United Nations Security Council structure and function

UN Security Council

Proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations is inarguably one of the greatest menaces threatening international peace and security today.[footnoteRef:1] Since the turn of the century, this sentiment has grown in strength across the world, and as a countermeasure to this threat, in 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1540 to combat the dangerous nexus between the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution mandates that all member states criminalizes and put into place a national enforcement system to deter and punish proliferation activities. Additionally, provisions under Resolution 1540 entail physical safety and security measures, as well as the adoption of border and export controls to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit trafficking. [1: During the 2010 Washington, DC Nuclear Security Summit, the United States President Barack Obama stated that "it is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security -- to our collective security." The White House, "Remarks by the President at the Opening Plenary Session of the Nuclear Security Summit," Office of the Press Secretary, April 13, 2010. Upon submission of this thesis to the Georgetown Graduate School, a version of this thesis will be published by the Stimson Center.]

Implementing Resolution 1540 is a long-term goal that poses significant challenges to all states because of the time and resources necessary to fully comply with the Resolution. In seeking to increase the level of 1540 implementation, a concept that has gained traction in recent years is the role played by regional organizations in assisting states to implement Resolution 1540. Regional organizations are important pieces of the 1540 implementation puzzle, and this research paper is aimed at exploring the how can regional organization can be used to assist their memberships with that task.

Structure and Responsibilities of UN Security Council

The United Nations Security Council has basic function and responsibility as described in the Charter, to maintain international peace and security. The institution is planned in a way that which helps it to be able to function constantly. By law, representative of all it members must be present full time at United Nations Headquarters. The first summit meeting was held on 31 January 1992, at Headquarters. 13 head states out of its 15 members and 2 foreign ministers of member states attended this meeting. The council can also meet elsewhere that at Headquarters. [footnoteRef:2] [2: Information from United Nations' website http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html]

When some states bring a complaint regarding a threat to peace before it, the Council's advises and suggest the parties to make agreement by peaceful means. If necessary, the Council itself carries out inquiry and arbitration. It may employ special legislative bodies or ask for the Secretary-General to appoint represent or use his good offices. It can also propose principles for a passive resolution.

In case of a dispute is not resolved through peaceful means and leads to fighting, the Council's first apprehension is to quit it as soon as possible. On several instances, the Council has issued cease-fire directives to avoid wider warfare. It also sends United Nations peace-keeping forces to assist reducing tensions. The Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action.

The member state against which Security Council takes preventive or enforcement action may be poised from the use membership privileges and civil liberties conferred by the General Assembly on the reference of the Security Council. Then, if a member state continuously violates principles of the Charter can be barred from the United Nations by the Assembly on the Council's recommendation.

States can participate in discussion without having council membership. The Presidency of the Council revolves on monthly basis and president is selected according to the English alphabetical listing of its member States.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540[footnoteRef:3] [3: This section draws from the following articles written by the author: "The Slippery Slope of Rational Inaction: Resolution 1540 and the Tragedy of the Commons," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 2008, pp. 373 -- 380; "Beyond UNSCR 1540: the Forging of a WMD Terrorism Treaty," CNS Feature Story, October 2008; "UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Historical analysis, current status of implementation, and a look to the future," CISTEC Journal, no. 126, 2010 (with Lawrence Scheinman).]

Resolution 1540 aims to prevent non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, from gaining access to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as means of their delivery, such as missiles. The measure was adopted under Article VII of the UN Charter, which means that implementing it is binding on all UN member states. Specifically, Resolution 1540 requires all countries to "refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery."[footnoteRef:4] It also calls on countries to establish a domestic judicial and law enforcement system appropriate to criminalize and punish terrorists who "manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use," WMD, missiles to deliver these weapons, and related materials.[footnoteRef:5] Additionally, under the terms of Resolution 1540, UN member states shall account for and maintain security for all WMD, delivery systems and related materials, on their territories as well as to put into place border and export controls to prevent them from being transferred through or stored on the national territory.[footnoteRef:6] In short, Resolution 1540 has become an important component of the international nonproliferation regime, and its intent is to prevent the spread and use of WMD by a terrorist organization. [4: Security Council, UN document S/RES/1540, Operative Paragraph 1, 28 April 2006.] [5: Security Council, UN document S/RES/1540, Operative Paragraph 2, 28 April 2006.] [6: Security Council, UN document S/RES/1540, Operative Paragraph 3, 28 April 2006]

