Western civilization: history, culture, and society

Peacemaking aims of President Woodrow Wilson and Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau differed, although both ultimately wanted a peaceful resolution to mark the end of the Great War. Wilson advocated a comprehensive Fourteen Point plan, which advocated for a diplomatic end of the conflicts that had led to and perpetuated the wartime conflict in the post-Ottoman world. Wilson emphasized free trade and national sovereignty as key points. His approach to peacemaking was less punitive and more proactive, at least on paper, than that of Clemenceau and even David Lloyd George. Clemenceau hoped for a more heavy-handed response to the German's behavior during World War One. France had suffered tremendous economic blows. Wilson's declaration of reverting the Alsace-Lorraine to France was not believed to be sufficient from Clemenceau's perspective. Clemenceau wanted to severely debilitate, even decapitate Germany. Wilson had hopes for a future in which European powers could be balanced politically.

The differences between Clemenceau and Wilson affected the deliberations of the Paris Peace Conference, and also the nature of the final peace settlement. Wilson advocated strongly for the League of Nations. Clemenceau reluctantly accepted, but ironically, the United States never joined. The deliberations impacted how the former colonies of Germany would be ruled and divided, as well as the question of how the former Ottoman colonies would be ruled. However, Clemenceau was generally receptive to Wilson's diplomatic ideas in spite of the French push for a more punitive approach to Germany.

Wilson's proposed Mandates, related to the division of former Ottoman and German colonies after World War One, was related to the more general trend towards de-colonization. The pan-African congresses represented the grassroots movements to extricate African colonies from European dominion. Wilson's plans did not suggest any notion of self-rule for Africans. The pan-African congresses represented the struggles of subjugated people against colonial leadership, including being tossed around in the post-colonial world. Wilson and Clemenceau barely considered it a possibility that the colonies could revert to their indigenous people; the pan-African congress represented the voices of the oppressed and helped to symbolize and herald a new era of post-colonial self-rule.

2. Churchill and Chamberlain had starkly opposing views regarding what would become the Munich Agreement. For Chamberlain, the appeasement of Nazi Germany was a price he was willing to pay. This was especially true given that the lands in question, the Sudetenland, was of no strategic importance to Great Britain. However, the Sudetenland was strategically, economically, and politically important for the Czechoslovakian government and its people. Chamberlain made his decision regarding Hitler's request without considering the long-term repercussions of appearing weak with the Nazis. Moreover, Chamberlain's approach signified serious humanitarian and diplomatic problems as it sold out the Czechoslovakian people and was an eerie harbinger of future Nazi encroachment. The Sudetenland residents included many ethnic Germans, who Hitler was using as an excuse about why he wanted this territory. In reality, Hitler wanted it for more sinister strategic measures that would end up hurting not only the Czechs but also Great Britain.

Churchill believed that Chamberlain acted poorly, and made the British look bad on the international stage. Indeed, Hitler violated the Munich Agreement and proceeded to invade the Czech Republic, turning the tide in Europe in his Nazi direction. Had Churchill dealt with Hitler in a tougher manner at the onset, it is possible that the outcome of World War Two might have been different. The men disagreed as much as they did because they had different political philosophies. Churchill was a realist and pragmatist who understood that men like Hitler cannot be reasoned with; whereas Chamberlain was an idealist who only wanted peace and trusted Germany's intentions. Furthermore, Chamberlain may have underestimated the importance of keeping Czechoslovakia strong during this critical moment. Churchill better understood the military realities of Europe, it seems.

I tend to agree with Churchill, even though I sympathize with Chamberlain. Chamberlain's idealism seems quaint in retrospect. He could not have foreseen the great evil that was to come. If he had, then Chamberlain has the blood of the Jews on his hands too, as he would have willingly played into the plans of the monster. Chamberlain comes across as being terribly naive, given his approach toward Hitler. Germany should have been treated more harshly, even before it became apparent what the Nazi plans were for the future.