McVeigh's military background had already taught him all that he needed to know about weapons and explosives. He merely needed to obtain the proper materials and build a bomb. Some of the materials were bought and others were stolen. Then it was time to assemble the bomb. As CNN (2004) reports, co-conspirator "Fortier told the court that McVeigh had written to him in the fall of 1994, 'telling me him and Terry had decided to take some type of positive action, and he wanted to know if I wanted to help them.' Prosecutors contend Nichols and McVeigh began buying the fertilizer that was used in the Oklahoma City bomb during that period" (p. 1). Many people saw McVeigh assembling the bomb at a nearby lake, but no one reported any suspicious activity. As the Homeland Security Newsletter explains, "McVeigh had pulled his Ryder moving van loaded with 55-gallon drums up to a local lake. No one bothered to report the incident though it probably appeared he was prepared to dump toxins into the lake. As it turns out, he was assembling the explosives." Obviously the people who saw McVeigh at the lake were not really sure what exactly they had witnessed, so they probably did not see any need to report McVeigh's actions to the authorities. However, as the First Observer training model emphasizes, the actions observed do not have to be illegal to be reported, they merely have to be suspicious. Therefore, "if you see something, say something."

Making the Grade

Ultimately, the authorities cannot be blamed for their lack of knowledge prior to the event. Firstly, no one reported any of the suspicious activity that was occurring. Secondly, McVeigh had no previous record or any indication that would target him as a possible terrorist. Thirdly, considering that McVeigh chose the wrong building, even if the authorities had taken notice of the Waco...

Therefore, it is difficult to give the authorities any type of "grade" because although they failed to prevent the attack, there were so many factors beyond their control that it is difficult to blame them. That does not mean, however, that important lessons were not learned.
Summary Report and Conclusion

Although there was little that authorities could have done to prevent the 1995 terrorist attack on the Murrah building, knowledge regarding preventative measures needed for future occurrences have emerged from this tragedy. Firstly, authorities have learned that security personnel, as well as the general public, need to be trained to spot "suspicious activity" and promptly report it. Secondly, the authorities now know that extra security during anniversaries of events such as Waco or the 9-11 terrorist attacks is of paramount importance. Lastly, they learned that you cannot judge a book by its cover. A terrorist is not necessarily of Middle Eastern decent. He can be a white, clean cut man who has dutifully served his country and has a clean record. These lessons are being applied to terrorist prevention activities today, which is ultimately the only positive thing to have come out of the horrific Oklahoma City bombing.