Recognizing that complying with all of Resolution 1540's provisions requires a major time and resource commitment from states in the developing part of the world, the measure calls on able states to support others' implementation efforts, including with financial, technical or human capacity and support. With regard to states failing to implement the resolution, as 1540 was adopted as a Chapter VII measure the UN Security Council can take punitive action against non-complying states. However, because of the general nature of Resolution 1540's language -- for example, it notes that states should take "appropriate" and "effective" measures to implement 1540's measures, but does not specify what that means -- full compliance, or noncompliance, are terms up for interpretation. Also, much of the work under Resolution 1540 is a constant work in progress as updates to, for instance the judicial system of any state, is a constant work in progress. One can therefore argue that no state will ever be in full compliance of 1540 and as such it is unlikely that the UN Security Council will ever consider singling out one or a group of state to punish them for not implementing Resolution 1540. Also, one 1540 expert has noted that the UN measure should not be considered a burden, but a "vision" for how to strategically plan for taking steps to implement the Resolution.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Remarks by Richard Cupitt, UN 1540 Committee Expert, at the 10th International Export Control Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, 25-27 June, 2010.]

Trigger events and precedents for Resolution 1540

The terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001 brought the perils of non-state actors to the forefront of the international security debate. The events on September 11 were catalysts for the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which obligates the international community to take measures to halt or disrupt funding to terrorist groups worldwide.[footnoteRef:8] Subsequently, the terrorist attacks against the American homeland also increased the focus on the threat that non-state actors were actively seeking chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, or radiological materials for a so called "dirty bomb," and highlighted the dangerous nexus between WMD and terrorism. Resolutions 1373 and 1540 both passed unanimously and set the precedent of being the only UN Security Council Resolutions that were not made in response to a specific phenomenon and do not target a specific country; instead Resolution 1373 and 1540 hone in on the general threat posed by terrorism and non-state actors acquiring WMD respectively. [8: Security Council, UN document S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001]

Revelations that A.Q. Khan, former head of Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, had successfully headed a nuclear black market by exploiting weak links in the global security chain was also an incentive to seek additional measures to combat the WMD terrorism threat. Peter Crail, a nuclear analyst with the Arms Control Association, noted in 2007 that the illicit network verified that non-state groups "may be the recipients as well as the suppliers of [WMD] and technologies [and that the] traditional international WMD nonproliferation regime was not formed to address these types of proliferation considerations…"[footnoteRef:9] This was dangerously coupled with the absence of measures to combat WMD proliferation to non-state actors.[footnoteRef:10] [9: Peter Crail, "Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach," The Nonproliferation Review, vol 15, no. 13, July 2006, p. 355.] [10: Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Cooperative Monitoring Center-Amman Occasional Paper, February 2008, p. 3.]

Simultaneously, in the years leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1540, the United States was in a hurry to put on the books a measure that obligated the entire international community to take steps to shut down or disrupt terrorist networks seeking WMD. More specifically, the George W. Bush Administration did not believe that the time-consuming process of negotiating a multilateral treaty was an appropriate path, considering the urgency of generating a WMD terrorism nonproliferation tool. In fact, the United States mirrored Resolution 1540 after the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was an all-voluntary measure guarding against the high seas being used as WMD trafficking routes. In sum, there were many events that triggered the passage of Resolution 1540, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing advanced consciousness of the threat posed by WMD terrorism, revelations about the A.Q. Khan network and the need for effective WMD terrorism security measures, and the Bush Administration's rejection of the multilateral treaty route

Early implementation challenges and current 1540 compliance rates

During the consultation process prior to 1540s adoption and immediately following the passage of the measure, numerous states questioned the legitimacy of the measure. The Non-Aligned Movement, but also countries such as New Zealand, Switzerland and the Republic of Korea, objected to their limited opportunity to impact 1540 negotiations and also that the Resolution was passed pursuant to Chapter VII under the UN Charter, making 1540 implementation an obligatory exercise for all states under international law.[footnoteRef:11] Egypt, Pakistan and South Africa were among over a dozen states that believed that in adopting Resolution 1540, the UN's executive body, the Security Council, had effectively overtaken the legislative powers of the General Assembly and other multilateral negotiating bodies.[footnoteRef:12]The inarguably heavy emphasis on nonproliferation compared to disarmament also frustrated many non-nuclear weapons countries, among them Germany, Canada and Norway.[footnoteRef:13] [11: During Security Council meetings, including UN Security Council 4950 Meeting on April 22, 2004, UN Security Council 4956 Meeting on April 28, 2004, UN Security Council 5106 Meeting on December 22, 2004, UN Security Council 5375 Meeting on February 21, 2006, UN Security Council 5886 Meeting on May 6, 2008, and in their reports to the 1540 Committee, the following states raised concerns with Resolution 1540 not being negotiated in a multilateral forum or called for such negotiations: Algeria, Chile, Benin, Peru, New Zealand, India, Singapore, Switzerland, Cuba, Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, peaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Republic of Korea, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Nigeria, Namibia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Brazil, and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.] [12: For example, the following states raised concerns about the UN Security Council's role as a legislator compared to an enforcer as is the case with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention: Pakistan, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt, Mexico, Lichtenstein, Nepal, Namibia, Brazil, and South Africa.] [13: States concerned with the imbalance between nonproliferation and disarmament included Namibia, Germany, Canada, Peru, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Switzerland, Cuba, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Syrian Arab Republic, Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Mexico, Norway, Kazakhstan, Austria, Lichtenstein, Nigeria, Namibia, Kuwait, Thailand, Chile, Algeria, and Brazil.]

