NATO and the European Union

NATO and the European Union

The Cold War period represented an important time in the history of the European continent and in the development of the concept of security and the way in which it was dealt with at the level of the national security strategies. The bipolar system that succumbed following the fall of the Iron Curtain had established up to that point a security structure based on the alliance system, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, when the Pact no longer represented an adversary for the Northern Alliance, the major problem for NATO as well as for the European Union became obvious in the lack of threat such a construction must face. At the same time, the challenges facing the new, emerging, international environment included the issue of nationalistic pressures coming from former Soviet states as well as former communist countries.

In terms of NATO and the European Union, the security aspect was considered essential to be dealt with at the level of the alliances and the future partnerships these organizations had to engage in order to insure the success of an equilibrium that at the time was fragile. In this sense, although during the Cold War the European Union had attempted create a certain security dimension, after the end of the bipolar security structure, this became an imperative need. Therefore, the evolution of the European Union, in relation to NATO as well as from the perspective of the European security dimension must be seen in the framework of the historical evolutions after the Cold War due to the fact that the European Union found it essential to address issues such as Russia, Turkey, the Ukraine, and their role in the security environment of the post Cold War era.

The present paper will try to assess the impact of the European enlargement process on the development of the countries it entangles as well as on the European Union's Security and Defence Policy. From this point-of-view it is important to consider the history of the security initiative developed by the European Union, on the one hand. On the other hand, an essential role in the evolution of this segment of the European integration is the background and the framework in which this development took place. Thus, a special emphasis will be placed on the challenges the EU had to face and which determined its answer in the form of the enlargement of the ESDP. Secondly, throughout the history of the European Union, any attempt to improve or at least increase the institutional framework or the political environment among the member countries or the partners in the neighbouring area, has concrete consequences on the way in which developments take effect. Therefore, another important dimension for analysis is the actual consequences of the political initiatives that led to the expansion of the ESDP's role. This retrospect view however must take into account both the internal effects on the EU countries, as well as the external impact, on the countries that are targeted by these attempts to increase the security space in Europe and in the Mediterranean area. This analysis will include views on the role of Russia, Turkey, the Ukraine, as well as Mediterranean countries. Finally, it is important to consider the potential future evolutions of the ESDP, not so much from the perspective of concrete predictions, but rather from a political point-of-view and taking into account possible internal evolutions in member countries and recipient countries.

History and challenges of the ESDP

First and foremost it must be pointed out the fact that the ESDP is the result of a traditional structure, which is the international organization. In this sense, the realistic theory argues that although there is a need for states to keep their sovereignty, it is important for them to have a certain form of cooperation that supports political relations. At the same time, the structure of the EU and implicitly the existence of the ESDP are justified through the neorealist perspective. In this sense, taking realist and neorealist points into account, it can be said that the birth of the ESDP was a matter of power calculus; thus, "states must look to themselves to survive" hence they must engage in strategic alliances or forms of cooperation that would ensure them the ability to maintain a certain balance of power and, as structural realists argue, their relative power. In this sense, the creation of the European Union and the establishment of its security dimension was a well thought of affair, taking into account the perspectives after the Second World War and the need for a strategic and political balance of power. The actual creation of the ESDP was more difficult than the issue of the First Communitarian Pillar because of the specificity of the European Union which does not fall in the traditional category of the international organization, but rather its supranational character determines state to share sovereignty, a factor which determined several member states to be reluctant to address the issue of security at a supranational level.

Current developments in ESDP have arisen out of powerful historical forces arising on both sides of the Atlantic." In this sense, it is clear that the end of the Second World War had left a power vacuum that had to be filled with a political and security actor that would balance the power equilibrium on the continent. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had filled the security vacuum in Europe by providing the necessary guarantees to European states in their relation with the U.S.S.R. From this point-of-view, the European Communities were not politically motivated to increase their efforts to accommodate the sovereignty needs and at the same time the security needs of the member states. Thus, there was little progress made in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The first attempts to create a common position in terms of security and defence issues was the 1953 Rome Treaty which put the basis of the European Defence Community. However, this aspect of cooperation was left outside the supranational pillar precisely because it represented a sensitive issue for states who were not willing and politically prepared to share their sovereignty in a matter of national security. Thus, the Fouchet Plans for a European voice in security and defence issues were rejected as being possibilities for increasing the voice of Europe in the relation with the North Atlantic organization. One of the most fervent proponents of an independent defence policy was France's Charles de Gaulle who constantly supported the idea of a European defence, not a transatlantic one.

