are to a large account responsible for the success or failure or the process. As it was pointed out, the main result of the ESDP on partner countries was an evolution on the democratic process. However, states such as Russia which have a more advantageous negotiating position will try to benefit more from the strategic partnership with the EU and accept to less.