Another, less political, initial speed bump for the implementation of Resolution 1540 was the ambiguous resolution language, making it difficult for states to actually understand what was expected of them. The Resolution, as noted above, in several places calls on countries to take "effective and appropriate measures" with regard to, for example, border and export controls, but provides no further explanation.

Today, however, several indicators point out that early legitimacy questions have been assuaged. First and foremost, in December 2009, then-1540 Committee Chairman, Ambassador Jorge Urbina, said "that the questions that were initially posed regarding the legitimacy of the resolution seem to have disappeared, as have the initial doubts on the need for the Committee. This represents a concrete achievement by the Committee and the Group of Experts that supports it."[footnoteRef:14] In line with that pronouncement, one no longer hears countries challenging the legal mandate of Resolution 1540 or complaining about the skewed balance between nonproliferation and disarmament. Indeed, the UN Security Council, with a new set of member states, has twice extended the 1540 Committee.[footnoteRef:15] Its current mandate runs through April 2011, at which point it is expected to be extended for an unknown number of years, perhaps even indefinitely. States and regional organizations have also publicly endorsed the implementation of the Resolution and in the latter case called upon member states to take all steps necessary to implement 1540.[footnoteRef:16] [14: Briefing by Ambassador Jorge Urbina, Chairman of the Committee Established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), 14 December, 2009] [15: The adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008) extended the 1540 Committee's work for two and three years respectively.] [16: Organization of American States, "AG/RES. 2333 (XXXVII-O/07) Support for Implementation at the Hemispheric Level of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)," adopted at the fourth plenary session (June 5, 2007); ASEAN Regional Forum, "Statement Supporting National Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540," Statement at Manila, Philippines (August 2, 2007); Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Decision No. 10/06 Supporting National Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)," Fourteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council (December 5, 2006).]

Turning to current levels of implementation, in 2004, the UN Security Council, when passing Resolution 1540, also established a Committee, the 1540 Committee, consisting of all Security Council states and a Group of Experts charged with monitoring 1540 compliance among UN member states. As a first implementation measure, countries were obligated to submit a report to the 1540 Committee six months after the Resolution's passage on "steps [countries] have taken or intend to take to implement [1540]." To date, over 160 states, or some 80% of UN member states, have submitted that report.[footnoteRef:17] Non-reporting countries are all located in the Global South, and while all Middle Eastern states have fulfilled this aspect of the implementation process, most reports are inadequate insofar as length and depth goes. For example, one state simply submitted a one page statement to the 1540 Committee saying that the country "does not possess nuclear, biological or chemical weapons."[footnoteRef:18] By contrast, countries that have more resources to devote to Resolution 1540 implementation activities, such as the U.S. And Germany, submitted elaborate reports that provided detailed descriptions on, inter alia, interagency implementation coordination efforts, future plans of action, and next steps to be taken to comply with the UN measure.[footnoteRef:19] [17: UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee website, , accessed on August 31, 2010.] [18: Security Council, Note verbale dated 29 December 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, UN Document S/AC.44/2004/(02)/97, 6 January 2005.] [19: Security Council, Letter dated 12 October 2004 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, UN document S/AC.44/2004/(02)/5, 14 October 2004; Security Council, Note verbale dated 26 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, UN document S/AC.44/2004/(02)/20, 2 November 2004.]