The major breakthrough in this sense was actually the fall of the Berlin War and the symbolic ending of the Cold War. That brought again to the attention of the political leaders the challenges the European Union, independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had to face. On the one hand, there was the matter of the lack of equilibrium in terms of the theoretical analysis of the post Cold War structure of power. Thus, as the U.S. had risen victorious from the Cold War, the international system became uni-polar in its distribution of power. However, the realist point-of-view, that was still dominating the scholarly environment considered that current state of affairs to be rather dangerous. Thus, there was a need for the balancing of the relations with the U.S. To such an extent as to create a new pole of power, which would offer the system a multi-polar structure, a much more stable framework for conducting politics. The emergence of the ideas related to the CFSP resulted in the official creation of the Second Pillar at the Maastricht Summit of 1992. That step enabled the European Union to have a stronger stand and role in the relations within the Union as well as by comparison with external factors, such as the U.S. Or the Russian Federation.

Another challenge Europeans had to face was the fall of the U.S.S.R. And the regional conflicts the EU had to face. "The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the subsequent process of German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Gulf War, the wars in the Caucasus and especially the wars in Yugoslavia combined to give new impetus to the process of European defence." These crises proved that the EU had "limit(ed) itself to the more popular and productive tasks of European construction; that it was an 'economic giant and political pygmy' (the same thing, not by coincidence, was often said about Germany); and the obvious point was made that the EU had no military component at all up to 1999."

The EU had to either limit itself in both initiatives and goals to a mere economic power, or establish a common and coherent foreign policy and to offer it the necessary tools to make a differences in war theatres of emerging democracies. Thus, "The European Union's European security and defence policy (ESDP) includes the gradual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. The European security and defence policy (ESDP) aims to allow the Union to develop its civilian and military capacities for crisis management and conflict prevention at international level, thus helping to maintain peace and international security, in accordance with the United Nations Charter." The Petersberg type missions done in association with the WEU were among the first steps taken to increase the voice of Europe on the international scene in the matter of security capabilities. However, they were abandoned or at least left aside due to the increased desire to develop the Union's own military capabilities and to become a relevant partner in insuring world security.

The most important challenge for the European Defence however came once the option of the war in Iraq appeared. In 2003 it was clear that there were different opinions arguing for and against the U.S. led military intervention. In this sense "the Iraq crisis has not only threatened the transatlantic ties but also produced intra-European divisions which have cast doubts over the future CSFP and ESDP of the EU." This turn of events in the international political life drew the attention on the various discussions that had already split the European countries in terms of deciding on common political stands concerning crises in the world.

The constant considerations of aspects such as common foreign policy or European defence has determined member state states to reconsider the traditional disputes related to sovereignty, political control, or the possible relation with NATO and other important actors of the international scene. The impact this evolution had on the member states, as well as on the institution itself is essential to the history of the EU. At the same time however, in order to establish itself as an essential played of the security environment, the European Union, through its ESDP had to take into account the entire array of influences, political and geographical spaces. In this sense, the Mediterranean Partnership, the relation with Russia, the Ukraine and Turkey are essential for the possible positive prospects of the European initiatives.

The ESDP

An important aspect of the conduct of the ESDP in relation to the constraints of the national entities is related to the limited desire of states and the political forces dominant in those states to engage in a political decision process that would suggest even the slightest restriction in the exercise of their sovereign status. Thus, the success of the ESDP implies a process of democratization, more precisely the insurance that decisions are taken in such a manner as to insure the voicing of all opinions. However, "it is not surprising in that democratisation involves the redistribution of influence among actors in every context and thus is bound to generate a degree of resistance and opposition. It would be implausible to suppose that the European Union (EU) should be any different in this respect. In the EU, the prospect of democratisation seems particularly problematic because the main actors threatened by it are precisely those in charge of determining the pace and shape of the Union's institutional change, that is, the governments of the member states." Thus, from this point-of-view, the tensions arising inside the ESPD are justifiable.

