NSC-68 represented a departure point for what would be the political attitude towards the communist phenomenon during the Cold War. While pointing out the imminence of the threat the U.S.S.R. posed, by describing its political structures in terms completely opposed to the U.S. system of politics, the secret document also presented four various courses of action possible in the confrontation with the U.S.S.R. These were the "continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies; isolation; war; a more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world" (NSC-68, 1950).
While the first options were argued and dismissed, the last one represented in the view of the document "the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop" (NSC-68, 1950). Gaddis argues in respect to the actual implications of the NSC-68 that it was in fact a strategy plan. He views the initiative as "to suggest a way to increase defense expenditures without war, without long-term budget deficits, and without crushing tax burdens" (1982, 93). Although the president resisted the initial proposal, due to the fact that it implied an enormous increase in the defense budget, the Korean War proved to be the perfect situation to demonstrate the possible intentions of the U.S.S.R. In terms of spreading communism.
The Russian support for the North Korean invasion of the South of the peninsula drew the attention...
From this point-of-view, while in the beginning president Truman was reluctant to endorse the proposal due to the possible budgetary strains such an act would create, following the unfolding events in the Korean peninsula, Truman decided to get involved in the war by supervising the withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38 Parallel, thus making a clear statement of the position of the American diplomacy in relation to the communist threat.
The Korean War proved essential for the start of the Cold War because it marked the emergence of a monolithic communist bloc, formed by the Russians, the Chinese, and the North Koreans. At the same time, the NSC-68 proved to be essential in pointing out the way in which the U.S. can actually deal with the communist threat and represented a practical expression of the political strategy of containment. The increase in military expenditure also gave the start to the arms race, an important element of the overall conduct of the Cold War.
Trump, Biden National Security Strategies, and RussiaIntroductionThe U.S. has a National Security Strategy to protect the safety and security of the nation through cooperative efforts and partnerships with other nations and organizations. This strategy provides a comprehensive vision for the use of diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence efforts to protect U.S. interests abroad, deter potential adversaries, respond effectively to threats, and meet alliances and global responsibilities. The National Security Strategy
S.S.R., which would ostensibly eliminate the threat posed by the U.S.S.R.'s capabilities. The report takes on a tone almost encouraging that to happen. It was very much the public mood of the time that would have supported that initiative. That the world came so close to the use of nuclear confrontation during the Cuban Missile Crisis is indicative of this, and it was only the ability of JFK to resist
China and the Korean War The fall of China to Communism in 1949 came about because of many different reasons. One, Mao Zedong was popular with the people, and this helped him overpower Jiang Jieshi and his government. Mao also had territory and Japanese military items left over from World War II, which Jiang did not. Mao had more military might, and he was simply more popular than Jiang with the
" (19:481) in order to wield the power of the opaque concept of 'national security' in foreign policy, the executers must use a careful construct of realities and perceptions that hang between an actual danger and a perceived threat. (9:144) Taking into account the internal roots of an external problem, to have heft in the weight of international opinion, alliances are key to public diplomacy. The first Golf War reflected a
As a matter of fact, by the end of 1980s, Soviet Union ran on these very principles. Kennan criticized the possibilities that Soviets may be involved in invading the pro-Soviet countries with their mind sets and weaken them even if they do not form a higher level of apprehension for them. Pro-Russian countries will be weakened through a designed framework to tackle the mindsets of the people following western ideologies. Fights will be
More often than not, the plan of containment has been used to describe U.S. foreign policy. It is equally frequently traced back to the achievements of President Truman with regard to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1950, there was a shift in foreign U.S. policy after President Truman moved from passive to active containment by signing the top-secret policy plan NSC-68. It took a much