Opium Can Be Described as “Cancer” in Afghanistan

Opium Can Be Described as "a Cancer" In Afghanistan

In 2014, an estimated 224,000 hectares (or between 200,000 and 250,500 hectares) of land in Afghanistan was utilized for cultivation of opium poppy -- a 7% increase from the previous year. Also, as per 2014 estimates, 98% of all opium farms in the country were found in Eastern (9%), Western (22%) and Southern (67%) Afghanistan. Southern Afghanistan's opium farms were concentrated in the provinces of Kandahar, Day Kundi, Zabul, Hilmand, and Uruzgan; Western Afghanistan's farms were concentrated in the provinces of Badghis, Nimroz, Farah, and Hirat; and Eastern Afghanistan's opium farms were concentrated in the provinces of Laghman, Kapisa, Nangarhar, and Kunar. The aforementioned provinces are the most vulnerable, with high to extreme security risk, according to the UNDSS (United Nations Department of Safety and Security). Furthermore, they are also largely inaccessible to non-government organizations and the UN. Day Kundi represents the only Southern province with generally good security, aside from the district of Kejran (UNODC, 2014).

Figure 1. Opium cultivation in Afghanistan, 1994-2014 (Hectares) (Adapted from UNODC, 2014)

Last year's estimates reveal that 183,000 hectares of land were utilized for opium poppy farming. Yearly opium production was projected to be about 3,300 metric tons. A poor harvest caused production to reduce from the 2014 level (6,400 metric tons), which was 17% higher than the quantity produced in 2013 (5,500 tons) (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016). The average yield of opium in 2014 was 28.7 kg/hectare -- an increase by 9% from the 2013 yield of 26.3 kg/hectare. Increased production was chiefly because of increased opium farming and yield. In particular, the 27% growth in yield witnesses in Southern Afghanistan led to an overall production increase. But, just like the past year, unfavorable climatic conditions in some areas of Southern and Western Afghanistan negatively impacted poppy plants, hence decreasing yield compared to the fairly unaffected yield of 2011 (44.5 kg/hectare). For instance, in Southern Afghanistan, a survey of the yield revealed a >39% reduction from the 2011 yield (UNODC, 2014).

In the poppy-rich Southwestern and Southern Afghanistan, there are known links existing between drug traffickers, operating along the Pakistani border and Taliban insurgents. Academic research, U.S. government statements, and media reports frequently mention that the Taliban terror outfit benefits from opium. Nevertheless, scant concrete details are available to lawmakers and members of the common public, regarding the mode of interaction between insurgents and drug dealers, as well as how they benefit from this trade. As long as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces, aid organizations, and civilian officials operating within these areas have no data on this issue (or possess data but haven't analyzed it as yet), they are sadly functioning in relative vacuum. A grasp of how Taliban benefits from this trade in opium can aid in developing strategies for extending governance by weakening the insurgents (Peters, 2009).

The involvement of corrupt Afghan government officials, members of the ANP (Afghan National Police), and different provincial administrations in opium trafficking has been widely suspected, with latest media reports suggesting that there are a few senior officials who are themselves engaged in this illegal business. Many South Afghanistan citizens are of the view that governmental officials earn more profits than insurgents from this illicit trading of drugs. An equally important concern is corruption, as corruption and insurgency perhaps contribute equally to South Afghanistan's continued insecurity, through the generation of a wicked incentive for the corrupt people holding high-ranking official positions, to institute good governance (Peters, 2009). On the whole, in spite of sustained reduction in opium production, largely on account of agronomic and economic factors, opium continues to represent a structuring and structural factor imbedded in every dimension of the nation's society, politics, and economy.

