Russia s Special Military Operation in Ukraine

Trump, Biden National Security Strategies, and Russia

Introduction

The U.S. has a National Security Strategy to protect the safety and security of the nation through cooperative efforts and partnerships with other nations and organizations. This strategy provides a comprehensive vision for the use of diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence efforts to protect U.S. interests abroad, deter potential adversaries, respond effectively to threats, and meet alliances and global responsibilities. The National Security Strategy also establishes a framework for evaluating security threats and assessing resources required to counter them.

Typically, U.S. National Security Strategy changes depending on the administration in power (Goddard, 2022). Each president has his own approach to national security policy and thus his own version of the National Security Strategy. Prior to the 2022 strategy released by the Biden Administration, the most recent version was released in 2017 by the Trump administration which focused on reinforcing economic security and a strong international presence. The Biden Administration, however, issued its National Security Strategy at a time when geopolitical tensions were at Cold War level highs, with record sanctions leveled by the West against Russia due to the Russia-Ukraine war. Yet, there are some similarities—and differences—to be found in the strategies put forward by the two administrations.

How do the national security strategies of the Trump and Biden administration compare and contrast in their approach towards Russia? There is much that can be said on this topic. The national security strategy of the Trump administration, for instance, did not prioritize relations with Russia, and instead focused on issues such as counter-terrorism, immigration, and trade. The Trump NSS of 2017 had a distinctly “America First” tenor, as Dhanani and McBrien (2022) have pointed out: “In other words, revitalizing the U.S. economy would take priority over U.S. engagement overseas” in the Trump NSS (Dhanani & McBrien, 2022). The Trump administration imposed economic sanctions on Russia and expelled Russian diplomats in response to Russia\\\\\\\'s interference in the 2016 election and other malicious activities. The Biden administration has stated that it will take a more assertive approach towards Russia, particularly in response to its efforts to interfere in US elections and its aggressive actions towards neighboring countries. The Biden administration has also indicated that it will seek to address issues such as arms control and nonproliferation with Russia, and has called for a global summit on cybersecurity to address the threat posed by Russia and other countries in this domain. However, overall, the two national security strategies of the two administrations view Russia as a threat to security. In the Biden NSS, more focus is given to Russia as a threat actor.

The Trump Administration’s national security strategy, which was released in 2017, focused on four main priorities:

1. Protecting the homeland and American people.

2. Promoting American prosperity.

3. Preserving peace through strength.

4. Advancing American influence.

The Trump administration\\\\\\\'s national security strategy also identified four main adversaries:

1. Rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran.

2. State actors, such as China and Russia.

3. Transnational terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda.

4. Cyber actors, including nation-states and criminal organizations.

To a large degree, the NSS did not change much from Trump to Biden; however, under Biden, Russia did receive more attention. Largely, the Biden Administration\\\\\\\'s National Security Strategy of 2022 focuses on restoring America’s global leadership and advancing US values abroad among democratic allies. The strategy emphasizes the need for collective action to address global challenges such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics. It also acknowledges that due to confrontations between Russia and the West, “we are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order” (Biden Administration, 2022, p. 1). Thus, Biden’s NSS does give more attention to strengthening alliances with NATO allies, partners in the Indo-Pacific region, and other like-minded partners around the world than did the Trump NSS. Other important points highlighted in the strategy include:

1. A commitment to protect democratic values at home and abroad;

2. A focus on economic policies that advance shared prosperity;

3. Investments in advanced technologies to promote security;

4. A pivot towards more sustainable energy sources;

5. De-escalation in the Middle East

6. Guaranteeing a fairer international economic system;

7. Strengthening U.S. homeland security including securing critical infrastructure from cyber threats;

8. Collaboration with other countries to reduce global health disparities; and

9. Ensuring credible deterrents remain in place against possible aggression by state actors or terrorists organizations.

Overall, the Biden administration\\\\\\\'s national security guidance emphasizes the need for multilateral cooperation to address global challenges, while the Trump administration\\\\\\\'s national security strategy focused on protecting American interests and promoting American influence. The Biden administration\\\\\\\'s approach also places a greater emphasis on addressing the threat of disinformation and domestic extremism. When it comes to Russia, however, the two NSS are in alignment.

