Political Economy Calculations Between Costs and Benefits

¶ … grades were determined on a curve, I would work very hard to try to be in the top 5% of the class. However, my view of that grading system might be colored by how widely distributed the grades in the class were. If the distribution was narrow, then the curve system would appear to be an arbitrary reflection of the professor's desire to have a certain grade distribution, rather than a reflection of student knowledge. If POL S. 270 was the only class in Political Science that graded on a curve, then all but the strongest performers would avoid the class, which would deflate the grades of those who are traditionally the strongest performers because they would be subject to the curve. If all of the courses in the university were graded on a curve, then the university would experience more drop-outs because of forced-fails. This type of curve system, though not the actual distribution, fairly approximates the distribution of wealth in a free market economy (some portion of people are super-rich, while another portion of people are impoverished). In some circumstances, this type of system can provide incentive for people to work harder, but, people who have less natural ability may be discouraged from putting forth any effort because, at some point, even their best efforts may be deemed insufficient.

b) If the dates of the two mid-term exams were not announced until the day of the exam, that should have a positive impact on both attendance and study habits, prior to the admission of the mid-term. Students would not want to risk missing the mid-term exam, so they would make efforts to attend each class, not knowing if that class would be the time of the mid-term exam. This impact would be heightened at and near the mid-point of the semester, when students could rationally expect a mid-term exam. However, once the mid-term exam has been administered, one would expect to see a sharp decrease in admission and study skills, particularly by any students who missed the original mid-term exam and, as a result, would be failing the class and unlikely to pass even with perfect attendance and a perfect final test score.

c) If grades in POL S. 270 are determined by the collective performance of the class, high performers are likely not to work as hard to achieve in the class. Their hard work will do little to impact their grades, so they have less incentive to perform well. However, it will not completely deprive them of the desire to perform well, because the higher the scores at the top, the greater the possibility of a higher median grade. However, at the bottom of the class, this scoring system would provide little incentive to those who consistently underperform because they would get the benefit of those working hard in the class. It would have little impact on the study habits of the mid-level performers. This question brings up the issue of the free rider in socialist or semi-socialist systems, because they get the benefit of other's hard work and therefore have no incentive to do their own hard work.