Airport Security Has airport security improved since 9/11/2001

There are certain historical moments which change everything: 9/11 is one of them. In addition to the seismic policy and personal effects of the tragedy, airport security and attitudes towards airport security have undergone substantial reforms. New screening methods of passengers in airports cost about $4 billion per year and security is now handled by the government in the form of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security, versus the private entities which used to handle security previously for the major carriers (McClure 2005). Security has clearly grown more visible and tighter but the question arises: is it truly safer to fly in the post 9/11 world? "Before 9/11, airport security consisted of a ticket agent asking if you packed your bag yourself, if it had been in your continuous custody since you packed it, and whether you had been given anything to carry aboard by a stranger" and having to pass through a metal detector (McClure 2005). Now, there are many additional layers of security but their efficacy is still being debated.

The Secure Flight Program

Administered by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Secure Flight Program is designed to make domestic and international travel safer through the use of watch list matching....

This list is used to prevent passengers on the No Fly List from boarding or to single out specific passengers from government watch lists for screening. It is also designed to expedite the process of boarding and reduce misidentification and needless delays. However, concerns remain that relevant government intelligence departments are not sharing data with the TSA, thus resulting in omissions with the no-fly list. "In September 2006, Congress reported that passenger names were still not being checked against the full terrorist watch list and cut funding for Secure Flight by more than 50%" (Johnson 2007). Certain 'red' behavioral flags also exist: one-way passengers, for example, are subjected to additional scrutiny, given that the 9/11 bombers only bought one-way tickets, presuming no need to return (McClure 2005). But training is still characterized as "spotty" and both weapons and persons exhibiting questionable credentials still manage to evade detection (McClure 2005). On the other hand, the opposite problem may occur: because people have the same name, they may be flagged for being on the no-fly list incorrectly. The late Senator Edward Kennedy was 'flagged' as a potential suspect simply because of his name (McClure 2005).
To quell public…