Joint Planning During Operation Anaconda Operation Anaconda was the first large-scale Army combat operation that was carried out as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. This operation included joint efforts by Special Operations and multinational partners who worked together in the Shahi Kot Valley in Afghanistan in March 2002 (Isherwood, 2007). Operation Anaconda was a relatively complex operation since it was fought in rugged mountainous terrain that was characterized by extremely difficult circumstances for the soldiers. While the operation ended as a victory for the United States, eight American military personnel and over 50 soldiers were wounded. The operation is well documented as a joint forces’ victory regardless of the joint planning challenges or issues faced with gathering intelligence, command and control issues, initial planning flaws, and negative activities carried out both on the ground and in the air. This paper examines the challenges faced by the American and Coalition forces and how they impacted the success and effectiveness of these forces.

Challenges faced with Gathering Intelligence

Andres & Hukill (2009) state that while American and Coalition forces experienced problems during Operation Anaconda, these problems did not take place due to reasons commonly given. These forces experience problems that contributed to the loss of eight American soldiers and injuries on more than 50 due to inherent challenges in the planning, organization, and execution of the operation. Even though the operation achieved its objective of capturing or killing al Qaeda fighters in Shahi Kot Valley, it was characterized by some challenges in organization, planning, and execution (Isherwood, 2007). One of the problems or initial mistakes that occurred in the organization and planning of Operation Anaconda was challenges relating to gathering intelligence. According to Kugler, Baranick & Binnendijk (2009), Operation Anaconda did not conform to theories of information-age battles...

The joint battle plans prepared by American and Coalition forces were based on poor intelligence estimates. As a result, these forces were unable to integrate all-source intelligence to obtain better threat assessments that would lead in the development of appropriate tactical plans.
Challenges in gathering accurate intelligence and threat estimates during Operation Anaconda were also attributable to the strong presence of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. American and Coalition forces streamed into Shahi Kot Valley expecting a 3-day battle against an unsuspecting and small Taliban and al Qaeda force (Andres & Hukill, 2007). Fleri et al. (2003) state that American and Coalition forces believed that the largest concentration of Taliban and al Qaeda forces was in Kowst & Gardez in southeastern Afghanistan. However, upon landing in Shahi Kot Valley, these forces found strong presence of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which was approximately 5 to 10 times larger than expected. These fighters manned concealed positions with heavy weapons that enabled them to detect likely approaches and helicopter landing zones, which made it difficult for American and Coalition forces to gather intelligence.

Challenges faced with Command and Control Issues

In addition to challenges faced with gathering intelligence, American and Coalition forces faced problems relating to command and control. Isherwood (2007) states that the joint forces lacked critical command and control node that could have integrated ground and air maneuver. This essentially means that the command and control issues that faced the joint team during Operation Anaconda were largely associated with lack of integration between ground and air maneuver. Operation Anaconda was characterized by attempts to execute a distant battle from displaced headquarters with a disjointed on-scene command staff. This disjointed on-scene command staff lacked unity of command despite trying…