Effects on Economy

A vast majority (i.e. 92%) of global illicit opium production occurs in Afghanistan -- an approximate 800 tons of heroin, nearly two times the reported world-wide demand. Much of opium farming is seen to be concentrated in Helmand and six other Southwest provinces. Helmand alone produces half the nation's overall opium yield (Felbab-Brown, 2009). Its export value is half the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), i.e., roughly 3 billion U.S. dollars. To form a comparison, Colombian cocaine's export value is not even 1% of its GDP, and is still a serious economic and security challenge to Latin American stability. This comparison will help one in understanding the actual scale of Afghanistan's illicit drugs issue. Opium is an immense illicit economy, which sustains the legal ones, by driving a growing building sector as well as generating capital for Afghanistan's rural, informal credit system. In spite of earning a comparatively larger amount than with lawful, acceptable crops, the three million rural poppy cultivators in the country are suffering in dire circumstances of poverty, shackled to the traditional opium credit system. It must be borne in mind that Afghanistan is one among the poorest nations in the world. Citizens' poppy dependency is so great that, in the view of experts from the World Bank, an abrupt decline in poppy economy will lead to economic destruction all over Afghanistan. Beyond this directly-impacted group, which constitutes 15% of the overall population, about the same amount of people are indirectly benefited by opium-related activities and cash (Felbab-Brown, 2009).

Moreover, opium influences the nation's institutions of alternate livelihoods. Right from district to provincial to national organizations, opium-related corruption is omnipresent in Afghanistan, posing a very genuine threat to the creation of fair and functional institutions aimed at serving the common people of Afghanistan, and not just the powerful, greedy players. Press reports state that the country's governmental involvement in opium trafficking is a shocking 70%, with about 25% of its 249-strong Parliament involved directly or indirectly in this illicit trade. Police officers are also apparently a part of this trade, and play the roles of facilitator, consumer, and protector. A British report claims that nearly 60% of Helmand's police force relies on heroin or opium or both (Mansfield, 2008; Azami, 2013). Another factor to consider in this regard is poppy politics -- intense competition exists between local parties for opium industry share. Different areas' power-holders, which include members of local police forces and governmental institutions, manipulate opium eradication operations to serve their personal motives, including securing international funds and forcing bribes from the area's farmers. Lastly, opium generates fresh funds for South Afghanistan's Taliban insurgency; it is reported that 10% usher or tax is levied on smuggling and cultivation of opium. Perhaps more notably, by extending protection to facilitators and opium farmers, substantial political leverage has been achieved, by the Taliban, with local people against international and national governments. But if this relationship of the terror outfit with opium trading is opportunistic, scant evidence exists to indicate that restricting drug flow will have any significant effect in weakening the Taliban insurgency, which is guided by political aims and has multiple revenue sources (Felbab-Brown, 2009; Mansfield, 2008).

The fuel for this industry, which earns annual revenues amounting to several billion dollars, is the fundamental conflict economics law, against which conventional tools of stability and order have no much effect. Opium is the most feasible of economic resources for a number of rural communities; despite a majority of farmers only receiving a small share of its market value (

Effects on Culture

Opium cultivation and utilization has led to the development of a distinctive material Afghan culture. The task of opium harvesting is labor-intensive -- individual poppy pods / heads require incising many times in a number of days. In the poppy harvesting season, an estimated 300,000 seasonal workers are employed in the country's vast opium fields. Since family labor doesn't suffice, seasonal workers follow the poppy harvest season from the place where it first arrives -- the warmer provinces in the South -- to the Northern poppy cultivating provinces. It is surprising that such a huge group of individuals, who need food, accommodation and transport, are able to traverse vast portions of the nation uneventfully (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016).

The instruments used by laborers must be cheap, simple, and easily replaceable. The tool employed in cutting poppy pods' surface, to allow the white morphine-containing latex to ooze out overnight, is in the shape of a little wooden handle inserted with razor-blade strips, fixed using glue. The shape of these lancets or scratchers, called neshtar or nishtar in Pashto and Dari --is different in different provinces and regions, indicating that cultural differentiation exists even in simple instruments (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016; Azami, 2013).

