Non State Actors Threats and Multilateral Responses

Question 1:  Can all non-state actor threats be addressed unilaterally as a non-traditional threat to only one country?  Do some of these non-traditional threats span borders and require international cooperation to counter the threat?  If so, why? What problems might such cooperation bring?
Of course, it is possible for state actors to unilaterally address non-state actor threats. Whether it is advisable for state actors to unilaterally address non-state actor threats is a matter of debate. While it may be tempting to point out the inherent weaknesses in the United Nations policies as an excuse for state actors to use unilateral responses as part of their national security strategies, doing so will have detrimental effects in the long run. The reasons why unilateral action has detrimental long-term effects include undermining the trust needed for efficient and reliable intelligence sharing and resource pooling. Responses to non-state actors need to be intelligent, strategic, and longitudinal rather than the types of knee-jerk and short-term methods that state actors have resorted to in response to terrorism and organized crime.
The United Nations remains one of the most important examples of international organizations designed to encourage and implement multilateral responses to global threats. However, the United Nations was created in a historical era in which the threat of non-state actors was minimal. As non-state actors have increasingly undermined geo-political stability and the predictability of old models of warfare. While the nation-state is still relevant, it is certainly a less relevant geo-political standard than it was fifty years ago. The Charter of the United Nations establishes the ground rules of international warfare, with the primary goal of promoting peace, global stability, and international security (Gorman). According to the Charter of the United Nations, threats to any member state are to be resolved ideally through peaceful means including economic sanctions and international diplomacy. When peaceful measures fail, there are specific protocols in place whereby state actors can use military responses to threats, but those responses must be in keeping with the multilateral principles of the United Nations.
Terrorist acts are considered criminal offences, not military offences, within the provisions of the United Nations Charter (Gorman). As such, acts of terror and perpetrators of terror are deferred to the International Criminal Court at the Hague. The United Nations has yet to update its Charter to reflect the realities of terrorism and non-state actor methods to fund terrorism such as organized crime syndicates. In reaction to these inherent weaknesses, state actors have begun using unilateral means to subvert the United Nations. Using unilateral responses to non-state actors allows the state to temporarily take control and act without the impediments of global consensus and collaboration. Unilateral responses also offer the benefit of being quick and easy to implement, relative to multilateral responses. In some cases, responses to non-state actors are unilateral and yet still involve the collaboration between more than one state actor, as with the case of the United States and Great Britain in the resopnse to September 11. As Sidhu points out, there has been “a greater impetus to develop ad hoc, short-term, unilateral or multilateral responses to addressing the immediate challenges posed by proliferation among non-state actors” (6).
Tempting and alluring as quick, unilateral responses to non-state actors can be, these types of responses are detrimental to international peace, stability, and security for several reasons. For one, violating international treaties and the United Nations Charter is technically illegal, and certainly unethical. In addition to clearly violating the sanctity of international treaties and the tenets of international law, acting unilaterally also undermines the efficacy of international cooperation by undermining trust. Trust building is one of the most important reasons to support and promote multilateralism in international counterterrorism efforts. Multilateral consensus promotes the safety of the global community and undermines the efforts of non-state actors, by enhancing trust because trust promotes information and intelligence sharing, and enables pooled resources. By sharing resources and intelligence, multiple state actors can prevent the proliferation of terrorist cells and the black market businesses—and legitimate businesses—that are being used to support and fund those cells.
In the long run, the cultivation of international coalitions will facilitate a comprehensive strategy for dealing with non-state actors. Sidhu goes so far as to suggest total ban on nuclear weapons, to set an international standard and marginalize states who proliferate. Also, as Sidhu points out, unilateral responses are often reflexive and short-term in scope, leading to “grave danger” of weakening potentially valuable long-term strategic alliances (6). Likewise, Weller states that unilateral responses to non-state actor threats will “undermine, rather than strengthen, the existing structures of international law and organization,” and are therefore “counterproductive” (177).
Another reason why unilateral responses are less beneficial to the goals of international security is that multilateralism is required for global coalitions against other non-state threats from cyber threats to environmental degradation. As Srikanath points out, cyber threats, cyber warfare and cyber espionage make international cooperation even more important because these are non-state threats that demand multilateral responses. The nature of the digital landscape is such that it has no geo-political boundary. The global banking system is similarly vulnerable to non-state actors; unilateral responses to threats to global banking systems are bound to be either ineffective or even dangerous (Srikanath). Similarly, international collaboration enables comprehensive action taken against some of the financial tactics used by non-state actors, primarily via organized crime, human trafficking, and the global trade in weapons, drugs, and other contraband. Multilateral coalitions also enable strategic responses to environmental threats.
Thus, in spite of the potential problems and inconveniences with deferring to international coalitions, multilateralism is the most effective strategy in dealing with non-state actors. Multilateralism builds trust over the long run, enabling shared information, intelligence, and resources. Similarly, multilateralism enhances strategic, creative, and critical responses to problems that do not belong just to one nation, but to the entire global community.

Question 2: What are the most important differences between the Kent and Kendall visions of intelligence?  Why are these differences so important and worth discussing? Which vision might be most applicable today and why?