Analysis

In the Trump NSS, Russia was mentioned 25 times, 11 times in conjunction with China as though the two nations were seen as a dual threat. In comparison, the Interim Biden NSS of 2021 mentioned Russia only five times—but it was also a much shorter document (Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, 2021). In the actual Biden NSS of 2022, finally released months after Russian-Ukrainian hostilities had escalated and the West had responded with sanctions, Russia received mention 77 times—more than three times as frequently as in the Trump NSS. Thus, Biden’s NSS focuses on Russia 3x more than Trump’s NSS and it does so in 20 fewer pages (Trump’s NSS is 68 pages versus Biden’s 48-page document) (Adesnik, 2022). With fewer words, Biden zeroes in on Russia as a major security threat. In fact, the Biden NSS was said to be delayed from 2021 to 2022 as a result of intelligence received on a Russian invasion of Ukraine (Dhanani & McBrien, 2022). It is not surprising, therefore, that the 2022 NSS focuses more explicitly on Russia as a threat to national security, with much consideration given to the Russian-Ukraine war and its knock-on effects.

The Strategic Council on Foreign Relations (2022) has noted that the interim national security document of that Biden released in 2021 essentially focused on dividing NSS into five categories: “the first category of threats are those that do not know the wall and border and confronting them needs a collective effort at global level. Climate crises, cyber and digital threats, international economic problems, humanitarian crises, terrorism and extremism, biological hazards and the spread of epidemics, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are included in this category.” This Interim document, however, merely set the stage for the much more robust and Russia-focused NSS of the following year. The Interim document, in other words, merely provides a sense of the direction that US NSS will take: there is little indication in it of divergence from the Trump era NSS. The 2022 NSS confirms the continuation of Trump era perspectives: Russia is consistently viewed in the Biden NSS as a power competitor opposed to Western democratic values and ideals. As Adesnik (2022) notes, “in their perception of threats, the Trump and Biden strategies converge fully on the pivotal issue of great-power rivalry.” Yet, in terms of how the US will deal with Russia, precise strategies are displaced by generalized principles (Adesnik, 2022). Still, both NSS’s set the tone for US foreign policy with respect to Russia by viewing Russia as a main threat to US power abroad.

Similarities

Recent National Security Strategies from the Trump Administration (2017) and the Biden Administration (2022) both note that Russia is a potential threat to American ambitions and interests. In fact, Adesnik (2022) points out that Biden’s NSS has much more in common with Trump’s NSS than it does with Obama’s. The byline of Adesnik’s (2022) review of the Biden NSS is that the strategy offers “a renewed focus on great-power rivalry [and] ratifies a sea change in U.S. thinking” first delivered under the Trump Administration. The Biden NSS does nothing to depict Russia in the kind of glowing terms offered during the Obama Administration; on the contrary, it echoes the sentiment of Russia as a threat actor as seen in the Trump NSS (Adesnik, 2022). Instead, it highlights and magnifies the danger that is Russia, and proceeds to focus on the need to check the Russian threat (Mackinnon, 2022). Under Trump, US NSS was already oriented towards isolating Russia as an aggressor in global political and economic affairs. Under Biden, following new geopolitical developments, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caused a reorientation of US national security policy toward ‘constraining’ Russia” (Hamilton, 2022). Yet if the main goal of the Trump NSS was to put America first in terms of foreign policy, the main goal of the Biden NSS appears to be “confronting Russia in the near-term while posturing for a long-term competition with China co-exists uneasily with a renewed focus on promoting democracy as a US national security goal” (Hamilton, 2022). In other words, the Biden NSS puts Russia-as-enemy first, whereas the Trump NSS put America-as-greatest-nation first.

Both strategies nonetheless highlight Russian efforts to undermine U.S. democracy, disrespecting and disregarding international laws, as well as Moscow’s use of hybrid warfare capabilities such as cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, energy blackmail, and other means of aggressive behavior. For instance in the Trump NSS, it reads: “A strong and free Europe is of vital importance to the United States. We are bound together by our shared commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” (Trump Administration, 2017, p. 47). It also asserts that “With its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia demonstrated its willingness to violate the sovereignty of states in the region. Russia continues to intimidate its neighbors with threatening behavior, such as nuclear posturing and the forward deployment of offensive capabilities” (Trump Administration, 2017, p. 47). Thus, in this particular sense of adopting a democracy-based focus on European sovereignty, the Trump NSS set the stage for the Biden NSS, which is essentially a continuation of the same perspective on Russia as a threat to democracy. Disinformation and cyber attacks are also listed as threats facing NSS: “Malicious state and non-state actors use cyberattacks for extortion, information warfare, disinformation, and more” (Trump Administration, 2017, p. 47). The Trump Administration gives several priority actions to take, including improving attribution, accountability, and response. This is in line with the Biden NSS as well, which states, “We are responding to the everevolving ways in which authoritarians seek to subvert the global order, notably by weaponizing information to undermine democracies and polarize societies. We are doing so by working with governments, civil society, independent media, and the private sector to prevent credible information from being crowded out, exposing disinformation campaigns, and strengthening the integrity of the media environment - a bedrock of thriving democracies” (Biden Administration, 2022, p. 18). Biden’s NSS emphasizes democratic values, as does Trump’s NSS. Biden’s NSS states in what could easily be viewed as a continuation of the Trump Administration NSS, that “the vast majority of countries want a stable and open rules-based order that respects their sovereignty and territorial integrity, provides a fair means of economic exchange with others and promotes shared prosperity, and enables cooperation on shared challenges” (Biden Administration, 2022, p. 18). Excluded from this “vast majority” is Russia, which is viewed as having “unprovoked aggression against Ukraine” (Biden Administration, 2022, p. 18). Thus, in both NSS documents of the two different Administrations, the same approach or attitude is adopted with respect to Russia: the two Administrations view Russia as outside the rules-based order of nations that respect sovereignty and democracy and thus is a threat to both.