To a large extent, poor reporting on 1540 implementation by developing countries indicates, more than anything, how difficult and expensive the task of complying with Resolution 1540 can be. This is particularly true for governments that have other legitimate priorities that more directly threaten the quality of life for their populations. For example, extreme poverty, public health challenges such as widespread HIV-/AIDS epidemics, domestic instability, and drug, human and small arms and light weapons trafficking are often more pressing security issues in the developing world.. As noted by Brian Finlay in a 2010 report on implementing Resolution 1540 in Central America:

"Yet while few can question the disastrous consequences of a WMD terrorist incident, in the face of the daily threats to citizen safety and security -- both economic and physical -- in Central America and much of the Global South, such pronouncements are not only inaccurate, they are prima facie unreasonable. Requiring resource-strapped governments to divert attention from more immediate challenges to the seemingly distant threat of WMD terrorism is a proliferation prevention strategy that is destined to fail -- if not from a lack of political will then from a sheer lack of implementation capacity in these countries." [footnoteRef:20] [20: Finlay, pp. 5-6.]

As a result of competing priorities and finite time and resources that can be committed to countering the WMD terrorism threat, implementing Resolution 1540 is in many cases an afterthought in the Global South.

There is no exact science in assessing to what degree states have implemented Resolution 1540. The 1540 Committee experts are charged with analyzing and determining the level of compliance and use a 1540 matrix to log states' self-reported achievements. A general overview of the reports and some matrices that are not made available to the general public indicate that some states have addressed numerous Resolution 1540 measures, while most countries are in compliance with only a limited number of the steps called for in the resolution.[footnoteRef:21] However, one committee expert has noted that the 1540 Committee had seen a significant increase in implementation efforts in recent years, indicating that Resolution 1540 implementation is gaining traction. That states today pay more attention to Resolution 1540 is also the result of extensive worldwide awareness-raising programs and outreach events held and sponsored by developed countries governments, regional and international organizations. Requests for assistance to implement the Resolution have also trickled in to the 1540 Committee. It should be noted that even though many of the early 1540 implementation challenges have been addressed, lack of capacity and resources remain crucial obstacle to complying with Resolution 1540. [21: Remarks by Cupitt, Istanbul, Turkey, June 25-27, 2010.]

Ongoing efforts to assuage implementation challenges

Self-finance and bilateral assistance are two avenues for states to pursue in seeking greater Resolution 1540 implementation. Outreach and awareness-raising seminars and workshops organized by UN bodies are also ongoing. For example, in late 2009, Egypt hosted a 1540 implementation workshop in Cairo, which was attended by over a dozen African states.[footnoteRef:22] Another African seminar took place in Kenya in February 2010 emphasizing, inter alia, the importance of in-region sharing of knowledge from Resolution 1540 implementation experiences and capacity-building, principally in the biosecurity area.[footnoteRef:23] Similar workshops, focusing on various aspects of Resolution 1540, have in recent years been organized in Brazil, Qatar, Vanuatu, Costa Rica and Vietnam in order to target their respective regions or sub-regions.[footnoteRef:24] [22: The Egypt workshop was held from December 7-10, 2009 with financial support from the European Union and the Governments of Norway and the United States. Officials from the Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda, as well as representatives from a number of international, regional and sub-regional organizations, were invited to participate.] [23: The Kenya workshop was held in Nairobi between February 2-4, 2010 and was attended by government officials from Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda.] [24: The Workshop on Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia was held on September 28, 2010 in Hanoi, Vietnam. It was organized by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and was funded by the EU and governments of Norway and the U.S.]

Besides states, regional workshops are often attended by representatives of international organizations with specialized knowledge in subject matters connected to the issue at hand. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons can assist states with technical and human capacity in regards to their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention nonproliferation treaties intrinsically linked to the implementation of Resolution 1540. Other multilateral arrangements, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are helping their states implement 1540. Moreover, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre in the United Kingdom, the Center for International Trade and Security, the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Stimson Center in the United States are just a few nongovernmental organizations that work with individual states or groups of states to, for example, provide legal and scientific expertise and train customs, border, and export control officials on the ground. An additional source of assistance is regional organizations, which have proven to play an important role in implementing Resolution 1540 among their member states. To provide context and explain these bodies' current and potential future successes in the Middle East and North Africa, the following section will discuss the historical foundation of these groups, their place in the international system, and how regional organizations evolved throughout the Cold War. Then, the relatively recent emergence of the regional-global security mechanism will be examined, and ultimately, their role in connection to Resolution 1540.