Opium production has led to high levels of damage to Afghan society, with a three-fold increase in the rate of opiate addiction in the last five years. At present, around 800,000 individuals (i.e. 2.65% of the country's population) consume opiates -- a challenge much beyond the government's scope. Very few rehabilitation centers exist in the country, and their demand is increasing. The situation is aggravated by nonexistent health education, causing a rise in transmission of HIV. The UNAIDS, U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and World Bank have all emphasized the absence of preventive education in individuals who inject themselves with drugs, and are at the greatest risk of contracting HIV via contaminated needles. Opiates cost more outside of the country, while within Afghanistan, they are much cheaper. This, coupled with poor educational standards and limited addiction support, will cause the Afghan drug addiction situation to exacerbate in the future (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016).

A local study revealed that considerable signs of drug exposure were observed among tested kids (some of whom were just over a year old) in a fourth of households with adult opium addicts. The kids displayed typical heroin-opium addict behavior: they experienced withdrawal after drug removal. Some estimates declare that, in the city wherein the research was conducted, between 35,000 and 50,000 kids are coerced into working for meager wages in factories, or begging, by their parents/guardians. They are exposed to all forms of abuse, with several ending up in the sex trade. Often, several children are shipped off to other places and forced into prostitution, while many others just disappear. Drug consumers are faced with the added risk of contracting HIV-infection through the sharing of contaminated syringes. Together, HIV / AIDS and drug addiction form a "silent tsunami" for Afghanistan (Chelala, 2013).

Effects on Government

Afghanistan's multibillion dollar drug cultivation and trafficking business is a key income source for terror outfits like Taliban, corrupt government officers, and organized criminal outfits. There are also a few allegations concerning state-sponsored institutions' involvement in the trafficking of drugs, especially in Iraq and Pakistan, which can potentially help them garner considerable funds for their undercover activities. The focus of the "counter-narcotics" policies of UK and USA is law enforcement in Afghanistan, as well as some small-scale economic development ventures involving "alternative likelihood" to aid affected areas' farmers (Mir, 2014). Both aforementioned aspects of this strategy met with failure, as the country's government lacked the political will required to stop leading drug lords, while farmers in the highest-risk provinces received no proper incentives to quit opium cultivation (Harper, 2014).

Corruption and bad governance in Afghanistan have, in fact, proved to be a major obstacle in curbing the nation's drug production. Drug money serves as a chief way of bribing people, and has impacted the Afghan government's highest levels, including top officials, judges, and parliamentarians. In the last ten years, excepting mid- and low- level drug traders, no mighty drug lord has been arrested and prosecuted by the country's government. In the meantime, the parliament of Afghanistan passed its 2014 Anti-Money Laundering Law, which, according to international experts, is not satisfactory (Mir, 2014; Harper, 2014). Further, the old, regional-level contraband and drug trafficking mechanism has strengthened, extending further to Central Asia, following the Soviet Union's fall in 1991.

Afghan governmental authorities have failed to contain the above mentioned relatively new phenomenon primarily due to colossal financial inducements from drug lords. Moreover, the drug lords possess safe havens within Pakistan and other neighboring countries, wherein they can conveniently access passports and national IDs. The combined vast income derived from the illicit drug trade and non-transparency of these nations' governmental systems has facilitated Afghan opium's access to global markets via a complex mafia network comprising of non-state as well as state actors. For defeating the Afghan drug mafia, authorities from UK and U.S. need to review their Afghan strategy. They will be unable to stop opium cultivation and trade in the country without other Asian countries' cooperation, and without eradicating drug lords' political influence in Afghanistan's corrupt government (Mir, 2014; Chelala, 2013).