Additionally, while both strategies emphasize a strong stance towards Russia\\\\\\\'s aggression against Ukraine, neither NSS mentions Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 but only the continued occupation of Ukrainian territory. Both strategies also point out the need to beef up security against malicious activities conducted by foreign actors—although in the Trump NSS, Russia is not stated explicitly with regards to cyber security. In the Biden NSS, Russia is linked directly with cyber security risks and threats.

In terms of dealing with Russia, the Trump strategy called for a “peace through strength” approach while the Biden strategy focuses on restoring diplomatic relations with “democratic allies,” thus excluding the possibility for a diplomatic relationship with Russia in terms of national security strategy (Trump Administration, 2017, p. 11; Biden Administration, 2022, p. 48). Both strategies mention diplomacy as an important tool for advancing U.S. interests—just not with respect to Russia. Both NSS documents emphasize the need for working closely with democratic allies against malicious actors and invaders, aggressors, and threat actors—which means that both Administrations put forward an NSS that puts Russia directly in the cross-hairs. Yet it is the Trump NSS and the Biden Interim NSS document that align most closely on how to deal with Russia. Hamilton (2022) explains that “despite the change in administrations, there was more continuity than change in how the 2017 Trump NSS and the 2021 Biden Interim Strategic Guidance approached Russia. Both saw Russia as a disruptive and destabilizing power, but one with which it was important to maintain a dialogue.” The biggest change occurs in the ramping up of rhetoric from the 2021 Interim document and the 2022 NSS: “The new NSS sees Russia as a ‘profoundly dangerous’ state posing ‘an immediate threat to the free and open international system’ and sets the US policy goal as ‘constraining’ Moscow” (Hamilton, 2022). Due to the Russia-Ukraine war, the NSS of the US in 2022 focuses on supporting Ukraine against Russia. Because the war had not started during the Trump era, it is not surprising that the Trump NSS offers less supportive of an approach to Ukraine on this matter of confronting Russia.

Overall, both national security strategies recognize Russia\\\\\\\'s challenges against the United States\\\\\\\' global interests and their approaches are similar. The two focus on the same military threats (including Russia) (Cordesman, 2022). The main differences, which will now be discussed, are in the extent to which Russia is explicitly discussed. In the Trump NSS, Russia is not the main focus. In the Biden NSS, Russia is a main focal point in the foreign policy strategy.

Differences

Compared to the Trump NSS, Hamilton (2022) notes that “the language in the Biden NSS is, unsurprisingly, far more confrontational toward Russia than in other recent US strategies.” Hamilton (2022) goes on to say that “Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shook the US national security establishment in a way no event since 9/11 has. It has ushered in an era of confrontation with Russia with serious efforts to constrain Moscow’s aggressive designs against its neighbors.” While the Trump NSS recognized Russia as a threat, it emphasized building up America as a great power to counter that threat. The Biden NSS emphasizes Russia as a threat to a much greater degree and emphasizes building up alliances around the world to counter the Russian threat. That is the main difference.

The Biden Administration views Russia as a great threat to US national security due to its aggressive foreign policy and increasingly belligerent actions in Europe, the Middle East and beyond. These include Russian military campaigns in Ukraine, Syrian and Georgia, cyberattacks on US and allied networks, interference in democratic elections in the US and other nations, and support for a variety of authoritarian regimes across the world. The Biden administration\\\\\\\'s National Security Strategy seeks to counter these activities and protect US interests through diplomatic and economic pressure, increased collaboration with allies and partners, and other measures designed to contain Moscow\\\\\\\'s influence.

