Iraq - a Muslim nation weakened by war and economic sanctions - would prove an easy target of American wrath in this new era of suspicion and fear. The belief had arisen that, if the rules governing intelligence had been different, 9/11 might have been prevented. A frequent target of attack was "the wall" that supposedly existed between domestic and foreign surveillance operations. In the opinion of the 9/11 Commission, there had evolved the,
Exaggerated belief that the FBI could not share any intelligence information with criminal investigators, even if no FISA procedures had been used. Thus, relevant information from the National Security Agency and the CIA often failed to make its way to criminal investigators. 13
In other words, information that had been available to domestic investigative agencies, like the FBI, could not be shared with the Central Intelligence Agency, and other national security organizations. The President and others pushed strongly to break down this supposed wall, to allow the various intelligence agencies and investigative services to share purportedly vital information regardless of where that information had been obtained or, in many cases, how that information had been obtained. The 9/11 Commission concluded that, "a 'smart' government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence." 14 The 9/11 Commission was advocating a greater role for the intelligence community in protecting the United States from future terrorist attacks. For the first time in years, the American people appeared willing to grant considerable latitude to the President, and the national security apparatus, if that freedom of action could be justified in the name of keeping the people safe from foreign enemies. The protections and boundaries that had been built up in reaction to prior CIA escapades would now largely be dismantled based on the recommendations in the 9/11 Commission Report.
As a result of their detailed investigation into the causes of the nation's most horrendous man-made disaster to date, the Commission made numerous recommendations in regard to reforming the structure of the intelligence community. As well, responsibilities were more clearly defined, and specific goals set. The 9/11 Commission recommended, in no uncertain terms, the creation of a new intelligence community that would work in tandem with other law enforcement agencies, information being shared, and action being undertaken jointly in the name of the defense of the American people:
We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of national government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies. The head of the NCTC should have authority to evaluate the performance of the people assigned to the Center. 15
The National Counterterrorism Center, or NCC, would not only possess oversight of all the disparate agencies, but would also serve as a sort of clearinghouse for information. The head of the NCC would hold responsibility for the proper performance of the personnel under his or her command. The idea was to "re-professionalize" the intelligence community along new lines. The old idea of the CIA as a center for secret plots against foreign governments, and agents of foreign governments, threatening foreign economic enterprises, etc., was being replaced by that of the CIA as but one component part of a vast and complex intelligence machine. In this new, post-9/11 world,
The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the CIA's analytic capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by building its human intelligence capabilities; - developing a stronger language program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; (d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities; (e) ensuring a seamless relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the operational level; and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral and liaison operations. 16
The recommendation was to re-build the CIA by reorganizing its priorities and making sure its personnel were fully trained to meet the challenges of fighting terrorism. The agency was now an organization with a genuine mission - it would focus its efforts on preventing and fighting specific threats to the nation's security; gathering information and conducting operation insofar as would be required in achieving these objectives. Though narrower in some ways, this represented, in fact, a considerable broadening of the reach of the intelligence community.
The United States Intelligence Community has changed considerably since the end of the Second World War. Constituted, at that time, as a force to fight the spread of communism, and with it the growth in power and influence of America's chief rival, the Soviet Union, it has now becoming a terrorist-fighting organization, and one that is intimately linked with other law enforcement agencies. In its earlier...
Presidents used the agency to conduct covert operation, engage in paramilitary activities, and spread propaganda in foreign nations. It was the backfiring of many of these schemes, in particular the failure of Vietnam, combined with the ignominies of Watergate, which brought Congressional oversight and direction back in the realm of national security. Through the 1980s and 1990s the public had little stomach for an intelligence community that conducted invasive operations - it was actually prohibited from gathering intelligence in the United States - or fomented unrest in foreign lands. Some would have supported a role that included economic espionage, but for the most part the agencies were denied an overly active role in geopolitical affairs until the fateful events of September 11, 2001. It was as a direct result of these events, and the war in Iraq that supposedly arose out of them that the 9/11 Commission proposed far-reaching reforms that would entirely re-shape and re-organize the intelligence community. Today, the United States intelligence community is an integrated whole charged with collecting information wherever that information can be found; processing that information, and sharing it with any arm of government that might require such intelligence and analyses. Operations are conducted jointly in the name of protecting the American people from future attack. The national security state is now united with law enforcement.
ENDNOTES
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59323973
Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 4th ed. [book online] (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, accessed 21 November 2006), 17.
2. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59323973
Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 4th ed. [book online] (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, accessed 21 November 2006), 17.
3. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=35536400
Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC [book online] (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, accessed 21 November 2006), 56.
4. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=35536400
Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC [book online] (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, accessed 21 November 2006), 188-189.
5. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=35536400
Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC [book online] (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, accessed 21 November 2006), 189.
6. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=35536400
Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC [book online] (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, accessed 21 November 2006), 194.
Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI [book online] (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 43.
Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI [book online] (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 44.
Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI [book online] (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 45.
10. Loch K. Johnson, "The Contemporary Presidency: Presidents, Lawmakers, and Spies Intelligence Accountability in the United States," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2004).
11. Loch K. Johnson, "The Contemporary Presidency: Presidents, Lawmakers, and Spies Intelligence Accountability in the United States," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2004).
12. Jeff Augustini, "From Goldfinger to Butterfinger: The Legal and Policy Issues Surrounding Proposals to Use the CIA for Economic Espionage," Law and Policy in International Business 26, no. 2 (1995).
13. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "3.2 Adaptation - and Nonadaptation - in the Law Enforcement Community," The 9/11 Commission Report (21 August 2004), 73.
14. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "3.2 Adaptation - and Nonadaptation - in the Law Enforcement Community," The 9/11 Commission Report (21 August 2004), 401.
15. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "3.2 Adaptation - and Nonadaptation - in the Law Enforcement Community," The 9/11 Commission Report (21 August 2004), 403.
16. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "3.2 Adaptation - and Nonadaptation - in the Law Enforcement Community," The 9/11 Commission Report (21 August 2004), 415.
Works Cited
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Augustini, Jeff. "From Goldfinger to Butterfinger: The Legal and Policy Issues Surrounding Proposals to Use the CIA for Economic Espionage." Law and Policy in International Business 26, no. 2 (1995): 459-495.
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Johnson, Loch K. "The Contemporary…