On the one hand, there is the issue of France, who is a strong supporter of the ESDP as well as the European Defence Identity. From the time of the Cold War onwards, every president marched on the idea of a distinct European identity from the NATO forces and the decision making process. This was largely because they considered NATO as being an organization clearly dominated by American politics and the boycott the French engaged in the sixties was relevant for their stand. The equipment of the EU with 60,000 military forces following the Helsinki Summit in 1999 can be considered a step in the right direction for the further establishment of a truly powerful European defence.

On the other hand, there is the issue of states such as Great Britain who are widely seen and for the right reason, to be the most important ally of the United States. In this sense, there are indeed matters of concern for the eventual integrated security strategy of the EU given the fact that NATO's presence in Europe and in regard to European affairs and the potential support the organization may insure to its European partners would prove to be dissolute. Thus, the UK especially under the ministry of Tony Blair was relatively reluctant to pledge support full heartily to the European Defence project. The St. Malo Summit which defined the guidelines for the ESDP showed a more consistent British attitude in terms of the ESDP. With that occasion," Blair and Chirac agreed that "the [European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises." The general opinion after the Summit was that in fact the two main countries of the European Union in terms of defence disputes sought different goals by applying the same means. Thus, while France tried to follow on its long desire to create a Defence unit for Europe to counter the influence of NATO, the British wanted to establish a force that, although would have an independent direction, it will be used to complete and not replace NATO in Europe.

However, it is clear for the UK as well as for the British political scene that Europe must have an integrated defence identity. Especially following the Iraqi War and the lack of evidence that would have justified the intervention, it became clear for the opposition and Gordon Brown in particular that the future of the British defence must be forged first and foremost inside the European context. Furthermore, the change of Tony Blair brought along a change in perspective, as well, taking into account the fact that although the new Prime Minister has made visits in the U.S., he takes more into account the relationship between European countries as well.

Also, the position of the new member countries is important in determining the eventual outcome of the distribution of power inside the ESDP. Thus, Poland for instance considers that the size and status it enjoys inside the European Union enables it to have a definite stand on its situation and on the decision making process inside the Union. Due to the sovereignty doctrine, this approach is entitled and this is the reason for which especially in the Iraq war situation it chose to view the decision of the U.S. intervention differently.

Similarly, Germany, as one of the most important promoters of the European Defence process considers the importance of the existence of an united vision on defence and security issues. In this sense, during the German Presidency the initiatives promoted by the country tried "to salvage from the wreckage of the constitution (...) the function of the EU's minister for foreign affairs and of a diplomatic service (External Action Service) to support him/her. The UK, even though it is not interested in a further "Europeanization" of its foreign and defence policy, opposes QMV in the CFSP area and sticks to an inter-governmentalist approach, has been supportive of the idea of an EU Foreign Minister (it insists on a name change to which the German presidency agrees) and of an EU External Action Service (which it opposed initially and then accepted under the responsibility of the EFM through the Council. The UK wants to ensure that the EFM would be only bound by Commission procedures where this did not conflict with his or her Council mandate. It is not willing to let the EFM speak through its permanent seat in the UN Security Council" Therefore, while Germany is opened to discussions in terms of common foreign policy, Great Britain for instance is reluctant to give away part of its sovereign right to decide on matters of national concern.

Effects on European countries

The issue of the ESDP is relatively complex because it entangles not only the member countries but also the neighbouring ones, especially Russia, the Ukraine, or Turkey. Also, the European Union also established through the Barcelona Process a new strategic Partnership with Mediterranean countries in order to increase the cooperation and the safety of the borders and of the sea that splits Europe from Africa. This is why it is important to consider each state in particular and assess the impact the establishment and enlargement of the ESDP has on the political decision making process in these countries.