For example, the Biden NSS goes to great lengths to note all the ways the US will counter Russia’s influence in various parts of the world: “As we support Ukraine, we will also work to enhance the stability and resilience of other democracies. We will support the European aspirations of Georgia and Moldova and their commitment to important institutional reforms. We will assist partners in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and economic development in the Western Balkans. We will back diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict in the South Caucasus. We will continue to engage with Turkey to reinforce its strategic, political, economic, and institutional ties to the West. We will work with allies and partners to manage the refugee crisis created by Russia’s war in Ukraine” (Biden Administration, 2022, p. 39). On the other hand, in the Trump NSS, the rhetoric is dialed back significantly: there is no strident assertion of global action; rather there is merely a statement of fact: “With its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia demonstrated its willingness to violate the sovereignty of states in the region. Russia continues to intimidate its neighbors with threatening behavior, such as nuclear posturing and the forward deployment of offensive capabilities” (Trump Administration, 2017, p. 47). In the Trump NSS, the topic then shifts to China, before concluding that “the United States is safer when Europe is prosperous and stable, and can help defend our shared interests and ideals” (Trump Administration, 2017, p. 48). The Trump NSS then calls for a stronger, freer NATO. The Biden NSS goes a step further in pledging to work with “the C5+1 diplomatic platform (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the United States)” and the G7 (Biden Administration, 2022, p. 39).

The Biden Administration begins its approach to the issue of Russia in the NSS of 2022 by stating, “Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown” (p. 8). In the Trump Administration’s (2017) NSS, Russia is not a topic that is broached alone: Russia is first mentioned alongside China, and lumped in with China as two states that represent a challenge to “American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity” (p. 2). The Biden NSS takes special care to delineate Russia from China, in an attempt to isolate Russia even more than is apparent in the Trump NSS. The Biden NSS views China and Russia as two separate threats, whereas in the Trump NSS they are perceived as mainly one threat.

Yet, because the Biden NSS is comparably brief when analyzed alongside the Trump NSS, one of the main criticisms of its text is that it is too general: Cordesman (2022) points out that “it does not go beyond stating broad goals, and stating how existing policy level initiatives can be strengthened to help achieve them. It does not advance detailed plans, programs, or indications of what new resources will be required. It rarely provides even the most general net assessments of key issues, or details as to what implementation plans exist—as distinguished from stating goals for existing initiatives.” Cordesman (2022) states of the Biden NSS that it contains all the same defects as the Trump NSS, too—almost as though it were simply a more aggressive and condensed version of the Trump NSS with respect to Russia: “In broad terms, it still has all too many of the defects in the Trump national strategy; it may identify China and Russia as the major threats, but it does not assess their current civil and military capabilities, and ongoing force developments. It does not compare their rates of civil and military change with the rates in the U.S. and its major strategic partners. It tacitly assumes most current U.S. plans and budgets are adequate and that the cooperative efforts with America’s strategic partners will achieve the level of common effectiveness and interoperability necessary to compensate for years of force cuts and underinvestment in every aspect of the military capability of most NATO countries.” Where the Biden NSS succeeds—like the Trump NSS—is in terms of rhetoric: it makes clear what the US aims to achieve; it simply fails to show how the US will in reality achieve it. Cordesman (2022) explains that the Biden NSS “provides a well-crafted statement of U.S. goals, but like so many other U.S. strategy documents, it has little substance in either measuring the scale of the challenges the U.S. must address, or going beyond setting broad global goals to describing any tangible path towards a credible future.” It is, in other words, a document desired more for posturing and political purposes than for practical implementation.

Wechsler (2022) and Skaluba (2022) both referred to Biden’s NSS as a strategy without strategy—just as Cordesman (2022) argued. Like the Trump NSS, the Biden NSS is laden with talking points rather than with actual strategy—but this is not surprising: the document is meant for public consumption, and it would not be strategic to give away strategy in the open public where enemies could see it. Therefore, it makes sense that the Biden NSS follows in the footsteps of the Trump NSS in terms of issuing strategy as talking points. For instance, the Trump NSS states that “the contest over information accelerates these political, economic, and military competitions. Data, like energy, will shape U.S. economic prosperity and our future strategic position in the world. The ability to harness the power of data is fundamental to the continuing growth of America’s economy, prevailing against hostile ideologies, and building and deploying the most effective military in the world” (Trump Administration, 2017, p. 3). The Biden NSS elaborates on the Trump talking point, stating that “we are responding to the ever evolving ways in which authoritarians seek to subvert the global order, notably by weaponizing information to undermine democracies and polarize societies. We are doing so by working with governments, civil society, independent media, and the private sector to prevent credible information from being crowded out, exposing disinformation campaigns, and strengthening the integrity of the media environment - a bedrock of thriving democracies” (Biden Administration, 2022, p. 17-8). The Biden NSS backs each strategic talking point with a reference to working with allies, with the goal being to build a more “inclusive world”—but one in which Russia will have no part to play (Biden Administration, 2022, p. 18).