Indeed, Afghanistan's new National Unity Government, characterized by a powerful political resolve of reducing corruption and fixing the nation's government, is a unique source of opportunity for creating fresh momentum in this battle against narcotics. Ashraf Ghani, President of Afghanistan, has already begun the fight against corruption, and requires the international community's support for dealing with the drug problem before it becomes a key income source for other terror groups across the globe, like ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in Syria and Iraq. The presence of a new President in the country affords an opportunity for injecting new energy into this battle against narcotics. However, past mistakes have to be acknowledged and dealt with (Mir, 2014; Harper, 2014; Rosen & Katzman, 2014). Countering Afghanistan's opium farming and trafficking has remained a major international dilemma in the last ten years. In spite of serious joint endeavors to curb Afghan drug production, the country continues to be a leading global opium producer.

Afghanistan's very first major policy against illicit drugs was created and financed by UK's government; however, this effort landed in failure in spite of its huge budget of over 160 million dollars. As a result, America has started leading the country's counter-narcotics plan since the year 2004, via a ten-fold increase in the original budget. The basis for its counter-narcotics policies are research works and analyses on the drug economy of Afghanistan, highlighting insurgency, administrative corruption, poverty, "warlordism," absence of the rule of law, and a weak government. But these policies have neglected the prominence and nature of the region's contraband and illicit business, dating back to Afghanistan's pre-Soviet occupation (Mir, 2014; Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016).

Effects on National Stability

Opiate trafficking permeates various levels of Afghanistan's society, with trading roles varying from extremely small-scale traders in villages (i.e., kamishankars) to large market traders having international links, and who organize cross-border trafficking. They typically have access to processing laboratories. The rather complex structure of opium trading implies that Afghan opium is associated with a wide array of profiteers, from black turbaned men to white-collar, high-ranked individuals (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016). Aside from direct profits gleaned from opium trade, the presence of corrupt military and political figures (border patrols, police chiefs, etc.) along trafficking routes is a hindrance, as these individuals normally accept bribes and take no notice of the illicit activities occurring under their noses, for bolstering their personal official incomes. With the reduction of international aid to Afghanistan in the near future, the economic significance of opium industry control for these authorities may increase.

Furthermore, the Taliban outfit is suspected to be deriving substantial income from the production of opium. According to UNODC estimates, the Taliban amassed between 350 and 650 million dollars from the opium trade, from 2005 to 2008. Profits for this terror organization are normally derived from conventional taxes gathered from areas under Taliban control, as well as from trade and transit levies imposed on drug traffickers. The Taliban has been imposing such levies systematically in the western and southern provinces since the year 2005. Also, the Kabul office of the UNODC discovered that even bigger production and trafficking networks are consolidating within the country, with the Taliban providing powerful, steady trade routes (Buddenberg & Ruttig, 2016).

Above all, Afghan government authorities are becoming directly involved on an increasing basis in the illicit drug trade, by expanding their rivalry with Taliban beyond the area of politics, to a battle for drug money and traffic control. This local fight usually resembles a drug gang war, even with U.S. troops being drawn back to the fight on behalf of the government, especially in Southern Afghanistan's Helmand. Government complicity has a number of phases, beginning with accommodating farmers and subsequently cooperating with them. This is followed by predation, in which the government basically takes control of the entire business (Ahmed, 2016).

The massive boom in the production of poppy, which started 12 years back, was identified strongly as the way by which Taliban militants acquired their vehicles, bullets, and bombs. Of late, these insurgents have been dedicating increasingly more hours to all facets of the opiate trade. This fact became a Western mantra in connection with Afghanistan's opium problem: when security gets better, it will become easier to pull apart the opium trade. The fact that Afghanistan's government is also a competitor in this business, because of a lack of other dependable economic successes, has consequences beyond Afghanistan's borders. Regional governments are struggling against the security and health issues associated with the increased trade of opium. Also, with increasing institutionalization of the trade in Afghanistan, anticorruption efforts of many years have been weakened, prolonging opium's status as the source of crime, intrigue and regional instability (Ahmed, 2016; Azami, 2013).