Nsc-68 Document Influence the U.S.A.\'s

¶ … NSC-68 document influence the U.S.A.'s policy of containment, especially its involment in the Korean War? Do you feel that the U.S.A. was successful in achieving its goals?

The end of the Second World War represented a turning point in the contemporary history of the world. It marked not only the defeat of a fierce enemy, Nazi Germany, or the first use of the most destructive weapons known to mankind, the atomic bomb, but also the emergence of a tacit conflict between two systems of power, two ideologies and two completely opposed views on the future of the world, the U.S. And the U.S.S.R. The confrontations that took place along the decades represented occasions for the two sides to interpose their military, political, and economic capabilities and exercise their influence. The Korean War was one of the first occasions for the two sides to interact, following the end of the war. However, the historical developments in the U.S. gave this confrontation a deeper meaning and the American reaction to the war was in fact a political statement to its adversary, the U.S.S.R.

The immediate period after the war represented a time of confusing decisions that had to be taken at the level of the American officials (Kissinger, 1995). There was a general sense of disorientation among the leaders of all the parties involved. From the U.S. side the issue of choosing between a universal nature of the U.S. And the conduct of this cold war was increasingly worrisome because of Stalin's eagerness to take full control over the European continent. As Joseph Nye suggests, the Cold War represented a challenge for the conduct of international affairs due to the fact that it was a time of constant tensions which did not resulted in an actual war between rival states (2005). Nonetheless, there were periods in which the growing tensions often jeopardized the sensible equilibrium.

From this perspective, an immediate action had to be taken in 1950, especially in the light of the 1949 Berlin Crisis (Calvocoressi, 1987).

In this sense, the containment policy proved to be the solution adopted by most policy leaders. It was connected with the concept of deterrence, which meant forcing an actor not to result to action from the perspective of unwanted and dangerous consequences for its security (Nye, 2005). Nonetheless, the Berlin crisis proved to be an important alarm signal which made the free world consider the gravity of the peril the U.S.S.R. represented for Western democracies. The containment policy was in this sense, a method used to isolate the influence of the Russian threat and at the same time to expand liberal ideas.

The concept of containment, although was not a new one, was made available by George Kennan, the charge d'affairs of the U.S. To Moscow who, after a thorough analysis of the current situation in the U.S.S.R., in one of the most famous document of the Cold War, "the Long Telegram" viewed the Russian state as an inevitable threat facing the security of the democratic systems around the world and considered that a policy of isolation would limit the influence of communism in third countries (Kissinger, 1995). The reaction to such a policy proposal was rather positive and included one of the most controversial documents of the Cold War, the National Security Council Directive no. 68, which, in its presentation, predicted a soviet attack in the following years, as part of a wider plan of global political domination.

NSC-68 represented a departure point for what would be the political attitude towards the communist phenomenon during the Cold War. While pointing out the imminence of the threat the U.S.S.R. posed, by describing its political structures in terms completely opposed to the U.S. system of politics, the secret document also presented four various courses of action possible in the confrontation with the U.S.S.R. These were the "continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies; isolation; war; a more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world" (NSC-68, 1950).

While the first options were argued and dismissed, the last one represented in the view of the document "the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop" (NSC-68, 1950). Gaddis argues in respect to the actual implications of the NSC-68 that it was in fact a strategy plan. He views the initiative as "to suggest a way to increase defense expenditures without war, without long-term budget deficits, and without crushing tax burdens" (1982, 93). Although the president resisted the initial proposal, due to the fact that it implied an enormous increase in the defense budget, the Korean War proved to be the perfect situation to demonstrate the possible intentions of the U.S.S.R. In terms of spreading communism.