Regionalism as an international security paradigm

Regional organizations are groups composed of geographically proximate nations sharing various characteristics and values that tie the states together. Compared to ad hoc collaborations between two or more states, regional organizations have, among other things, founding documents, formalized organizational structures, including budgetary means and staff, permanent headquarters or rotating chairmanships, annual summits, and/or lower level meetings throughout the year. Regional organizations can possess varying degrees of advanced bureaucracies to adopt binding resolution and implement decisions made by the member states. Regional and subregional organizations can focus exclusively on one set of issues, like economic cooperation, or include cooperation on a range of regional and international matters. They often will also have overlapping memberships.

By continent, examples of regional and subregional organizations across the globe include: in Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; in Europe, the European Union; in Africa, the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community; in the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); and in Australia, the Pacific Island Forum. One prominent scholar in the field, Muthiah Alagappa, an expert on international politics, describes the assets, roles and strategies of regional institutions in the following manner:

"In theory, regionalism should facilitate communications and socialization, information sharing, ncrease in consensual knowledge, and growth in power through the pooling of resources and collective action. Based on these assets, regional institutions should be able to avail themselves of one or more of the following interconnected strategies: norm-setting, assurance, community building, deterrence, non-intervention, isolation, intermediation, enforcement and internationalization. Norms can define identities of states as well as regulate their behavior. Through norm-setting, regional institutions can influence the collective expectations and the internal and international behavior of member states in the political, economic and security arenas" [footnoteRef:25] [25: Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional institutions, the UN and international security: a framework for analysis," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997, p. 427. The ideas featured in quoted section was also prominent in Alagappa, "Regionalism and conflict management: a framework for analysis," Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1995, pp. 5-7.]

The role assigned to regional organizations in the UN Charter

Regional organizations' formal role in maintaining international peace and security is only vaguely defined in the UN Charter, and there is no language that details the mechanisms of interaction with the UN Security Council.[footnoteRef:26] Article 53 in Chapter VIII of the Charter reads that regional organizations "shall, where appropriate, utilize…regional arrangements…for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council…"[footnoteRef:27] The rather undefined position assigned to regional organizations in maintaining peace and security is largely because, according to Tania Felizio at the UN University, "the notion of regionalism was still in its infancy" at the time when the Charter was drafted in the mid 1940s[footnoteRef:28] Alagappa provides an additional reason for the relatively weak role assigned to regional organizations in the UN's founding document, writing that during the organization's formative years, regional organizations "were seen as competing with and detrimental to the universal approach embodied in the UN."[footnoteRef:29] [26: Tania Felicio and Nikki Slocum, "The Role of Regional Integration in the Promotion of Peace and Security," United Nations University -- Comparative Regional Integration Studies Occasional Papers, 2006, p. 10] [27: Charter of the United Nations, chp. VIII, art. 52.] [28: Tania Felicio, "Managing Security as a Regional Public Good: A Regional-Global Mechanism for Security," United Nations University -- Comparative Regional Integration Studies Occasional Papers, 2005, p. 8.] [29: Alagappa (1997), p. 422.]

The argument that "the UN and regional organizations should play complementary roles in facing the challenges of international peace and security," has taken root among academics, policy-makers and practitioners, who refer to this dynamic as the "regionalglobal security mechanism."[footnoteRef:30]This is, for example, evident by the numerous UN and Security Council meetings with representatives from regional bodies which have taken place since the end of the Cold War.[footnoteRef:31] Also, UN Secretary Generals Boutros- Ghali and Kofi Annan both stressed the importance of strengthening regional organizations during their tenures. Perhaps the strongest endorsement came from the latter when writing in 2006 that the UN "is not equipped to handle every crisis in the world on its own. It is acknowledged that a partnership between the United Nations and regional and other intergovernmental organizations should be developed if peace and security are to be maintained."[footnoteRef:32] Upon taking office, current Secretary General Ban Kimoon said that the UN "partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations are stronger and more active than ever [and that]…[t]he United Nations is committed to helping build up the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations…"[footnoteRef:33] Inarguably, despite the vague role assigned to regional organizations in the UN charter, these bodies have over time evolved, and today they are recognized in all quarters of the world as important players in the international system. [30: Felicio, p. 12.] [31: Between 1994 and 2007 the UN Secretary-General convened seven meetings between the UN and Regional organizations to explore the potential for broader and deeper cooperation. The UN Security Council has also invited regional organizations to meetings six times since 2003.] [32: Kofi Annan, "A regional -- global security partnership: challenges and opportunities, report of the Secretary-General, United Nations (2006).] [33: Fawcett, p. 3; UN Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council debate on the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security New York, 6 November 2007.]