EU relations with Russia

The relations with the Former Soviet space represented an important pivotal point for the development of foreign relations of the EU. This is largely due to the fact that the European Union, until the end of the Cold War relied heavily on the power and influence of the NATO structure and institutional framework for the import of security. However, the demise of the Soviet Union brought the issues of the URRS, especially the conflict situations, closer to the borders of the EU. Consequently, "Russia and the former Soviet Union were designated as one of main priorities for the Common Foreign and Security Policy by the Lisbon European Council in June 1992." This was in reaction to the fact that Russia was in a political disarray and the European Union could not afford to exclude its Eastern neighbour from a future strategic partnership and vision. Therefore, efforts have been made in order to include the Russian Federation in the group of countries that receive special attention from the EU as "Russia is the only country with which the EU has regular biannual summits, in addition to the more typical annual foreign ministers meetings and ad hoc ministerial meetings."

At the level of the EU-Russian relations there have been increased contacts between the two sides. The political framework also included the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994. On the one hand, the interest of the two parts is visible at the level of the meeting of heads of state, on the other hand at lower levels such as the parliamentary diplomacy conducted between the EU and the Russian Duma. However, the way in which politics is conducted at the level of the EU-Russia partnership is often compared to the level of intensity of the EU's other relations, especially with CSI countries. This is considered to be an important aspect in analysing the relations with Russia because it points out the political perspective that drives forward the process of cooperation with the Eastern bloc. In this sense, "Russia first'- strategy has been criticised by some analysts and CIS diplomats as being based more on old fashioned real politik than a sober assessment of the relative progress of the transition process in Russia and other CIS states and their respective aspirations vis-a-vis the EU. Relations with CIS countries other than Russia are thus seen as a function of policy towards Russia, rather than being developed on their own merit." Thus, there is a certain tension on the way in which the Russian side views enlargement and the future consideration of EU relations in terms of diplomatic contacts with CSI countries and on how the evolution of the situation in the former communist countries is stable, durable, and reliable for the European Union.

The enlargement process was viewed by the Russian Federation as a crucial step not necessarily from the point-of-view of the economic strains ten new members and an additional two put on the communitarian integrated system; it was viewed with increased attention because of the limited space for manoeuvre the Russian Federation would come to have following the enlargement. After 2007, the EU shares a close space with Russia, especially from the perspective of Ukraine's proximity to Romania. This is why, there were several incentives being proposed at different EU-Russia summits that preceded official meetings of the EU. Even so, there are voices that Russia is not yet a democratic partner for dialogue. Thus, "Western media, many Russia scholars, politicians who are not in power and much of the public see President Vladimir Putin moving Russia further away from democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as they are understood in the West. The critics may disagree about whether today's Russia can be described as a "managed democracy," an "authoritarian state," or a "new totalitarian state." But they all agree that the political system President Putin has designed and erected during the past few years no longer has much in common with western democracy. Many of the critics conclude that the European Union and the United States cannot develop a partnership, let alone a "strategic partnership," with Russia, as long as there is such an evident lack of "common values."

Despite these visions on the situation of Russia, it considers a privileged partnership its relation with the EU. In this sense, officials have argues that "the EU develops some of the most intense relations with the Russian Federation and that the framework considered by the European Neighbourhood Policy offers to little space for the development of the bilateral relations." Thus, the incentives for an increased partnership are both from the political level as well as from the strategic ones. The energetic field also plays a major role in the establishment of in-depth relations because of the UE dependency on the Russian energy supplies. This is one of the reasons for which the political incentives are stronger and stronger. At the same time, the strategic implications for an increased partnership revolve around the issues related to the West Balkans or the former Soviet space.

Another important aspect of the cooperation process between Russia and the EU is the establishment of a common security environment based on common values because it is considered that precisely this gap is the main impediment in the further strengthening of the bilateral relations. Thus, the term democracy fails to have the same meaning in both camps and it clear that democratic principles as understood at the level of the European Union are not consistent to the actual situation in Russia, especially from the perspective of the facts that constantly mark the Putin administration.