Kent focuses on the relationship between the producers of intelligence and the consumers of intelligence. Kent valued the role of the scholarly community in generating intelligence, and urged the promotion of academic objectivity via the assurance of institutional independence. In other words, the policy analysis should be conducted without any conflicts of interest and occur behind closed doors while also remaining relevant by responding to specific policy problems that were suggested by the actual stakeholders.
Kendall disagreed with Kent, particularly with regard to the role of academics in policy analysis and intelligence production. According to Kendall, academics were too disconnected with the real world to properly provide policymakers with relevant information. For Kendall, the fundamental purpose of intelligence is to guide national or international policy. As such, policy cannot be divorced from reality and cannot take place in an ivory tower.
Kent recognized the delicate, sensitive, and politically charged relationship between the producers and consumers of intelligence. According to Kent, it was necessary to maintain the relationship between producer and consumer through earnest efforts that highlight mutual interdependence. Kent also understood that policymakers had difficulty trusting the information provided to them, or finding that information fully reliable or applicable to taking action. The function of the intelligence production sector was to provide “expert knowledge of the external world,” (Davis 92). For example, a scholar might offer a comprehensive overview of Sunni-Shia history or other historical and contextual variables. The goal of expert knowledge creation and dissemination was to better inform an evidence-based international policy. For any policy to be evidence-based, the evidence itself has to be reliable and unbiased. Kent was summarily concerned with academic rigor and methodologies, deriving perhaps from his affiliation with established institutes of higher learning like Yale. According to the principles of social science and the ethics of research methodology, scholars would need to operate without any conflict of interest or bias on their part. Kent was also concerned that if policymakers had too much say in intelligence creation, that they would guide the research to make it say what they wanted, in order to support their point of view or their desired plan of action. The same is true for any academic research; institutional independence assures accuracy, validity, reliability, and a lack of bias.
Kendall could not possibly disagree with Kent’s assessment of the importance of sound research ethics and methodologies. However, Kendall was far less cynical about the potential for policymakers to influence intelligence creation. Kendall seemed less interested than Kent in history and context, and far more interested in pragmatism and results. In essence, Kendall decried an overabundance of theory in academic intelligence construction. Davis claims Kendall also believed academics were too preoccupied with “prediction” in their analyses of global affairs (95). For Kendall, the academic or policy analyst should be working in tandem with the policymaker. The consumer of the intelligence should guide the intelligence creation process, as if to custom order policy papers, even if it implied state interference with academic activities and research. Finally, Kendall holds an idealistic vision of the policymaker as promoting the best interests of the state.
The differences between Kent and Kendall are important for several reasons. One, the differences in opinion have a strong bearing on how intelligence is created, and which organizations are given clout and status in the intelligence community. Second, the differences in opinion between Kent and Kendall have direct implications for funding allocations. If, as Kent suggests, independence and separation are necessary, then government funding for academic creation of intelligence would be limited, naturally. Kendall’s approach allows for government investments in academic intelligence analysis. Third, the differences between Kent and Kendall have direct implications for what policies are being studied, and from what theoretical vantage points. Kendall does not completely shun theory, although those who align themselves with Kendall would certainly say that all policy analysis should be purpose-driven and pragmatic. Anything extraneous would be considered a waste of resources and not even qualify as “intelligence.” Finally, the differences between Kent and Kendall have direct implications for foreign policy. Kendall was more outspoken in this regard, but it is certain that policy analysis ultimately is designed to inform public policy and foreign diplomacy.
Both Kent and Kendall make valid points, and much can be learned from their debate. While Kent is correct that independence ensures honesty and prevents conflicts of interest, Kendall is correct that too much separation between the producer and the consumer of intelligence is impractical and counterproductive. Ultimately, strategic intelligence should be guided by a synthesis of Kent and Kendall’s views on the creation and implementation of intelligence. Neither vision is more or less applicable today, although the benefits of institutional independence remain critical—particularly in a liberal democracy. State involvement in intelligence creation comes dangerously close to corruption, a view that, as Davis points out, was in fact held by CIA officials in the 1970s. The independence of strategic intelligence creation remains one of the most critical elements of democracy, akin to media independence from state control.



Bibliography

Davis, Jack. “The Kent-Kendall Debate.” Retrieved online: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol35no2/pdf/v35i2a06p.pdf
Gorman, Fitzalan Crowe. “Non-State Actors, Terrorism and the United Nations: A Critical Analysis through three Case Studies Examining the United Nations’ Effectiveness in Addressing the Threat Imposed by Violent Non-State Actors.” Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2009. Retrieved online: https://theses.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-04202009-185313/unrestricted/Fitzalan_Gorman_Thesis.pdf
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal. “Proliferation, Non-state Actors, and the Impact on Global Security.” Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) Policy Brief No. 19. Dec 6, 2006. Retrieved online: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/92730/Brief-19.pdf
Srikanath, Divya. “Non-Traditional Security Threats.” International Journal of Development and Conflict 4(2014): 60-68.
Weller, Marc. “The changing environment for forcible responses to nontraditional threats.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law). Vol. 92, The Challenge of Non-State Actors (APRIL 1-4, 1998), pp. 177-185